FOREIGN AFFAIRS

AN AMERICAN QUARTERLY REVIEW

APRIL, 1929

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The Editors.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

Vol. 7 APRIL, 1929 No. 3

ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS AND SEA POWER

By John W. Davis

ALL Jeremiahs to the contrary notwithstanding, it may well be doubted whether the fundamental relations between any nations in close and constant contact have ever been more satisfactory than those now existing between the United States on the one hand and Great Britain and the British Commonwealth of Nations on the other. More than that, there are fewer real causes of friction between them today than at any time in their common history — the years of their joint participation in the Great War alone excepted. Broad as these statements may appear, it would not be hard to justify them by a historical survey did space permit. Speaking only of the present, however, let us remind ourselves that all boundary disputes are ended, no territorial questions disturb us, and no claims against one another (either by the respective governments on their own behalf, or on behalf of their nationals) are clamoring for settlement. The debt incurred during the war has been adjusted upon terms mutually agreed upon after full and fair conference; and while no responsible statesman should foreclose the possibility of a reconsideration in the light of future events, no one seeks a further discussion at this time. Even the delicate question of the enforcement of our prohibition laws by search and seizure beyond the three-mile limit has been solved by generous concessions to the American point of view, although it is rumored that here and there contraband supplies occasionally leak in nevertheless.

Commercial and industrial competition between them is more or less acute, but no more and no less so than between any pair of rival merchants; and the disagreeable things said or done in the course of trade are no more justified, and no more disagreeable. After all, one should not be surprised at a certain jostling and shoving in the scramble of the market place. So far as the

trade between them is concerned, it is obvious that the relation of buyer and seller is of the greatest possible economic value to both — a value exceeding that to be found in any other quarter. Here are the figures for 1927:

	Combined figures of U. S. export and import trade	*Percent of total U. S. export and import trade*
Canada	$1,311,000,000	14.4
United Kingdom	1,198,000,000	13.5
British South Africa and British Malaya	330,300,000	3.6
Australia	197,700,000	2.1
British India	194,300,000	2.1
	$3,231,300,000	35.7

1928 will tell a similar story. Our best customers are, and promise for an indefinite period to remain, Canada and the United Kingdom.

In the domain of the mind, interchanges between scientists and other workers in the field of knowledge are constant; we observe and take full advantage of each other's political and social experiments; our capitalists, financiers and leaders of labor are in intimate contact; there are cultural stimulations one from the other in art, drama and letters; and many valued personal friendships add their fragrance to the whole.

Yet for some years the impolitic question has been repeatedly put on both sides: Is the friendship proof against every strain? And if not, what will be the consequences and how and to what extent is it prudent to prepare against that day? The question "Are you or are you not my friend?" is always a stupid one, for it demands an analysis of the unanalysible. To the imaginary interlocutor who asked, "Is it still the same between us?" Stevenson replied, "Why, how can it be? It is eternally different; and yet you are still the friend of my heart." And to the further question, "Do you understand me?" — "God knows; I should think it highly improbable."

In the Anglo-American instance the answer to the hypothetical question is particularly difficult because, at bottom, it depends not so much upon the behavior of the parties in their direct relation, as upon their attitude conditioned by the behavior of a future enemy of one or the other. The possible consequences, military, economic, political and social, of a war between the United States and Great Britain or the British Commonwealth are so

appalling that no man can sanely contemplate them. Discussion which proceeds on the basis of averting or preparing for such a war starts with a false and hurtful premise by assuming that which public opinion should be educated to exclude and not to include in its reasoning; as indeed in the case of Canada our public opinion already does. Statesmen on both sides would do well instead to direct their own and the public's attention toward the strain that may come when a third party is at grips with either, and so to strengthen our relations that it may be proof against the stress of that event. Unfortunately there are many utterances on the subject by those who are neither statesmen nor near-statesmen, and these are not altogether harmless. Like the railings of a nagging spouse, they create a reciprocal frame of mind.

No sane man, I repeat, who considers the consequences of a war between the two powers, will urge courses which are calculated in the most remote sense to increase its possibility. It is not my purpose here to conjure up in detail the destruction to the political and economic welfare of each country, the disintegration of the ties of our common civilization, the sudden apparition of those hideous forces which lurk under the repression of organized society, and the physical and moral degradation which would result. Neither prospective combatant, it must be remembered, is made of the stuff that easily yields. Yet no American who truly loves his country could lightly contemplate a victory which left her in the position occupied in the ancient world by Rome; and short of victory by one or the other nothing would be settled.

If the sort of sermonizing in which I have thus permitted myself to indulge has no other usefulness, it may help to turn the discussion into more fruitful channels. Something may be gained by coming from the general to the particular and considering those specific matters which seem most likely to tax the friendly feelings of the two peoples. At the moment, these appear to be three in number: First, commercial rivalries in Latin America, the Far East and elsewhere, and the struggle for raw supplies. Second, the running sore of the unpaid debt, which recurrently recalls to each Briton, as often as he pays his income tax, our happier economic situation, and also the pressure which he has to transfer to his Continental debtors. Third, the problems, psychological, legal and technical, connected with naval power. On the first two it is not especially profitable to dwell, for neither lies at present in the field of debate. It may be said in passing, however,

that the rigors of economic competition will doubtless be mitigated, are being mitigated indeed, by private adjustments along practical economic lines rather than by political or official handling, and quite clearly there is no shortage of raw materials anywhere.

Naval policy offers a more promising field for investigation and action, and in the better atmosphere that would result from a settlement of one category of disputes the others would prove less aggravating and less dangerous. In this realm sober public discussion is doubly useful. It will educate the public, and the public may educate the governments, for the public has already learnt that governments have much to learn. The British public has shown itself fully aware of the miscalculations which led to the Anglo-French naval compromise. Washington doubtless has come to share the popular realization that the Three-Power Disarmament Conference failed because the ground had not been prepared and because the technique of international conference which has been developing since 1917 was wholly ignored. At the opening session of the Conference, a fully elaborated scheme, which obviously had not been the subject of mutual exploration and tentative consultation, was publicly thrown by each delegation at the head of the other; national prestige became involved; and after showing how the worst elements of both open and secret diplomacy might be combined, the Conference adjourned, with the general atmosphere much less friendly than if no Conference had been held.

Aside from a want of careful preparation, the cardinal weakness in that Conference was that questions of naval strategy were always to the fore, and emphasis on strategy always deflects policy; in fact, the naval "building" question, which is strategy, has continued to deflect policy ever since. It is policy which ought first to be determined, so that in the end it may control strategy.

This is not the prelude to an argument for another conference to "codify" or "state" war law or practice. When Senator Borah proposes a "restatement and recodification of the rules of law governing belligerents and neutrals in war at sea" he hastens to add, "on the basis of the inviolability of private property therein." There is no such accepted "law" as that; Senator Borah is dealing wholly with policy. To enter a conference on policy, having determined in advance and announced to your own nation what the outcome of the conference must be, is to make, with

lawyers as agents, the same mistake that was made at Geneva through the admirals.

What then is the question of policy at issue? The position of the British Admiralty is simply this:

> We happen to be an island, and it is necessary to our existence in time of war to dominate the sea. In peace the sea is free to all in the world through our own policing of it. . . . What happens on the sea in war threatens our very existence. . . . If the claim were not made and upheld, then the freedom of England would perish utterly. . . .

Or as Lord Wester Wemyss is reported to have said:

> Every Englishman knows in a general way that his safety and even the national existence depend entirely on the navy, but he has the vaguest idea what a fleet does. Its chief power lies not in guns or torpedoes, but in the immemorial right of all belligerents to suppress entirely all sea-borne supplies of enemies on which the enemies' continued resistance must depend.

This position never has been willingly accepted by any other nation independent of Great Britain, and never will be except under *force majeure*. Jefferson's protest still holds good:

> Reason and usages have established, that when two nations go to war, those who choose to live in peace retain their natural right to pursue their agriculture, manufactures, and other ordinary vocation; to carry the produce of their industry, for exchange, to all nations, belligerent or neutral as usual; to go and come freely, without injury or molestation; and, in short, that the war among others, shall be, for them, as if it did not exist. One restriction on those mutual rights has been submitted to by nations at peace; that is to say, that of not furnishing to either party implements merely of war, for the annoyance of the other, nor anything whatever to a place blockaded by its enemy. . . . If any nation whatever has a right to shut up to our produce all the ports of the earth except her own, and those of her friends, she can shut these also and so confine us within our limits. No nation can subscribe to such pretentions.

The United States insists upon "freedom of the seas," but just how much freedom is not clear, for there are many shades of American opinion. Some want freedom of sea transit in time of war for all private property, of belligerents as well as of neutrals; some are for freedom for all neutral commerce; some would except munitions, or other forms of contraband, or make a class of conditional contraband; some would allow blockade, the doctrine of continuous voyage, etc., and in substance hold to Lord Stowell's rules. What all are agreed on is that there shall be rules, in the making of which the United States shall share, and that Great Britain shall not violate them when she is at war.

Here is the first weakness in the current discussion of the question. It is based on the wholly unprovable, indeed the unlikely assumption that in future wars Great Britain will always be a belligerent (of the traditional or "old-fashioned" kind) and the United States always a neutral (again of the "old-fashioned" type). When wars come, if come they must in the future, who is so wise that he can foretell in what quarter they will arise or who will be the primary combatants? I shall revert to this assumption later.

Now the British conceive, and we in this country with our views of democracy are scarcely in a position to dispute the point with them, that all of their great wars in which they asserted a domination of the seas were those in which by opposing the aggrandizement of autocracy they were defending the liberties of the civilized world — the war against Philip II and his Armada, the long drawn-out wars against Louis XIV and his successors, the life and death struggle against Napoleon, and the resistance in 1914 to a German military power which, whatever the causes of the war, would if successful have come to dominate all Europe. Their naval strength, and the rules (or absence of them) by which they give it the utmost effectiveness in time of war, seem to them no more than a natural protection to give to the great trading enterprise called the British Empire, or the British Commonwealth of Nations, whose security they identify with world peace. I have no intention of saying we should accept, or that I intellectually accept, such an identity; I say only that the British so conceive it and that after 340 years of history it is not unnatural that they should.

There is no occasion for resentment, therefore, if they turn to us and say: "When we were fighting Napoleon you went to war with us, oblivious to the issues involved in the great struggle, and quarreling over the means we used to make it successful. If the Germans had not taken the lives of so many of your citizens in the World War and had not so nearly succeeded in destroying your highly profitable trade with the Entente Powers, you might have come to blows with us again. Our position is precarious, as our existence depends upon overseas imports of food and overseas exports of our manufactures. How are we to maintain it, except by the means we have tried and found good? What other means are we to employ and what are to be the rules of the game? Define your own position."

Now, making the assumption which I deprecated above, viz. that Great Britain is to be an "old-fashioned" belligerent and the United States an "old-fashioned" neutral, what are the proposals which are possible in reply? One which has already become overfamiliar is that there should be a "codification" of the decisions of Lord Stowell and other authorities, with nice definitions of search, seizure, contraband, blockade, continuous voyage and so on. This might at first seem attractive to the British civilian. But the attractiveness would gradually wear away as the British admirals, examining the definitions, pointed out how they would have hampered such and such an operation in the World War which they think contributed to its winning. No definition of contraband or of blockade would stand up with those operations as the standard.

A second is an agreement for the free transit of the seas in time of war for all property of every character owned by neutrals. This and more is what Congress has suggested in the Fifteen Cruiser Bill when it declared for a treaty or treaties "regulating the conduct of belligerents and neutrals in war at sea, including the inviolability of private property [*all* private property, presumably, whether belligerent or neutral] thereon." Is it probable that this would be accepted? Or would the British Admiralty, seeing in its imagination a ship chartered by Krupp's passing down the Channel in time of war between Great Britain and France, explode with Pitt's classical statement:

> Shall we allow entire freedom to the trade of France? Shall we allow her to receive naval stores undisturbed, and to rebuild and refit that navy which the valor of our seamen has destroyed? Will you silently stand by and acknowledge these monstrous and unheard-of principles of neutrality, and ensure your enemy against the effects of your hostility?

Is this as unreasonable as it sounds? Consider what we should do if the United States were at war with a southern neighbor, Cuba or Mexico, for instance, which was planning to raid the Panama Canal, and munitions and supplies were being shipped by neutrals from Halifax to Havana or Vera Cruz. Would we seize their vessels, if we could, off Cape Ann, and bring them in to Boston for search, or would we not? Perhaps the probability of such an event is so remote that we should be willing to agree upon a general rule, otherwise beneficial to us, even though it might involve the event and compel us to hold our hand if it happened.

That we may not be too quick with our answer to the instance

given, and lest we fancy that our record alone is one of consistency on the law of the sea, let us turn to the minutes of the Second Hague Conference of 1907. At that conference the British Delegation announced that:

> In order to diminish the difficulties encountered by neutral commerce in time of war, the Government of His Britannic Majesty is ready to abandon the principle of contraband in case of war between the powers which may sign a covenant to this effect. The right of search would be exercised only for the purpose of ascertaining the neutral character of the merchant ships.

Twenty-five nations voted for the acceptance of this proposal. Four abstained from voting. Five voted in the negative; and these were Germany, France, Russia, Montenegro and — the United States. When the attention of the American Delegation was called to the vigorous letter of Secretary Marcy in 1856 on the question, they bluntly answered that America had learned much in the meantime and was following the policies of Roosevelt rather than those of Marcy. *Tempora mutantur.*

Every discussion of policy necessarily enters the field of probabilities. This is precisely the field for political thinkers, often called statesmen; it ought not to be left as a tilting ground for the admirals, who are so admirable on their own target-ranges. The whole crux of the matter lies in an effort to make it reasonably probable that in future naval conflicts, the fixed policies of Great Britain and the United States will cause their navies to work in harmony or at least not as potentially hostile agencies of policies diametrically opposed.

In the discussions of boundaries and armaments and occupied territories that have occurred since the Great War, we have grown accustomed to the talk of security as the thing which must first be sought, and without which no progress could be made. At every turn that idea has confronted us. We shall not escape it here. Let us suppose that Great Britain agrees to the inviolability of all private property in time of war but Germany or France do not. If Great Britain should then reduce her navy so that she could no longer protect her commerce from the surface-raider or the submarine of either power, could she reasonably expect the United States to join in the protection of that commerce or to abstain from trade with the belligerent? Or would we be likely rather to insist on this trade and use our navy if need be to protect it? The real problem, as the imagined instance shows, arises from Great Britain's exposure to risks which we do not share.

She has developed — or believes that she has — a technical protection against those risks, a security of her own against all possible threats from an anarchic world. She can hardly be blamed for thinking that weapon necessary for her; others cannot be blamed for deeming it intolerable when used to prevent all the world from having relations with her enemies. But if she is to diminish or weaken that protection, is there nothing by way of inducement that we can or should do to lessen her risk?

I assume the readers of this article will see at once that this implies that the United States should take an active part in concerting measures for the prevention of war, and in compelling the observance of those rules which are designed to mitigate its destructiveness — in other words, that it should accept what the Treaty for the Renunciation of War may be said to imply, viz. that all the nations whose treaty is broken or threatened so to be, have a mandate to concert measures to prevent the breach or to repress it; that there must be introduced, in short, into the rest of the world the principle established for the Pacific area by the Four Power Treaty of 1921, that of "joint conference . . . for consideration and adjustment." The sequence of ideas is so natural as to be unavoidable; the breach of a treaty (the Kellogg-Briand Treaty) or the approaching probability of its breach is a cause of concern to all the signatories whose covenant is or is to be broken; the nations thus flouted may — nay, they must be expected to — consult together for the protection of their common interest; that common interest is the preservation of peace; consultation is idle unless it leads to a concert of measures of some sort — economic, diplomatic, or what not — of a coöperative character.

The resulting coöperation might or might not be spontaneous, and might at first be an *ad hoc*, world-wide activity not inherent in the League of Nations although germane to its purposes. One of its first consequences undoubtedly would be that of making neutrality under the assumed circumstances immoral. Governmental protection afforded to munition makers attempting to supply a country which had refused "the settlement or solution" of its dispute "by pacific means" would become an act of national wickedness, and would class the country with Dante's "caitiff choir" of angels who stood aloof from the struggle between God and Satan.

To return, then, to the theme of reducing the probabilities of conflict of policy between the two countries. If indications are

given from responsible sources that in the event of constabulary action against a covenant-breaking state the navies of the two countries will act together, or at least that as a result of diplomatic consultation neither will be used to protect the trade, inbound or outbound, of an outlaw state, one area of possible conflict is greatly reduced. The directors of policy in each country would be brought to rely confidently upon the sympathy and not the opposition of the other so long as they used their navy sincerely in the interest of world peace and not as an instrument of selfish national policy.

On the basis of such an understanding, however informal, it would not be unreasonable to expect Great Britain to agree that if she were engaged in an old-fashioned "private" war — a war, let us say, in which though she might not be the aggressor, it could not be clearly established nevertheless that her adversary had broken the Covenant of the League or the Locarno treaties or the Kellogg-Briand Pact — she would not attempt to interfere with the fullest freedom of sea transit by all nations not engaged in the war. This would be the policy she deliberately adopted at the outbreak of the Crimean War in response to representations from Sweden and Denmark. It is the policy to which for obvious reasons her mercantile interests have always leaned. Once adopted by the world at large, it would in the long run afford protection to herself. The danger she fears most is an attack in the narrow seas on her vital supplies, by submarines, aëroplanes or surface commerce-raiders dashing out from harbor and back again. Full freedom of the seas for neutral trade to her ports would protect her against such dangers, and bring the "neutrals" (if any there were) to the support of the principle in the event of its violation.

Surely this is the most hopeful line of progress. Efforts by strategists and technicians to translate naval parity into terms of guns and vessels may be expected to end where they have ended before. Unfortunately, in such matters — complicated as they are by geography, distance and national needs, as well as by national pride — mathematics alone will not serve us. The axiom that things which are equal to the same thing are equal to each other, no longer applies. Attempts by conference or by treaty to codify the law of the sea are well enough in their way, but if the world is today just what it was yesterday the welcome that has awaited previous attempts of the same sort is not encouraging.

When the work of the codifier is done, the parliamentary gauntlet is still to run and the strain the work will bear under stress of war is still to be calculated. Behind both processes lies the question of the policy that guns and vessels and codes are designed to serve. Until there is some agreement there, we but treat the symptoms and not the disease.

In the world of yesterday, the dominant thought was national security against all comers. If the Covenant of the League, the Locarno Treaties, the Four Power Pacific Treaty, and the Kellogg-Briand Pact are anything more than idle words, the controlling idea today is world-wide peace against all disturbers. I am persuaded that a frank declaration on the part of the United States of its willingness to accept the implications and responsibilities which that ideal demands would do more than all else to convert it into a reality. At the least, it would shrink the whole naval controversy to its true proportions. It would reduce the probability of a collision between the navies of the United States and Great Britain to the vanishing point. And incidentally it would take away all support from those naval proposals which pretend to secure the sea commerce of each country against imaginary attack from the combined navies of other powers, whenever and wherever delivered; proposals comparable in their mounting extravagance only to those of the military men, who, as Lord Salisbury exclaimed, "would fortify the Moon against an attack from Mars."

THE PACT OF PARIS: A GESTURE OR A PLEDGE?

By George W. Wickersham

Article I

The High Contracting Parties solemnly declare in the names of their respective peoples that they condemn recourse to war for the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another.

Article II

The High Contracting Parties agree that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means.

BY a record making vote — 85 ayes, 1 nay, 9 absent — the Senate on January 15, 1929, did advise and consent to the United States Government's execution of the multilateral treaty for the renunciation of war, of which the essence is contained in the two articles standing at the head of this page. This result came at the close of a discussion distinguished by an obvious desire to make it clear that while the body yielded to an imperative public demand for the approval of the treaty, many of those who voted for it believed that it was a futile and even a foolish gesture, which could have no practical value. The fact that, immediately following the vote, the Senate proceeded to the consideration of a bill authorizing the construction of fifteen cruisers, to which a large number of Senators obviously were committed, accentuated their lack of conviction in the reality of the peace treaty, and a willingness that that august body should appear like the temple of Janus, with two heads — one contemplating peace and the other smiling at war!

THE DIPLOMATIC CORRESPONDENCE

As it reached the Senate, the treaty — known colloquially as the Briand-Kellogg Peace Treaty, or, more tersely, as the Pact of Paris — was the product of the highest idealism of the Coolidge Administration. Its germ was contained in an offer by the French Minister of Foreign Affairs, M. Briand, on the part of his Government, to enter into a treaty with the United States condemning recourse to war, renouncing it as an instrument of their national policy towards each other, and agreeing to submit every question

of whatsoever character which might arise between them to determination by peaceful means.

Several months passed before the American Government replied to the French proposal. When it did, its counter offer went far beyond anything in M. Briand's contemplation. Mr. Kellogg wrote that it had occurred to him

> that the two Governments, instead of contenting themselves with a bilateral declaration of the nature suggested by M. Briand, might make a more signal contribution to world peace by joining in an effort to obtain the adherence of all the principal Powers of the world to a declaration renouncing war as an instrument of national policy. Such a declaration, if executed by the principal world Powers, could not but be an impressive example to all the other nations of the world, and might conceivably lead such nations to subscribe in their turn to the same instrument, thus perfecting among all the Powers of the world an arrangement heretofore suggested only as between France and the United States.[1]

This bold proposal astonished not only the French Foreign Minister, but the greater number of statesmen in our own country. At first, many thought the proposal a clever ruse to evade acceptance of M. Briand's pacifist move. Any such idea was soon dissipated, as with unyielding steadfastness of purpose Mr. Kellogg pursued his object to a successful issue.

At the outset, the French Government was hesitant in accepting Mr. Kellogg's proposal in its full scope; they expressed their willingness to accept it as applied to *aggressive* war. Mr. Kellogg objected to the restriction. M. Briand then explained that France was bound by the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Locarno Treaties, as well as by certain treaties of neutrality, and he feared this proposed agreement might conflict with her obligations under those conventions. The Secretary replied that the Covenant constrained none of the members of the League to make war against its will, and that the Locarno Treaties were purely defensive. He proposed that all the parties to the latter be brought in as original signatories to the new treaty, as well as any of the other states with whom France had neutrality agreements, pointing out that if any party to those agreements should make war in violation of their terms, such act would be at the same time a contravention of the peace treaty, and would free the offended Power from its obligations and leave it at liberty to defend itself.

[1] For full text of pact and diplomatic correspondence see "The General Pact for the Renunciation of War," U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1928; 71 pp., 15 cents.

By an identic note dated April 13, 1928, the Secretary of State transmitted the two forms of treaty proposed by himself and by M. Briand respectively, together with the correspondence which had passed between them, to the Governments of Great Britain, Germany, Italy and Japan, stating that the discussions had

> reached the point where it seems essential, if ultimate success is to be attained, that the British, German, Italian and Japanese Governments should each have an opportunity formally to decide to what extent, if any, any existing commitments constitute a bar to its participation with the United States in an unqualified renunciation of war.

The replies from all four Governments evidenced a willingness to accept the American proposal. The German Government expressed the belief

> that the binding obligation not to use war as an instrument of national policy could only serve to strengthen the fundamental idea of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Rhine (Locarno) Pact.

The Japanese Government understood the proposal of the United States

> to contain nothing that would refuse to independent states the right of self-defense, and nothing which is incompatible with the obligations of agreements guaranteeing the public peace, such as are embodied in the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Treaties of Locarno.

On her part Italy

> welcomed with lively sympathy this initiative and offers very willingly her cordial coöperation towards reaching an agreement.

Sir Austen Chamberlain, writing for His Majesty's Government in considerable detail, expressed the opinion, (1) that after studying the wording of Article 1 of the United States draft he did not feel that its terms excluded action which a state might be forced to take in self-defense; (2) that while he was not satisfied that if the treaty stood alone the addition of some such provision as the French note suggested, namely, an article to the effect that violation of the treaty by one of the parties should release the others from their obligations under it toward that party, would not be necessary, Mr. Kellogg's speech delivered before the American Society of International Law on April 28, 1928, had showed that he put forward for acceptance the text of the proposed treaty upon the understanding that violation of the undertaking by one party would free the remaining parties from the obligation to observe its terms in respect of the treaty-breaking state; that if it

was agreed that this was the principle to apply to the case of this particular treaty, the British Government were satisfied, and would not ask for the insertion of any amendment. He said:

> Means can no doubt be found without difficulty of placing this understanding on record in some appropriate manner so that it may have equal value with the terms of the Treaty itself.

Sir Austen pointed out that the point was of some importance, because of its bearing upon the obligations of the British Government under the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Locarno Treaties; that the machinery of those obligations goes somewhat further than a renunciation of war as a policy, in that they provide certain sanctions in case of a breach. Mr. Kellogg, he noted, had made it clear in the speech referred to that he had no intention that the new treaty should prevent parties to the Covenant or the Locarno Treaties from fulfilling their obligations. He made the following additional statement:

> The language of Article 1, as to the renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, renders it desirable that I should remind Your Excellency that there are certain regions of the world the welfare and the integrity of which constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety. His Majesty's Government have been at pains to make it clear in the past that interference with those regions cannot be suffered. Their protection against attack is to the British Empire a measure of self-defense. It must be clearly understood that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the distinct understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect. The Government of the United States have comparable interests any disregard of which by a foreign power they have declared that they would regard as an unfriendly act. His Majesty's Government believe, therefore, that in defining their position they are expressing the intention and meaning of the United States Government.

After these observations, Sir Austen said that his Government found nothing in their existing commitments which would prevent their hearty coöperation in this movement for strengthening the foundations of peace.

After considering this correspondence, Mr. Kellogg, on June 23, 1928, addressed an identic note to the Governments of Australia, Belgium, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, Great Britain, India, Irish Free State, Italy, Japan, New Zealand, Poland and South Africa, reviewing the above history and recalling the fact that on April 28, 1928, he had delivered before the American Society of International Law an address in which he

explained fully the construction placed by his Government upon the treaty proposed, by referring to six major considerations emphasized by France in its alternative draft treaty and prior diplomatic correspondence had with the American Government. The points so dealt with were succinctly as follows:

1. As to self-defense, the Secretary stated there was nothing in the American draft which restricted or impaired in any way the right of self-defense, a right which, he said, "is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense."

2. The Secretary expressed the opinion that there is no necessary inconsistency between the Covenant and the idea of an unqualified renunciation of war.

3. As to the Treaties of Locarno, the Secretary suggested that if all the parties to these treaties became parties to the multilateral treaty there would be a double assurance that the former would not be violated by recourse to arms.

4. As to the treaties of neutrality, which had been referred to by France, the Secretary again proposed that all states parties to them be made parties to the anti-war treaty, saying that if this were done no party to the latter could attack a neutralized state without violating the treaty, and thereby automatically freeing France and the other Powers, in respect of the treaty-breaking state, from the obligations of the anti-war treaty.

5. Concerning the relations with the treaty-breaking state, the Secretary said he had already pointed out there could be no question as a matter of law "that violation of the multilateral anti-war treaty through resort to war by one party thereto would automatically release the other parties from their obligation to the treaty-breaking state."

6. As to universality, the Secretary stated that it had been the hope of the United States that the new treaty should be world wide in its application, and appropriate provision therefor was made in the draft submitted to the other Governments on April 13; that from a practical standpoint it was preferable not to postpone the coming into force of the treaty until all the nations of the world could agree upon its text and cause it to be ratified; that the coming into force among the six Great Powers of an effective anti-

war treaty, and their observance thereof, would be a practical guarantee against a second world war.

The note further stated that as it appeared that by modifying the draft treaty in form, though not in substance, the points raised by other Governments could be satisfactorily met and general agreement upon the text promptly reached, the Government of the United States had decided to submit a revised draft to the fourteen other Governments now concerned in the negotiations. This draft was identical with that proposed by the United States on April 13, except that the new preamble provided that the British Dominions, India, and all parties to the Treaties of Locarno should be included among the Powers called upon to sign the treaty in the first instance, and the preamble had been revised by giving express recognition to the principle that if a state resorts to war in violation of the treaty, the other contracting parties are released from their obligations to that state under the treaty, and provision also had been made for participation in the treaty by all parties to the Treaties of Locarno, thus making it certain that resort to war in violation of these treaties would also violate the proposed treaty, and release, not only the other signatories of the Locarno Treaties, but all the other signatories to the anti-war treaty, from their obligations to the treaty-breaking state.

This communication met with cordial acceptance by all the governments addressed. Some of them took pains to express their understanding of the treaty. The Government of Canada stated that it

> regards the League, with all its limitations, as an indispensable and continuing agency of international understanding and would not desire to enter upon any course which would prejudice its effectiveness —

but it hastened to add that it was

> convinced that there is no conflict either in the letter, or in the spirit, between the Covenant and the multilateral pact, or between the obligations assumed under each.

The Government of the Union of South Africa, in expressing its willingness to become a party to the treaty, said it took it for granted

> (*a*) That it is not intended to deprive any party to the proposed treaty of any of its natural right of legitimate self-defense;
>
> (*b*) That a violation of any one of the parties of any of the provisions of the proposed treaty will free the other parties from obligation to observe its terms in respect of the party committing such violation; and

(c) That provision will be made for rendering it quite clear that it is not intended that the Union of South Africa by becoming a party to the proposed treaty would be precluded from fulfilling as a member of the League of Nations its obligations towards the other members thereof under the provisions of the Covenant of the League.

The Government of Belgium "noted with satisfaction" the explanations and interpretations contained in Mr. Kellogg's letter, adding that it was

pleased to note that the proposed pact will maintain unimpaired the rights and obligations arising from the Covenant of the League of Nations and from the Locarno agreements, which constitute for Belgium fundamental guaranties of security.

The Governments of Poland, Australia and Czechoslovakia noted the explanations and interpretations expressed in Mr. Kellogg's letters and speech, accepted them, and stated their willingness to sign the treaty.

Sir Austen Chamberlain, writing for the British Government, expressed its satisfaction with the revised treaty, but said:

As regards the passage in my note of the 19th May relating to certain regions of which the welfare and integrity constitute a special and vital interest for our peace and safety, I need only repeat that His Majesty's Government in Great Britain accept the new treaty upon the understanding that it does not prejudice their freedom of action in this respect.

It was "in the light of the foregoing explanations," he said, that his Government was glad to join with the United States and all other governments similarly disposed, in signing the definitive treaty for the renunciation of war, in the form transmitted on June 29 by Secretary Kellogg.

But in none of Mr. Kellogg's letters, nor in his address before the American Society of International Law, was any reference made to Sir Austen's explicit reservation of British interests "in certain regions."

IN THE SENATE

The treaty in the revised form, thus commented upon and approved, was signed by the representatives of the sixteen nations in the city of Paris on August 27, 1928, and was transmitted to the Senate by President Coolidge on December 4, 1928, with the expression of his hope that it might come into force with the least possible delay. He would be pleased, he said, if the Senate would take action during the present session to enable the United States to ratify the treaty before the expiration of his term of

office. In his annual message to Congress, transmitted on the same day, the President said of this treaty:

> It is the most solemn declaration against war, the most positive adherence to peace, that it is possible for sovereign nations to make. It does not supersede our inalienable sovereign right and duty of national defense, or undertake to commit us before the event to any mode of action which the Congress might decide to be wise if the treaty should be broken. But it is a new standard in the world around which can rally the informed enlightened opinion of nations to prevent their Governments from being forced into hostile action by the temporary outbreak of international animosities. The observance of this covenant, so simple and so straightforward, promises more for the peace of the world than any other agreement ever negotiated among the nations.

Very few of the Senators expressed opinions in accord with the President's views. Senator Swanson said during the debate that the treaty "is a friendly gesture for peace, that as a peace pact it will be found ineffective and disappointing." Senator Fess announced that he would vote for the treaty, but he never would believe that it is a guarantee against war. The greatest result to be hoped from it, he thought, was "the augmentation of the spirit of peace as against that of war." Senator Carter Glass gave utterance to the most cynical of all expressions in connection with the matter, when he said: "I may say I intend to vote for the peace pact, but I am not willing anybody in Virginia shall think I am simple enough to suppose that it is worth a postage stamp in the direction of accomplishing permanent international peace."

The principal discussion over the treaty and most of the opposition expressed to it arose out of the correspondence between the Secretary of State and the representatives of the other Governments. Particular emphasis was laid upon the points made by Sir Austen Chamberlain in his two letters, and the absence of any reply or observation on the subject by our Department of State.

Senator Bruce attacked the treaty because of its lack of sanctions; he thought that whatever its face value might be, it had been largely destroyed by the interpretative notes that accompanied it. Yet he finally said he intended to vote for the treaty because its tendency

> is to substitute a peace psychology for a war psychology, to strengthen the disposition of our people to enter into closer working relations with the other peoples of the world for the preservation of international peace, and to make it easier for us than it has been in the past to devise with those other peoples proper measures for that purpose . . . because it measurably tends to draw us nto the World Court and the League.

There was much discussion over the extent to which the right of self-defense — which Secretary Kellogg had maintained was inherent in every sovereign state and implicit in every treaty — would enable the United States to take such action as it might at any time consider necessary under the Monroe Doctrine.

Senator Swanson, referring to Mr. Kellogg's position that each Government is alone competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in self-defense, said:

> It should be noted that this question of self-defense is not limited to territory, but includes anything that any nation may determine is vital for its protection and self-defense. The wars excluded from the operations of this treaty by this interpretation are as limitless as the imagination or the ambition of nations may desire. . . . This interpretation, given by the Secretary of State and acquiesced in by all the signatories, permits governments desirous of engaging in war to be unrestrained by this treaty, because all they will have to do is to claim it is a war of self-defense, and the interpretations of the treaty make them alone the judge of this question.

Senator Borah, who was in charge of the measure, met this criticism by contending that the notes of the various Powers added nothing to the treaty and took nothing from it, but simply placed upon it a construction which necessarily would arise from the treaty itself. Yet he admitted, in reply to an inquiry by Senator Blaine, that if we adhered to the treaty, that action — in the light of the British note — would be a recognition of Great Britain's right to construe the doctrine of self-defense to apply to any territory which she conceives it necessary for her to apply it to as a matter of her own protection. He added:

> We have got to leave it to each signatory to the treaty to determine for itself what is self-defense. It may construe the treaty out of all reason, and there is no one to censure it, except the public opinion of the world. I know of no way to curtail that right.

Mr. Borah might have contrasted this *non possumus* with the provisions in the Treaty of Mutual Guaranty, initialed at Locarno October 16, 1925. Article 5 of that Treaty provides:

> Where one of the Powers referred to in Article 3, without committing a violation of Article 2 of the present treaty [the stipulation whereby each party agrees in no case to attack or invade each other or resort to war against each other] . . . refuses to submit a dispute to peaceful settlement or to comply with an arbitral or judicial decision, the other party shall bring the matter before the Council of the League of Nations, and the Council shall propose what steps shall be taken; the high contracting parties shall comply with these proposals.

In other words, by the Locarno Treaties, every contingency is envisaged. The effectiveness of the treaty does not rest upon so vague and unsubstantial a basis as that every party to it is at liberty to construe it at will, and to carry it out or not in accordance with its own sense of justice. In advance of the arising of any controversy, machinery is created for the peaceful settlement in one form or another of any character of dispute: arbitration; submission to judicial decision; conciliation; or a determination by the Council of the League of Nations; and all parties solemnly pledge themselves by the treaty to abide by the decision reached by one or the other of these means. Until the United States is prepared to buttress its covenants by agreements of this kind, even so promising and important a treaty as the Paris Pact will rest upon a somewhat unsubstantial foundation, and no one can say, except in the language of hyperbole, that such an agreement "promises more for the peace of the world than any other agreement ever negotiated among the nations."

Senator Bingham, who spoke frequently during the debate over the treaty, said that never before in his short experience in the Senate had there been such violent differences of opinion with regard to two brief paragraphs as there were with regard to the articles of this treaty, and he urged that in view of this difference of opinion it was incumbent on the body to know what the treaty really meant. There were three ways in which this could be made manifest: (1) By reservation or amendment; (2) by a resolution expressing the meaning; and (3) by having the Foreign Relations Committee present a report as to what they believed was the meaning of this treaty which they asked the Senate to ratify.

Other Senators pressed for some form of interpretative resolution or report. Senator Borah strenuously resisted this demand upon the ground that the right of self-defense, which was implicit in the treaty, and of which each nation was its own judge, was so plain as to render unnecessary any interpretative resolution or report; that the letters from the various Governments did not change the treaty in any respect, nor did they give the nations writing the letters any additional right, privilege or advantage other than that which they would have under the treaty if they had never written them. He declared the fundamental principle in the treaty to be

> a solemn pledge upon the part of the nations representing now practically all the inhabitants of the earth that they will not seek other methods than peace-

ful methods for the settlement of their controversies. It may be said that it is not much. I think it is a stupendous fact.

Despite these views, which were shared by some of the other Senators, ratification could not be secured until Senator Borah had laid before the Senate a report from the Committee on Foreign Relations, running as follows:

The Committee reports the above treaty with the understanding that the right of self-defense is in no way curtailed or impaired by the terms or conditions of the treaty. Each nation is free at all times and regardless of the treaty provisions to defend itself, and is the sole judge of what constitutes the right of self-defense and the necessity and extent of the same.

The United States regards the Monroe Doctrine as a part of its national security and defense. Under the right of self-defense allowed by the treaty must necessarily be included the right to maintain the Monroe Doctrine, which is a part of our system of national defense.

There follows a series of quotations from Presidents Monroe and Cleveland, and others, concerning the nature of the Monroe Doctrine. After this, comes a disclaimer of the treaty committing the United States to any affirmative binding agreement which any other nation has a right to hold it to perform, in the following language:

The Committee further understands the treaty does not provide sanctions, express or implied. Should any signatory to the treaty or any nations adhering to the treaty violate the terms of the same, there is no obligation or commitment, express or implied, upon the part of any of the other signers of the treaty to engage in punitive or coercive measures as against the nation violating the treaty. The effect of the violation of the treaty is to relieve the other signers of the treaty from any obligation under it with the nation thus violating the same.

In other words, the treaty does not, either expressly or impliedly, contemplate the use of force or coercive measures for its enforcement as against any nation violating it. It is a voluntary pledge upon the part of each nation that it will not have recourse to war except in self-defense, and that it will not seek settlement of its international controversies except through pacific means. *And if a nation sees proper to disregard the treaty and violate the same, the effect of such action is to take it from under the benefits of the treaty and to relieve the other nations from any treaty relationship with the said Power.*

In other words, the offending nation is to be dismissed as Dogberry advised the Watch to treat a resisting offender, with the observation, "Thank God, you are rid of a villain!"

The report continues:

This treaty in no respect changes or qualifies our present position or relation to any pact or treaty existing between other nations or governments.

Having thus done their best, by explaining their understanding of the agreement which they wished to have ratified, to reduce it to the confines of a pious wish, the Committee added:

This report is made solely for the purpose of putting upon record what your Committee understands to be the true interpretation of the treaty, and not in any sense for the purpose or with the design of modifying or changing the treaty in any way or effectuating a reservation or reservations to the same.

The effect of such a report was the subject of some discussion. Senator Robinson, of Indiana, stated that he would regard it as in the nature of a reservation — "*but not such a reservation as would necessarily need to be submitted to the other signatories*"!! He thought, however, that it might have the effect of a reservation as a legal proposition. "*I think it would certainly be considered as the meaning placed upon the treaty by the Senate.*"

Other Senators desired to have the report in order that there be placed on record the interpretation which the Senate put upon the treaty, although they were unwilling to adopt either an amendment or a reservation to the treaty as executed.

Senator Walsh, of Massachusetts, expressed not only his own views but those of several others when he said that he would vote to ratify the treaty,

not because I am entirely certain that it is a real genuine movement that will materially advance the ending of war and the promotion of peace in the world, but because if the United States fail to ratify it now, in view of their participation in the international negotiations that have brought it into being, it would be misunderstood,

and the United States would be put in the position of an obstructionist to the peace movement.

So, with a wry face, the Senate yielded to the undoubted popular pressure in favor of the treaty, and authorized its execution by the President.

THE MEANING OF THE PACT

Is this simple, direct agreement, by which every state party to it renounces war as an instrument of national policy, and agrees never to seek the solution of any controversy arising between it and another signatory except by peaceable means, merely an idle gesture? Is it the mere expression of a yearning of the peoples of the earth for the unattainable? Or is it, as its language purports it to be, the most solemn of all possible undertakings to which the faith and honor of the American people are pledged?

The utterances of individual Senators and the course of the Senate in immediately after ratifying the peace treaty taking up and passing the bill for the construction of fifteen cruisers, rejecting furthermore the President's plea to require only five to be built at once, indicate that the Senate has not taken the treaty seriously. It is to be hoped they have builded better than they knew, and that as the people come to realize the extent and solemnity of the pledges made on their behalf, public opinion will assert itself and compel respect for the spirit, as well as the letter, of the Pact.

What is war as an instrument of national policy? It is the right which in the past was reserved to every nation, when it failed to achieve by peaceful means some object which it held to be necessary, or important for its happiness or prosperity, to resort to force of arms. This instrument was employed by the American Government in the war against Great Britain in 1812, to secure its freedom from encroachment upon its rights upon the high seas; it was used again in its war against Mexico, in 1846, for the extension of slave territory. Its use was threatened in the boundary dispute with England in 1842, as expressed in the slogan, "Fifty-four—forty, or fight." It was threatened again in the controversy with England over the Venezuela boundary matter in 1895. It was employed in the war against Spain in 1898, and in the Great War. The great significance of the Pact of Paris lies in the fact that we solemnly renounce war as an instrument of our national policy. It is no longer to remain in our national wardrobe, nor to be thought of as a means to the attainment of our national objectives.

It is hardly to be wondered at that Senators were insistent upon recording some interpretation of the treaty which should reserve for the United States as wide a latitude of action as Sir Austen Chamberlain had reserved for the British Government and which neither Secretary Kellogg nor any other representative of one of the negotiating governments had questioned. With all deference to Mr. Kellogg, it may well be doubted whether the terms of the treaty reasonably permit any such interpretation as that expressed in the Chamberlain notes. The policy of Great Britain towards "certain regions" and the Monroe Doctrine of the United States, are national policies of the respective nations. But the treaty renounces war as an instrument whereby such national policies may be secured or advanced. The British reservation and that implied in the report of the United States Senate, if accepted as

qualifying or giving an interpretation to the treaty, plainly restrict its natural meaning and limit its effect. When there is added the claim emphasized by the Senate that each party to the treaty is the sole judge of what constitutes the right of self-defense and the necessity and extent of the same, the simple, direct pledges of the treaty are still further qualified. It was concession on these points that made the proponents of the agreement so weak in the Senatorial debate, and so seriously impaired the force of President Coolidge's statement that the observance of the treaty "promises more for the peace of the world than any other agreement ever negotiated among the nations." The Covenant of the League of Nations and the Locarno Treaties would seem far more directly to guarantee the peace of the world than the new treaty limited in its application by the "interpretations" referred to. One of the strongest objections to the Covenant made during and since the Senatorial debates in 1919, was that it did not prohibit war at all times. But as Secretary Kellogg said in his note to the Powers of June 23, 1928:

> The Covenant imposed no affirmative primary obligations to go to war. The obligation, if any, is secondary, and attaches only when deliberately accepted by a state. . . . There is, in my opinion, no necessary inconsistency between the Covenant and the idea of an unqualified renunciation of war.

As construed by the British Government and by the United States Senate, the new treaty is far from being "an unqualified renunciation of war." The Covenant of the League of Nations outlaws all wars, except those sanctioned by the League Council against a State which violates the guarantees of the Covenant.

In the Locarno Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, between Germany, Belgium, France, Great Britain and Italy, there is an exception expressed to the mutual undertaking of each not to resort to war against the others, in the case of "the exercise of the right of self-defense," which is expressly defined as "resistance to a violation of the undertaking contained in" the paragraphs agreeing to maintain the status quo of the frontiers fixed by the Treaty of Versailles, and then only "*if such breach constitutes an unprovoked act of aggression and by reason of the assembly of armed forces in the demilitarized zone immediate action is necessary.*"

In other words, the right of self-defense, by that definition, is limited to resistance to an actual or immediately threatened military attack. The possible extension of that right, by sophistical reasoning or chauvinistic assertions such as were made during the

debate in the United States Senate, would be entirely removed by such a provision.

But the question remains whether the notes and the Senate report mentioned do qualify the treaty. That they should do so was undoubtedly the intention of both the British Secretary of State and of the Senators who insisted upon a Committee report. That that correspondence and the report would be read by any tribunal called upon to interpret the obligations of a party to the treaty, is beyond doubt. True, it is not what *one* party understands, but what *all* parties understood to be the matters agreed upon, which must be ascertained, and the text of the agreement when unambiguous necessarily controls. Yet, the correspondence which was submitted to and considered by all the primary parties to the treaty, and the report which was required before the necessary majority could be secured in the United States Senate, would be reviewed to show the circumstances out of which the treaty was made, and the understanding of the parties to the meaning of the convention. The greatest objection to the correspondence and the report is that they would afford popular justification to any Power bent on making war in violation of the Pact, and claiming that it was acting in self-defense.

This weakness in the Briand-Kellogg treaty accentuates the importance of strengthening and improving the existing machinery for preventing international misunderstanding and for the peaceful determination of international controversies. The two most effective agencies for that purpose are the League of Nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice; of these, incomparably the best ever devised for the purpose, as Mr. Elihu Root has testified, is the League. Senator Borah in an interview with Kirby Page, published some months ago in the *New York Times*, said the object of the proposed treaty was to let all of the peace machinery work and the League accomplish its beneficent purposes. In closing the debate on the treaty in the Senate, Mr. Borah again expressed this thought: "Its great purpose is to let the peace machinery of all peace plans work to realize the everlasting real aspiration of the human family."

The principal objection made to American participation in the League in the past has been that through it we might become involved in wars with which we had no actual concern. But the Pact of Paris has ruled war (except wars of defense) out of the question. The problem now is how all nations may avoid any possible viola-

tion of their sacred pledges. The great gap left by the Chamberlain notes and the Senate report can only be closed through the League of Nations. Frequent and regular conferences between the representatives of the nations, such as the League Covenant requires, afford the best means of avoiding misunderstanding. When disagreements arise, processes of conciliation, arbitration, and submission to judicial decision, are available. If the United States is to live up to the spirit as well as to the letter of the great covenant to which it has invited the world to adhere, it must be through generous and unsuspicious coöperation with other nations. This would reverse utterly the attitude of the past ten years. It cannot be expected at once. The blatant nationalism of legislators cannot be stilled merely by signing a convention which few of its members take seriously. Change will come only as the result of an informed and imperative public opinion. The American people must realize the full meaning of the treaty and compel its representatives in Congress assembled to respect and enforce it.

On the occasion of the signing of the Pact in Paris, M. Briand referred to it as the awakening of a great hope. "It will be a sacred duty for us henceforth to do everything possible and necessary," he added, "that that hope shall not be delusive. Peace proclaimed is good; it is much. But it must be organized. For solutions by force judicial solutions must be organized. That is the work of the future."

If the American people realize the full scope of the covenant that has been entered into in their name, they will visit with political infamy those who would deride their faith and violate their honor by making a mockery of its real import.

GOVERNOR STIMSON IN THE PHILIPPINES

By Maximo M. Kalaw

IN 1916 the American Congress passed the present organic law of the Philippines, popularly known as the Jones Law. Since that time three Governors-General have sat at Malacañang: the first a Democrat, Governor-General Francis Burton Harrison; the second and third Republicans, the late Governor-General Leonard Wood and Governor-General Henry L. Stimson. Under the same organic law these three chief executives established different governmental forms and practices.

It is easy to conceive how a Democratic Governor-General, sent out by a party with a liberal policy towards the Philippines and imbued with the ideals of self-determination propounded by Woodrow Wilson, would establish, as he did establish, a government which interpreted the Jones Law in terms of more democracy for the Filipinos. "To every Democrat," said Francis Burton Harrison upon his inauguration, "government rests only upon the consent of the governed." He announced "a new era" for the country and gave the Filipino leaders every opportunity to exercise autonomy, provided that no disloyalty to American sovereignty was shown. He believed that self-government must be a matter of experience and not of theory. In all domestic questions he followed the advice of the Council of State, excepting in matters affecting public order and the protection of American interests. He allowed the departmental secretaries wide discretion. He used the veto power very rarely; he vetoed only five bills throughout the period from 1916 to 1921. He established a party government, making the majority party responsible for the success or failure of the administration.

That there were mistakes committed under the Harrison régime the writer, a Filipino, will not deny. That there was more democracy in the Islands during that period than during any of the subsequent periods, no impartial observer can also deny. But democracy everywhere, as Bryce says, is not noted for its wisdom, but for its strength. And Governor Harrison believed that the evils of a democracy should be self-corrected. The process might be a longer one, but the results would be more lasting.

His successor, General Leonard Wood, had a quite different theory. He came as an administrator first and foremost, de-

termined to correct in person whatever evils and errors had been committed under the previous administration. He endeavored to exercise legally all the powers granted him by law. He did not believe in a party government in the Philippines, and from the beginning he would have liked to do away with any semblance of party cabinet. While he was prevailed upon to retain a cabinet which was favorable to the Nacionalista party, he claimed that its members were fully responsible to him and not, even partly, to the legislature. "To try to dictate to my secretaries of department is just like my trying to dictate to your own private secretary," he was reported to have told President Quezon once. He created what was popularly called a military cabinet, composed of men who were independent of the executive departments, but who were assigned functions as advisers on departmental matters. In some cases these advisers (so certain bureau chiefs and departmental secretaries alleged) directly dictated to the bureaus as to what should be done, and thus assumed semi-administrative functions. The Governor-General exercised the power of control and supervision to a great extent. As a matter of fact, it was his interpretation of this phrase which was the immediate cause of the resignation of the Filipino members of the Council of State, leading to a condition of virtual non-coöperation.

Undoubtedly a great deal of good was accomplished during General Wood's administration. Philippine finances were rehabilitated, much politics was eliminated from the administration, unnecessary personnel were dispensed with, pork barrel legislation was vetoed, and a certain degree of efficiency was effected. But there were also mistakes committed. Methods of questionable legal validity were employed. Dissensions between Moros and Christians increased. Men with unclean records were protected because they showed loyalty to the Governor. There is no doubt that the better political elements of the Philippines, with a few exceptions, were on the side of the leaders. In formal state papers the Governor was accused of disloyalty to American ideals and principles, with reversing the policy of Filipinization, with disregarding the authority of the Filipino heads of departments, with using public funds in violation of law, and with favoring various selfish interests which wanted to exploit the country.

What would have been the result of the continuation of these strained relations between the American representative and the Filipino leaders, nobody can say. Then came the death of the Gov-

ernor-General, and after some time the appointment of Mr. Stimson.

THE NEW GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S ARRIVAL

This much historic background is necessary in order to understand the problems that faced Governor Stimson upon his assumption of office. It was a critical period. President Coolidge had backed up General Wood in every instance. Yet the constant friction in the Islands could not have been to the entire satisfaction of the administration at Washington. Hence, the tact characteristic of Mr. Stimson must have been a factor in his appointment. Some of the leaders who had talked with Mr. Stimson were impressed with his relatively liberal views. President Quezon and Senator Osmeña were then in America, and they immediately expressed their unqualified endorsement of the appointment of Mr. Stimson and pledged their whole-hearted support and coöperation. Let it be confessed that at that time quite a number of people back in the Islands expressed surprise at this, for all they knew of the new Governor-General was his public avowal of General Wood's policies. Governor Stimson had visited General Wood and had given public support to his policies, as shown in the articles which he wrote for FOREIGN AFFAIRS and the *Saturday Evening Post*.[1] In the former, however, he had suggested the desirability of ultimately creating a semi-parliamentary or responsible government in the Philippines.

In his inaugural address the new Governor-General warmly invited a harmonious coöperation under our organic law. He evaded the question of future political relationship with America, saying that that question rested with the Government of the United States. The fundamental theme of his inaugural address was industrial and economic development; while the country had progressed educationally and politically, he said, it had not progressed very much along economic lines, and it was now the duty of all to coöperate to that end.

A favorable impression was soon created by Governor Stimson's settlement of the so-called Cornejo Case, arising out of a sale of public lands in Malibay conducted by the Director of Lands. Mr. Cornejo was not in favor of the procedure of the Director,

[1] "Future Philippine Policy Under the Jones Act," FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1927, p. 459–471; and "First-Hand Impressions of the Philippine Problem," *Saturday Evening Post*, March 19, 1927, pp. 6–7.

and kept sending telegrams to the Governor-General asking him to intervene. The impression had often been given during the Wood régime that the Governor-General would intervene whenever he was appealed to, even in cases where the law gives the trust and responsibility to other officials. But Governor Stimson refused to intervene and in a letter to Cornejo explained his stand in such matters. He wrote: "The great power of supervision and control over the executive functions of government which that Organic Law imposes upon me should ordinarily not be invoked to interfere with the conduct of government by my subordinates, unless they have been guilty of some misconduct or neglect deserving of grave reprehension or even removal from office." This was interpreted in many quarters as not exactly in consonance with the practice of General Wood or his interpretation of the power of control and supervision.

Some people were suspicious when Mr. Stimson stated at the outset that he was bringing back some of the military assistants of the late General Wood. Governor Stimson insisted that he must have competent assistants and that hence there was necessity for the so-called Kiess Bill, introduced in the American Congress, making ample allowance for the civil assistants that he wanted. The Filipino leaders yielded and promised the administration at Washington that the Legislature itself would pass a bill giving funds to the Governor-General for his advisers. What is locally known as the Belo Act, making an annual appropriation of ₱250,000 ($125,000) for the Governor-General's advisers was, therefore, approved. The Governor-General may spend this money in any way he likes. Evidently, however, Governor Stimson did not intend to allow the assistants to take up administrative work, for in explaining the measure he said that their duties would be limited "to giving advice upon technical matters or assisting the Governor-General in those informative and supervisory functions." He believed that the creation of the posts of civil assistants would help develop the autonomy of the heads of departments.

THE RESTORATION OF PARTY GOVERNMENT

A very significant step taken by Governor Stimson was his appointment in August of a cabinet composed of men possessing the confidence of the party which had triumphed at the last election. It meant the reëstablishment of party government. The Cabinet,

which was immediately confirmed by the Senate, was composed of the following: Secretary of the Interior, Honorio Ventura; Secretary of Public Instruction, Eugene A. Gilmore; Secretary of Finance, Miguel Unson; Secretary of Justice, Jose Abad Santos; Secretary of Commerce and Communications, Filemon Perez; and Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, Rafael Alunan. It was considered one of the strongest cabinets the Philippines had ever had.

The establishment of a party cabinet was followed on August 30, 1928, by the re-creation of the Council of State under an executive order reading as follows:

> A Council of State is hereby created to advise the Governor-General on such matters of public policy as he may from time to time lay before it. He shall be the presiding officer of such Council of State, and it shall consist of such persons as from time to time may be appointed and summoned by him. Until otherwise ordered by him, it shall consist of the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Majority Floor leader of the Senate, the Majority Floor leader of the House of Representatives, and the heads of the six executive departments.

This, again, was a most signal step because, as may be remembered, the resignation of the Council of State under General Wood meant the severance of relations between the Filipino leaders and the Chief Executive. Also, the inclusion in the new Council of the majority floor leaders of both houses of the Legislature made it even more representative.

The Governor-General considered the creation of the Council of State the last of the four steps necessary to complete the framework of government under his administration. The first step had been the passage of the Belo Act giving him money for his advisers, the second had been the appointment of a party cabinet, and the third had been the amendment to the rules of procedure of both houses giving the cabinet members the privilege of the floor. "With the aid of these four steps to aid such cooperation," says the Governor-General, "it is hoped that a system of mutual action will gradually be established which will not subordinate either branch of the government to the other, but, on the contrary, will facilitate the necessary coöperation in their action and will materially assist in the development of an efficient administration in these Islands which will become more and more responsive to the deliberately expressed policies of a self-governing electorate."

Immediately after this explanation of the four steps taken under Governor Stimson's guidance, President Quezon, speaking in the Senate on behalf of the majority party, explained why he was supporting the Chief Executive. "The views of Governor Stimson," he said, "as to the proper relations between the Executive and the Legislature in the Philippines and the responsibilities and powers that should be granted to the Department Heads are substantially in accord with our own." He considered the appointment of a party cabinet and the revival of the Council of State as real advances towards responsible government, which, in his definition, is "a government under which our people can give expression to their genius and desires and where their rights and interests are left largely to their own care."

The social aspects of the Governor-General's position should not be lost sight of, for they affect official attitudes a great deal. How many questions have been decided over the dining table or at receptions! Coöperation paved the way for social contacts; and Malacañang was reopened to state functions. Senators and representatives have often been invited to dine at the Governor's palace. Mrs. Stimson agreeably surprised people by attending state balls and receptions in Filipino dress. All these things naturally helped create a more wholesome atmosphere.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL'S ECONOMIC PROGRAM

Once the necessary machinery for running the government had been established, Governor Stimson turned his attention to the economic development of the country, which he considers the fundamental problem of the Islands today. In his inaugural address to the Legislature he said that Philippine economic development must henceforward be carried on along corporate lines. What was needed were corporations with ample resources and capital. He intimated that he was in favor not only of amending the corporation law to attract corporate capital, but of "a wise and conservative revision of your land laws."

One of his first acts was to oppose the curtailment of the free trade relations with the United States. In this he of course had the support of both the Filipino leaders and the local Americans, who are naturally thriving under the free trade relations. It may be remembered that complete reciprocity in the protection of products does not exist today. While all American products are protected in the Philippines because of the tariff imposed by the Philippine

Government on foreign goods (thus practically creating a monopoly of Philippine foreign trade by the Americans), not all Philippine products are protected in the United States. Philippine copra, for instance, which is one of our most important products, is on the same footing as copra from other countries.

Another discriminatory feature of present trade relations with the United States is the fact that while Philippine manufactures with 20 percent or more of foreign materials do not enter the United States free, all American manufactures whether or not they contain 20 percent or over of foreign materials are admitted free to the Philippines. Despite this already one-sided trade relationship, the movement is gaining ground in the United States for a further discrimination against Philippine products. For example, there is an agitation among some Pacific states against Philippine coconut butter because of its competition with American dairy products, and there is the Timberlake resolution presented in Congress which would limit the importation of Philippine sugar to the United States to 500,000 tons yearly.

The Philippine Islands have found in Governor Stimson a staunch supporter of the present free trade relations with the United States and an ardent opponent of further discrimination against Philippine products. Thus, in his address before the American Chamber of Commerce on August 15, 1928, he said that "the attempt to restrict freedom of trade between the Islands and the United States represents about the worst possible backward step that could be taken in American policy."

His economic program at first gave rise to some suspicion. It was rumored that he was in favor of giving huge tracts of public lands to American corporations. To allay the feeling engendered by this rumor, President Quezon gave a banquet on September 27, 1928, to afford the Governor-General a chance to discuss more fully his economic policy, and on that occasion he said that he was opposed to a land law which would give large tracts of public lands to corporations. What he planned was a temporary combination for the purpose of production and marketing in very much the same way that sugar planters have combined to have coöperative milling. He was in favor of establishing investment and holding companies to finance small, independent farmers.

His plan for an economic development which will not touch the land law has met with the approval of President Quezon and

his party. Mr. Quezon said: "The world knows that our nationalistic creed does not entail only the realization of our political independence and the development of our national genius as a people but also the accomplishment of economic independence; and this economic independence does not mean that the country should be rich merely, but that its wealth should belong to its own people. We would be guilty of negligence in the fulfilment of our duty if, while struggling for our political rights, we completely abandon all activities in the economic field."

As the first step in his plan of economic development Governor Stimson favored a change in the corporation law. After much discussion, the Philippine Legislature approved amendments to the corporation law permitting the merger of two or more corporations without first dissolving them, allowing the issuance of no par value stocks and of stock dividends, and definitely permitting corporations to engage in more than one activity.

THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND THE LEGISLATURE

The first session of the Legislature has ended. Besides the corporation amendments alluded to above, the bill creating new posts for judges to facilitate the registry of lands and the franchise for a long-distance telephone company in the Philippines have been approved by the Governor-General as highly meritorious. He was forced, however, to veto twenty bills on the ground that they were poorly and immaturely prepared.

Probably the most serious difference of opinion between the Chief Executive and the Legislature occurred in the matter of appropriations. The amounts requested by the Governor-General for the general appropriations for 1929 and for public works were ₱56,330,872 and ₱8,540,100, respectively; but the Legislature approved ₱57,229,323 and ₱12,960,300, respectively, or an increase of ₱898,451 for the general appropriations and ₱4,420,200 for public works. In turn he cut off ₱508,972 and ₱2,666,098, respectively. In explaining his veto of certain items in the appropriation and public works bills, he expressed himself in favor of a budget system whereby the administration would assume the responsibility for framing the financial program of the government, and the Legislature would be converted into a sort of board of control with power to cut but not to add items in the appropriation bills. He suggested that the corresponding legislative

committees should discuss with the Council of State and the Secretary of Finance the financial program before the drafting of the general budget. The leaders, especially President Quezon, expressed approval of the proposal, but the final adoption of a real budget system will probably require a little further study.

"Pork barrel" legislation has long played an important rôle in Philippine politics. Senators and representatives have vied with each other in trying to secure the largest amount of appropriations for their districts. A strict budget system will take away from legislators much of the credit for securing appropriations, because the need for local public improvements will be decided from a scientific and national standpoint.

MINDANAO

The Governor-General's policy towards Mindanao, as gathered from a study of his administrative measures, has been based on the development of that island by Filipinos and the unification of Christians and Mohammedans. Some people see in this an improvement over General Wood's policies in Mindanao, or at any rate over the acts of his subordinates there. It is commonly believed that, whether General Wood expressly allowed it or not, his American assistants encouraged the Moros to make constant complaints against their Christian brothers, thus fostering dissension rather than friendship between them. Moreover, General Wood publicly stated that he was in favor of turning over large tracts of land in Mindanao to corporations. Governor Stimson's first step in appointing Rafael Alunan, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as chairman of a committee to look into the development of Mindanao, allayed suspicion as to his possible purposes with regard to that region, and in his trips to the Moro country he made it plain that he did not want dissensions between Moros and Christians, but on the contrary union between them.

WOOD AND STIMSON

Not only in their ideas with regard to administration, the Cabinet, the Council of State, the technical assistants, and the policy in Mindanao, do we find differences between General Wood and Governor Stimson; in their attitude towards the Philippines in general we may also notice certain individual characteristics,

probably growing out of their past training and experience. General Wood was primarily an administrator and a social worker; hence he loved to display his executive experience and constantly spoke of the interests of the masses as against those of the leaders and the politicians. Governor Stimson has been connected with the activities of large corporations, first as a prosecuting attorney, when he prosecuted corporate abuses, and later as a corporation counsel. He is therefore acquainted with the good and bad points of corporations and is convinced that a corporation honestly and efficiently managed is a tremendous factor for economic development. He has also to his credit as a diplomat the settlement of the Nicaraguan dispute. His views, therefore, are those of a man who believes in economic development along corporate lines, and his services to the Filipino people in this regard will be of inestimable value, while his diplomatic gifts promptly secured him the coöperation of the Filipino leaders.

It must be remembered, however, that Governor Stimson came to the Islands in a more favorable atmosphere than did General Wood. The change from Harrison to Wood — from a liberal-minded Democrat, anxious to give all the autonomy possible, to an administrator who wanted to administer unaided — was necessarily abrupt and could not have been made without protests from the Filipino people and their representatives. In their struggles with Wood, however, the Filipinos found out that Washington, publicly at any rate, stood by the Chief Executive in every instance, so that by the time Governor Stimson arrived, though still fretting under the strain of severe disappointment, they were probably more disposed to follow a policy of coöperation. Add to this favorable circumstance Governor Stimson's gift as a diplomat and his relatively much more liberal policies as regards the machinery of government, and you have the explanation for the more wholesome conditions that obtain in the Philippines today.

AS TO INDEPENDENCE

On the question of independence we can also see a shade of difference between the two Governors-General. General Wood made it known to the leaders that he was ready to discuss the independence problem with them. During the first months of his administration he encouraged pursuit of the ideal of independ-

ence. After his break with the leaders, however, he was most outspoken in his opposition to early independence and he stressed the need of the United States to retain the Philippines as an outpost of American commercial expansion in Asia. Governor Stimson has preferred not to speak of independence, saying that the ultimate political relationship between the Islands and the United States remains with Congress to decide. Judged solely by their utterances, Governor Stimson is less for ultimate independence than was General Wood, but he does not believe in discussing the question with the leaders or the people. Before he was appointed Governor-General he seemed to favor a permanent connection of the Islands with the United States under some form of colonial self-government. In his FOREIGN AFFAIRS article, for example, he recommended the advisability of stopping all agitation for separation. He has told the writer, however, that he would not object to the Filipinos discussing the problem provided the discussion is carried on unemotionally and sanely, weighing realistically all the possibilities of independence.

While his views, or lack of definite views, on independence may not have been satisfactory to the Filipino people, there is no doubt that he came here imbued with the most friendly feelings for the country. His first idea of a Philippine policy came through his close associations with Secretary Root and President Taft, and these two men, it may be remembered, really laid the cornerstone of a Republican policy towards the Philippines, a policy based on enlightened trusteeship and hostile to all forms of selfish exploitation. One of the first men whom he consulted when the post was offered to him was Elihu Root, the author of President McKinley's famous Instructions to the Philippine Commission. This state paper was called in the early days the Magna Carta of the Filipinos, for it contains the great principles of American liberty and maps out a humanitarian policy.

Although they have coöperated with Governor Stimson, the leaders have not given up the ideal of independence. At the last session of the Legislature they passed the customary resolution in favor of immediate independence, and they have been talking of renewing their campaign for independence in the United States. They believe that independence is not incompatible with the program of economic development mapped out by Governor Stimson.

COÖPERATION

We might sum up by saying that the administration established by Governor Stimson lies midway between the Harrison and Wood régimes. The personal nature of the Wood régime gave way to a system which, Governor Stimson himself confessed, has attempted to approach a responsible type of government, with the administration becoming more and more responsive to the electorate and the Legislature. The Governor-General of course retains considerable checks through the veto and appointing powers and through the power of control and supervision. Further relaxation of these powers might be made if the Governor-General saw that it could be done wisely. A party cabinet has been established. The Council of State has been enlarged to include the majority floor leaders of both houses of the Legislature so as to make it more representative. While Governor Stimson has said that it will not take up matters of administration, the fact that he suggested that the Council might take charge of the budget shows that the Council may after all become a potent factor in administration.

The leaders pledged themselves to coöperate and have actually been coöperating enthusiastically. They have backed the Governor's economic program, including the introduction of foreign capital, though they would oppose a change in the land law or the monopolistic control of Philippine industries by foreign capital. To the charge made by the minority that this coöperation policy entails a surrender of the people's rights in exchange for a few positions, they answer, through Senator Osmeña: Coöperation means liberty, not submission; it means mutual understanding, not mistrust; it means working together for the common good, each standing by his constitutional rights and not encroaching upon that of the other. Coöperation means pulling together for the best interests of the Filipino people; it stands for friendship and goodwill, two elements necessary for the successful running of any government. Coöperation, in fine, means the return of the government to normalcy, where each organism performs its function and does it in harmony with that of the whole machine.

HOW THE WAR CAME

By Pierre Renouvin

THE ORIGINS OF THE WORLD WAR. By Sidney B. Fay. New York: Macmillan, 1928. 2 vols., pp. 551, 557.

TENS of thousands of diplomatic documents to read, the testimony of hundreds of witnesses to be sought out and criticized, a maze of controversy and debate to be traversed in quest of some occasional revelation of importance — this is the task of the historian who undertakes to attack as a whole the great problem of the origins of the World War. The United States takes the lead in publishing a first great work in which the diplomatic history of prewar Europe is comprehensively studied in the light of the newest documents. Surely by virtue of its sound methods of research, the detail of its facts, the scope of its personal judgments, Professor Sidney B. Fay's book is a remarkable effort. It is no small achievement to have sifted the essentials from a mass of documents so vast and to have handled the copious materials with such ease and clearness. But for the very reason that the facts have not yet been definitely established in their detail, Mr. Fay's book is a narrative and often a summary: it is not an attempt at synthesis. The author has been careful to maintain a certain reserve in his judgments, with the result that his study is sprinkled with observations of the greatest importance which are never brought together in a general survey.

It is this sort of a survey that I would like here to attempt. I shall not, of course, take my stand on Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles. To the problem of the origins of the war, as to any historical problem, no answer entirely satisfactory to all minds can be given. In such cases there can be no question of establishing a dogma or of respecting one. It is the historian's task not to fix responsibilities, but rather to furnish explanations and to make clear the circumstances which guided the development of international policies.

I

The Great War arose from a local incident: the murders of Sarajevo. But that an incident should have contained forces capable of hurling the European Powers at one another's throats is a thing impossible to understand unless we take account of the

political and moral situation that prevailed in Europe in the spring of 1914. To be sure, the growing rivalries of the Triple Entente and the Central Empires and the resulting competition in armaments established ideas of war in the minds of the masses. Nevertheless, the parallel existence of two groups of powers was not in itself a threat to peace: at the time when the Franco-Russian Alliance came into being as a counter-balance to the Triple Alliance, it had, as Mr. Fay admits (I, p. 121), the effect of stabilizing the Continent. How, then, did the opposition between the two rival systems of alliances come to a head? Here is a chain of facts which we must try to grasp.

In 1904, France had just concluded an agreement with England settling their colonial difficulties. But this rapprochement endangered the Franco-Russian Alliance, since, in the Far East, Russia was at cross-purposes with Japan, an ally of England. Germany, however, was sure of her own strength and sure of the fidelity of Austria-Hungary. She was, as yet, hardly disturbed by any "pirouettes" Italy might indulge in.

But in the years following the international situation changed to the disadvantage of the Central Powers. The Entente Cordiale assumed a new aspect early in the year 1906, when the British Government authorized its General Staff to keep in touch with the General Staff of France. Though these conferences of technicians did not necessarily imply any promise on Great Britain's part to assist France in case of war, they indicated at least that English statesmen were holding such an intervention in view; and the fact has its importance.

In 1907, furthermore, England and Russia settled their Asiatic differences; and though this purely negative agreement contained no expression of future friendship, no formula for future coöperation, the ending of Russo-British antagonism, which had been one of the "constants" of European policy for a generation past, was an event of the greatest significance.

So the ground had been laid for a new grouping of the Powers. What was the exact nature of this new grouping? "It was insurance against the supposed danger of possible German aggression," says Mr. Fay (I, p. 244), "and not for any aggression against Germany's existing position in Europe and in the commercial world." But Mr. Fay seems to recognize the notion of "diplomatic encirclement" (I, p. 243): "Germany," he says, "was now surrounded by three Great Powers . . . who were

growing increasingly ready to coöperate in defense of their own interests whether in Morocco, Mesopotamia, or the Balkans."

Some exaggeration, here, is evident. There was coöperation between France and England on the Moroccan question. There was no coöperation between Russia and England. Doubtless Isvolsky had hoped that the Anglo-Russian rapprochement would allow him to bring up the question of the Dardanelles in a more favorable atmosphere. But he had not succeeded in introducing that question during the negotiations of 1907; and he was to suffer a more emphatic check in October 1908 when he tried to obtain from Sir Edward Grey some generic endorsement of the Russian program. If the Tsar's government could, on this capital point, derive no direct advantage from its better understanding with London, we are obliged to infer that Anglo-Russian "friendship" was still something hesitant and precarious. In 1907, in fact, the Triple Entente existed only in rudimentary form. The conditions essential to active and cordial collaboration between the three Powers were not present; nor were they to be for a long time to come. Not till the spring of 1914 did the governments of London and St. Petersburg think of working out a naval agreement, which had been hardly outlined at the time of the Sarajevo incident.

I must not leave the impression that Mr. Fay has overlooked this weakness in the Entente. He refers here and there to the difficulties of applying the Persian agreement which repeatedly threatened Anglo-Russian relations. He is aware of the significance of the dickerings between Germany and Russia at Potsdam in 1910. But such allusions as he makes are incidental. I do not believe that he has adequately expressed the real feeling of all these doings — the frequent nervousness in France as to her Russian ally; the friction between London and St. Petersburg, all the more acute since the understanding of 1907 had no sympathetic hold on public opinion; the hidden intentions, finally, of the Russian Government. Just after the rapprochement of 1907, Isvolsky himself remarked to his colleague, Baron Taube: "We must beware of general treaties of alliance. Sound policy and an unbiased perception of our real interests require us to make all sorts of arrangements with all sorts of Powers for the solution of specific problems; and such arrangements may gradually lead us to new combinations in world polity at large."[1] The Russian

[1] Baron M. de Taube: "La politique russe d'avant guerre et la fin de l'Empire du Tsar." Paris, 1928, p. 139.

Minister of Foreign Affairs was far, therefore, from abandoning all thought of continuing his "friendly and confidential conversations" with Germany. Nor is that surprising. A system of ententes and alliances may be only a momentary expression of common interests. It becomes consolidated only with time. The Triple Entente underwent such a consolidation; but the consolidation took place without any real intimacy ever having existed between London and St. Petersburg.

What should be noted is that the policy of the Central Powers, and especially the policy of Germany, contributed largely to the tightening of the bonds between England, France and Russia. By the things it said and the things it did, the German Government was the fundamental artisan of the Triple Entente. As the result of her defeat in Manchuria, Russia was in no position, over several years' time, to take part in any European conflict. Germany knew that, and profited by it. On more than one occasion she assumed attitudes dangerous to the peace of Europe.

In 1905 and again in 1911, France was the target of the German threat. Bülow's policy in 1905 has been made perfectly clear by documents recently published. "Germany," he wrote,[2] "must object to the control over Morocco that France has in view, not only for material reasons, but even more for considerations of prestige." In putting forward the principle of the "open door," the Chancellor hoped, furthermore, to satisfy the economic interests of England and incline her to interpret "in a restrictive sense" the Anglo-French accord of April 8, 1904. In that case, the Entente Cordiale would have no future. Mr. Fay neglects this aspect of German policy almost completely, trying, instead, to define a divergence in policy between Emperor William, who wanted a "Continental Alliance," and Chancellor Bülow, who was interested in the Moroccan question. But no such divergence existed. Bülow himself outlined the treaty of Björkö. Late in July 1905 he was ready to give France "a free hand in Morocco," if she would agree to enter the continental system — abandoning the Entente Cordiale, that is.[3] The objective of German diplomacy was to wreck the agreement of April 8, 1904.

In 1911, the German Government was looking for prestige. In the demand for colonial compensations it would "give Moroccan affairs such a turn as to cancel the impression left by pre-

[2] "Grosse Politik," No. 6521, Note to Holstein, June 3, 1904.
[3] *Ibid.*, No. 6782, Letter to Emperor William, July 31, 1905.

ceding defeats." That is why it thought it necessary to "hold some collateral" through the seizure of a port in Morocco. To no purpose did M. Jules Cambon at Kissingen (June 21, 1911) accept the principle of compensation. Kiderlen-Waechter was careful not to abandon his program. He insisted on making the "Agadir coup." The German minister knew he could not get any definite offers from France for some days, since M. Cambon had made a special trip to Paris to discuss them with his government. He was concerned to make his gesture before the French proposals came in, and he had to hurry. Or may it be that Mr. Fay regards the arrival of the *Panther* off Morocco as a matter of secondary importance? Though he reproaches Lloyd George for "playing with fire" in serving a famous notice on Germany on July 21, 1911, he does not even refer to the excitement the coup at Agadir occasioned among the French public.

In 1909, Austro-German diplomacy was aiming at a victory over Russia. Isvolsky's imprudence at Buchlau supplied the pretext. Count Aehrenthal was satisfied with inflicting on Russia a stinging humiliation which Russian statesmen would long remember. But Germany's rôle in this crisis was not less important. From her point of view, the Bosnian affair was a "test of strength."[4] The "test" involved no danger, however. Russia was in no position to declare war. But the Wilhelmstrasse made the decisive move, on its own account, in its note of March 21, 1909. Mr. Fay goes to great pains to present this German manœuvre in a favorable light. It was not an ultimatum, he says. What exactly shall we call it? — "We must know in definite terms whether Russia accepts the Austro-Hungarian note and gives her formal and unreserved consent to the abrogation of Article 25 of the Treaty of Berlin. Your Excellency will kindly make it clear to Mr. Isvolsky that we expect a definite answer: yes, or no. An evasive, conditional, or vague reply we shall regard as a refusal. And thereupon we shall withdraw and allow things to take their course!"

Lastly, it was England's turn to be worried by German policies. In signing the secret treaty of Björkö with the Tsar, William II was well aware that the policy of continental alliances was directed against British power. "In reality and in fact, that's how things are — but not every truth is to be told!" Also directed

[4] The author of this phrase was Metternich, German Ambassador at London. See Jacques Ancel, "Le duel Isvolsky-Aehrenthal en 1908–1909," *Bulletin de la Société d'Histoire Moderne*, March, 1927.

against English interests was the "big navy" policy begun in 1906; and vainly did the London government try time after time to strike a bargain. Its last effort, made by Lord Haldane, came to grief in February 1912. Why? Because Germany's object was not so much to put an end to naval rivalry, as to dissolve the Anglo-French entente. England did not lend herself to such a manœuvre.

It was in tempo with these German enterprises that the Triple Entente developed. The military conferences between France and England in January 1906 were the direct result of the Moroccan crisis. Fear inspired by the German policy of continental alliances impelled England to seek a *modus vivendi* with Russia. Smarting under the humiliation of 1909, Russia felt obliged to "bind herself more closely to France and England, in order to oppose in common the further penetration of Germany and Austria in the Balkans." The failure, lastly, of the Haldane mission was the origin of the naval agreement between France and England in 1912. It is quite possible that Germany was not deliberately trying to provoke a war either in 1905 or in 1911; but she acted as though she were. The historian who tries to grasp the chain of facts rests content with that statement. It clarifies the whole development of European policy between the years 1904 and 1912.

In the two years preceding the World War, Austro-German initiative no longer determined the course of events. The eclipse of Russia had come to an end. Following the Bosnian crisis, the Russian Government was doing its utmost to complete the reorganization of its army. It was again able to resume an active rôle in European politics. It was eager to repair the damage it had suffered in 1909 and to reëstablish its influence in the Balkans.

Mr. Fay devotes a large part of his first volume to Balkan affairs. He shows the important influence exerted on Russian policy by the question of the Dardanelles. He might perhaps have stated more clearly the difficulties that lay in the way of this Russian dream. Though the Balkan states had concluded their alliance under the auspices of St. Petersburg, their victory had its dangers for Russian interest itself, as became apparent in November 1912 when the Bulgar offensive was threatening Constantinople. In any event the Tsar's government was not willing to defend Serbia's interests at the cost of a general war. Was it the same with Austria-Hungary? The Dual Monarchy seemed quite

reconciled to a recourse to arms if it should not obtain satisfaction. Mr. Fay mentions this Austrian attitude; but he does not stress its animus with the care he devotes to the details of the Russian program. He does not relate, for example, the conversation of June 21, 1912, in which Count Berchtold calmly contemplated the possibility of Austrian intervention in the Serb-Bulgar war even at the risk of war with Russia.[5]

But, from the viewpoint which, properly, most concerns Mr. Fay — "the opposition of systems of alliances" — this revival of Austro-Russian antagonism gains importance largely in so far as the governments at Vienna and St. Petersburg seek and find support with their allies, Germany and France.

The attitude of the French Government toward the Balkan crisis has been the subject of no end of studies, many of them of a controversial character. Mr. Fay does not conceal the fact that he has made up his mind. The policy followed by Germany in the Agadir affair had caused, he says, a "national awakening" in France. The remark is accurate. But this national awakening, whatever Mr. Fay may say of it, had nothing in common with a yearning for "revanche," nor with a determination to reconquer Alsace-Lorraine. This national sentiment, says Mr. Fay, was "personified in M. Raymond Poincaré," whose powerful influence was exerted "in the direction of an aggressive and dangerous policy" (I, 315). After so flat an assertion, it is surprising not to find in Mr. Fay's narrative of the Balkan crises proofs sufficient to justify it.

M. Poincaré, says Mr. Fay, was less concerned with preserving the "European concert" than in strengthening the cohesion of the Triple Entente. It is true that in 1912 French diplomacy strove to maintain closer contact with Russia than she had done in the past. But was that not necessary? During the crisis over Agadir, the attitude of the Russian Government had occasioned grave uneasiness — the shadow of the Potsdam negotiations still lingered over Franco-Russian relations. It is sufficient to read such French documents as have been published to understand these fears.[6] In the spring of 1912, France was wondering what Russia was driving at, whether she were not groping for a new policy outside the orbit of the Alliance. But this nervousness never went so far as partnership in a policy of adventure. When

[5] Conrad: "Aus meiner Dienstzeit," III, 313.

[6] The *Livre Jaune* on Balkan affairs, and the papers quoted by M. Poincaré in his Memoirs.

news of the Balkan Alliance, that "war agreement," came to the French Prime Minister, he did not conceal his surprise and displeasure from M. Sazonoff. "Public opinion in France would not permit a ministry to resort to military action on strictly Balkan issues, if Germany took no part in such a conflict and did not provoke the application of the *casus fœderis* on her own initiative." To be sure, M. Poincaré did not *immediately* begin intervention in the interests of peace. But, under pressure from France, Russia tried to "hold back" the Balkan states. Why does not Mr. Fay say so?

The crisis materialized. When the question of a Serbian port on the Adriatic threatened to provoke an Austro-Russian outbreak, the French Government considered the necessity of supporting Russia, but only in case the *casus fœderis* should come into play — in case, that is, "Germany should support Austria against Russia by force of arms." Russia was afraid of such a war. She notified the Serbian Government that Serbia could not rely on her help. She even hesitated, in the face of mobilization in Austria-Hungary, to take similar precautions herself. France expressed surprise at such indifference. Does that mean that France was egging Russia on? She was simply wondering just what this laxness on the part of the Russian Government might be hiding.

Such interpretations may well be subject to revision. Mr. Fay rightly observes that the investigation of this aspect of the Balkan crisis is perforce imperfect because the French diplomatic papers have not been very extensively published as yet. But we shall not be kept waiting long. Perhaps by the time this article appears in print the French publication will have begun.

Germany's attitude is better known already. It is true that she interfered on two occasions in 1913 to prevent the Viennese ministry from venturing war. The differing views of the two allies as to policy toward Rumania figured to some extent in such steps. But in October 1913 the Wilhelmstrasse was already changing its tack. When the Serbs, on October 18, refused to evacuate Albanian territory, William II had made up his mind to lend Austria unreserved support: "I will go with you," wrote the Emperor to Conrad. "In two days you must be in Belgrade. I have always worked for peace, but this thing has limits." The truth was that Germany had been surprised by the victory of the Balkan states. She was aware that the Treaty of Bucharest had

affected the situation of Austria-Hungary, and, consequently, her own situation. The two victories of Serbia, the one in the fall of 1912 and the other in July 1913, gave added seriousness to the nationalist agitation of the South Slavs. Political circles in Vienna were not willing to accept such a checkmate; they had resolved to react against the consequences of the Balkan crisis. And Germany had now decided to support Austria-Hungary. She was traversing, to use a phrase of Veit Valentin, "a crisis in her world power." Russia's recovery had changed the terms of European polity. Germany had had a hand in the humiliation inflicted on Russia in 1909 — she was not disposed to accept this come-back. Of course, all the Powers had participated in the race for armaments during the years just preceding the World War; but neither in France nor in Russia had plans for the increase of war materials been carried out. This was not the case in Germany. General Moltke declared early in 1914: "The moment is so favorable from the military point of view that, so far as we can see, there will never be another one like it."[1]

II

The Sarajevo outrage brought Austria and Russia face to face for the third time in ten years. The stake was still the same: preponderance in the Balkans. The cause was still the same: the conflict between Austria and Serbia. Russia had yielded in 1909 because she was not in condition for an appeal to arms at that time. Without desiring war in 1912-13, she might have risked it; but Austria-Hungary had taken no irreparable step — she had not invaded Serbian territory, because Germany had forbidden such a move. In 1914, Germany decided to back Austria-Hungary, even at the cost of a general war; and now Russia was in a position to fight back.

Disregarding details — the order of the principal episodes is now virtually established — an effort at interpretation may bear on three essential points: the part played by the Serbian Government in the Sarajevo murders; the policy of a "localized war;" the matter of Russian intervention.

1. The questions raised by the assassination of the Archduke, heir to the Austrian throne, have attracted particular attention from Mr. Fay. He studies them with remarkable conscientiousness and with remarkable critical acumen. All this portion of his

[1] Reported by Kirchenfeld in Dirr: "Bayerische Dokumente," No. 71.

work is a splendid example of method severe and sound, of far-reaching and fruitful research. The character portrait of the Archduke, the story of the plot, the discussion of "responsibilities," are executed with a masterly hand. The conclusions, however, are not always convincing. If we must grant, relying on the testimony of Ljuba Jovanovich, that the Serbian Government had knowledge of the plot three weeks before its execution, have we a right to say that it took no effective measures to prevent the conspirators from crossing the frontiers and that it gave "no warning and no information" to Austria-Hungary? The documents would seem to show that M. Pashitch gave orders to prevent the conspirators from crossing the Sava and the Drina, but that the officers of the frontier guards belonged to the secret "Black Hand," which the government did not dare attack. Furthermore, the Serbian minister at Vienna delivered a warning on June 5, in terms too vague to be sure, but still such as to have merited more attention. It is hard to believe that this diplomatic agent acted on his own initiative. To decide such a point, are probabilities alone adequate? In neglecting to publish the documents in its archives, the Serbian Government, it is true, lays itself open to all kinds of suspicions. The fact nevertheless remains — and Mr. Fay's excellent study proves as much — that we are not yet in possession of certain knowledge. Besides, in 1914 the Government of Austria-Hungary knew nothing of what we know today. Resolved long before the Sarajevo affair to force a revision of the Treaty of Bucharest, it saw in the murder of the Archduke only a favorable opportunity for resorting to energetic action. As Berchtold put it, it was necessary to "profit by the crime at Sarajevo to settle accounts with Serbia."[1] The assassination of Franz Ferdinand was "a suitable *casus belli*." That, in the eyes of the statesmen of Austria-Hungary, was the whole story.

2. This "settlement of accounts" Austria-Hungary intended to arrive at through war — she refused to rest content with a diplomatic success. The terms of the ultimatum were such that they must necessarily lead to an Austro-Serbian outbreak. Germany covered the demands of her allies with her approval, and assumed responsibility for them, though she herself perhaps considered them awkwardly expressed and excessive in terms. Such was the situation that confronted the European Powers on July 24.

[1] "Austrian Red Book" (1920), I, No. 2.

One may grant that, at the outset, neither Austria-Hungary nor Germany desired that this war between Austria and Serbia should become a general war. "The issue here," says the German note of July 24, "is something to be settled exclusively between Austria-Hungary and Serbia." But was such a "localization" of the conflict possible? The Austro-Serbian affair was not and could not be a *local* affair. The vital interests of Russia were at stake: if she allowed Serbia to be crushed, she handed the Balkans over to the influence of the Central Powers, she admitted default. Berlin, as well as Vienna, was perfectly aware of this. "Russia will be against us!" William II declared as early as the fifth of July. But would Russian resistance go as far as an appeal to arms? That was not certain, though possible. In either event, Vienna and Berlin would not draw back. When the Central Powers adopted the slogan of "localization" they by no means implied that the Austro-Serbian conflict was foreign to the interests of the other Powers. They asserted simply that they would reject interventions because it was to their special interest to do so, that they would carry out the plan they had agreed upon even if it involved a general war. This conception already inspired the parleys at Berlin on July 5 and 6, but it became more sharply defined during the days just preceding the despatch of the Austrian ultimatum to Serbia: "I do not want a preventive war," wrote von Jagow on July 18, "but if war is thrust upon us, we must not retreat." And the Vienna Cabinet opined that if the general war must come, better sooner than later.

Thus far the statesmen of Austria and Germany had been expressing only *a priori* opinions. They did not know as yet whether Russia would react vigorously. The information that reached them from London and St. Petersburg on July 23 began to indicate that, as Lichnowsky put it, "localization is a pipe-dream." Russia would not allow the Slavs and the Balkans to be overwhelmed. When, on the 25th the Serbian reply yielded, "save on points of detail," to the demands of Austria-Hungary, it was hard to imagine Europe's remaining passive in the face of a "punitive expedition" which, as William II himself saw it, had no longer any point. "A great moral victory for Vienna," he wrote, "but it removes all pretext for war!" If Austria-Hungary now refused to argue, she would show that her intention was not to check the South Slav movement, but to alter the balance in the Balkans in her own favor. She refused to argue nevertheless. She

rejected offers of mediation. The integrity of Serbian territory and the political independence of the Serb kingdom were now at stake. The Vienna government was bent on reducing Serbia to the position of a vassal state, on "changing the dynasty," and distributing morsels of Serbian territory to Albania and Bulgaria. To accept mediation was to make, perforce, public confession of such demands, which obviously would not prove acceptable. That is why Count Berchtold "refuses everything." To halt efforts at conciliation he put Europe face to face with a *fait accompli:* he declared war on Serbia, though the Austrian army was not ready to begin military operations. Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia was a capital fact in the development of the crisis: neither in 1909 nor in 1913 had the Vienna government dared go so far. In appealing to arms, Count Berchtold provoked Russian intervention. Now Germany did nothing to delay this declaration of war. She even desired and advised it. On July 25 and 26 she had brought "energetic" pressure to bear on her ally to obtain prompt military action.[9]

3. Then came the Russian counter-move. How could the Tsar's government manifest its resolve to defend the Serb kingdom unless by taking military measures? Austria-Hungary's declaration of war rendered attempts at "conversation" fruitless and left no other recourse. The decision to make a partial mobilization was reached at St. Petersburg on the 29th. The step had been under consideration since the 25th as a means of intimidating the Austro-Hungarian Government and clearly voicing Russia's determination. In Berlin, von Jagow declared that in such an eventuality Germany would doubtless refrain from any immediate "counter-measure."

But if the decision for partial mobilization was only the logical consequence of the steps taken by Austria-Hungary, the case was different with general mobilization. The order signed and sent out on July 30, determined though it may have been by technical considerations, was a serious thing, since it necessarily provoked mobilization in Germany, and it was of such a nature in itself as to hasten an outcome. Nevertheless, it did not have, in my opinion, all the importance that Mr. Fay attaches to it.

Is it quite true that "nothing new" had supervened on the 29th and the 30th to cause alarm in the Russian General Staff? One thing at least had happened — the notice served on M.

[9] "Austrian Red Book" (1920), II, No. 42; and "Kautsky Documents," 213.

Sazonoff through M. de Pourtalès late during the afternoon of the 29th, to this effect: "The continuation of mobilization on Russia's part would force us to mobilize; and in that case, a European war could hardly be avoided." That step was not, to be sure, exactly an ultimatum; but it at least showed that the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs had modified its point of view. Two days before it had been saying it would not counter to a Russian mobilization directed solely against Austria-Hungary. Now it was demanding that Russia cease her military preparations. The Russian Government would therefore be obliged either to leave Serbia to her fate or to face the risk of a war against Germany. Is it surprising if the Russian General Staff considered a general mobilization as called for from that moment?

Is it quite true that the Russian order for mobilization thwarted "the efforts at mediation" which Bethmann-Hollweg had just begun? Those efforts had already failed. They had encountered an uncompromising attitude at Vienna in the course of the 30th of July; so much so that the German Chancellor, on the evening of that day and before learning of the Tsar's decision, himself gave up the idea of bringing energetic pressure to bear on the Austro-Hungarian Government. The following morning, before the news of the general mobilization in Russia reached Vienna, the Austro-Hungarian Government emphatically rejected the proposal to limit military operations against Serbia to a "seizure of collateral." And it was merely following the advice of General Moltke: "Facing a European war is the best means of safeguarding the existence of Austria-Hungary. Germany goes forward unreservedly!"[10]

Is it legitimate, finally, to see in the general mobilization in Russia the *cause* not only of general mobilization in Germany, but also of the declaration of war? "Mobilization means war!" ruled the negotiators of the military agreement between France and Russia in 1892. And how many times has that apothegm been repeated in discussions of the immediate origins of the Great War? Mr. Fay gives it the force of a "political maxim" maturely accepted by all general-staffs and by all governments. But this thesis is contradicted by General Moltke himself: he does not attach to general mobilization in Russia the importance such mobilization might have in the case of another army: "In contrast to the mobilizations and demobilizations which have been

[10] Conrad: "Aus meiner Dienstzeit," IV, p. 152.

customary in Russia, Germany's mobilization would unconditionally lead to war." So he declared to the Austrian, Major Fleischmann, on July 30. In his mind the maxim that "mobilization means war" did not apply to Russia.

In hastily deciding to put all its armed forces on a war footing the Russian Government complicated the crisis. But how, in any case, could peace have been maintained, with Austria refusing to compromise? By July 28, all the conditions essential for the European conflict had been provided by the Central Powers. I do not claim that Russian policy was free from reproach in 1914, any more than it was in 1912. French statesmen have often feared the moves made on the Bridge of the Minstrels, and they have done their best to anticipate them. But I believe that in trying to load a preponderance of responsibility upon the St. Petersburg government certain historians fall into an error which a more exact estimate of the facts will not fail to reveal.

The notable work by Mr. Fay does not, accordingly, impress me as having attained that absolute objectiveness to which it aspired. In such subjects it is extremely difficult to maintain a perfect equilibrium of the critical faculties. Historical truth rarely presents itself in such striking guise as to force conviction. In the interpretation, always so delicate, of an endless series of documents, the historian is in constant danger of slipping from perfect balance. I felt in reading Mr. Fay's volumes that he was more concerned to understand and explain the German attitude than he was the Russian or the French attitude. But may I not myself be affected by some preconceived idea, some national predisposition of mind? However great one's eagerness to escape the influence of instinctive sympathies, one must always realize how difficult it is to do so. Only sincere exchanges of views (and they can be sincere only when made apart from the deforming influence of public debates) can provide opportunity for correcting national tendencies. Only through mutual criticism is progress made toward that truth — always imperfect, always subjective — which we call "historical truth."

AMERICAN MISSIONS IN THE NEAR EAST

By Edward Mead Earle

NO other American activity in the Near East has been of such extent and consequence as Christian missions. No other has been so long and so earnestly supported by so numerous and so influential a constituency at home. No other has made such persistent claims upon Christian Americans for financial assistance and upon the Government of the United States for diplomatic support. Not a region of the Near East has been neglected. First and foremost in the field were the Congregationalists (represented by the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions);[1] during the past sixty years, however, their work has been supplemented in Syria and Persia by the Presbyterians, in the Balkans by the Methodists, and in Egypt by the United Presbyterians; there are also less extensive American missions conducted by the Reformed Church among the Arabs, by Lutherans among the Kurds, and by the Society of Friends in Palestine. The American Bible Society, which has been active in the Near East for a century, has distributed between four and five million volumes of the Scriptures in the several vernaculars. Along with these Protestant missionary organizations and largely under their ægis have gone American schools, American colleges, American hospitals, and American social service organizations — the whole making an impressive array, involving the expenditure of millions of dollars and the devoted service of thousands of lives. Until recently, American Catholics have shown little interest in the Near East, although Roman Catholic missions under French and Italian auspices have been conspicuous in Syria and elsewhere throughout the former Ottoman Empire.

The past quarter century has been particularly trying for missionaries in the Near East. Following upon a period of annoyance and obstruction under Abdul Hamid II, came the series of events which led to the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. The old Empire, crazy-quilt though it was, possessed certain advantages to all foreigners operating within its borders: it was an economic, political, and administrative unit; it was founded upon the principle of toleration, if not tolerance, of the several religious and

[1] Hereafter referred to as the "American Board."

nationalist minorities; it was under the thumb of the Great Powers and would invariably yield to an appropriate amount of diplomatic pressure; its authority over foreigners was curtailed by the Capitulations; it lacked the cohesive force of nationalism — in short, it was susceptible to the infiltration of Western ideas. But the Young Turk Revolutions of 1908–1909, the Balkan Wars, the Great War, the practical extermination of the Armenian population of Anatolia, the Græco-Turkish war of 1919–1922, the creation of the Class A mandates, the Peace of Lausanne, and the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey produced kaleidoscopic changes. In Soviet Armenia, Persia and Egypt, no less than in Turkey and the Arab world, nationalism and westernization became the controlling forces in politics, economics, and education. Nationalism was hostile to missions and mission-schools because they came from abroad. Westernization reproduced in Near Eastern countries many of the conditions — such as compulsory secularization of education and rigid separation of Church and State — which western missionaries have found not altogether agreeable in their homelands. The former Christian constituencies of American missionaries in the Near East have either been wiped out or removed to political jurisdictions which are ill-disposed to evangelism of the old type. No one is more aware than the missionary groups themselves that their program in the Near East must be thoroughly revamped.

When the first American missionaries (accompanied by their tracts and printing presses) arrived in the Near East more than a century ago, Moslems might have felt that the dominions of the Padishah and his neighbors were about to be overrun by a swarm of infidel locusts determined to destroy the true faith. American evangelism, however, carried no immediate menace to Islam. The early missionaries determined that it was the Christian churches within the Ottoman Empire which were most in need of regeneration. The Moslem population had seen "only an impure form of Christianity" practiced by "corrupt Oriental churches" which had "lost the great distinctive principles of Christianity, and were in doctrine and morals no higher than the followers of the false prophet"; therefore the Greek and Armenian orthodox churches were to be evangelized, principally by the introduction of the New Testament in the vernacular languages. Quite apart from the Ottoman law prescribing the death penalty for apostates, conversions from Islam would be difficult because of the

"hereditary scorn of Mohammedans for the religion we hold so dear." American missionaries were interested also in the large colonies of Jews at Smyrna, Saloniki and Constantinople. These Jews, whose ancestors had been driven from Western Europe by Christian persecution, were possessed of strong loyalty to their religion and race. Moreover, conversion from Judaism would have involved not only religious apostasy but social disadvantages which the Ottoman Jew hardly could be expected to assume. In 1855, therefore, American missionary work among the Ottoman Jews was abandoned. It is of interest to note, however, that Jews frequently embraced Islam and that the resulting class of Dunmehs has enjoyed a unique position of respect and influence among the Turks.

Having failed to reach the Jews and having decided against work among Moslems, American missionaries proceeded with the task of reforming the ethical and religious concepts, if not the ecclesiastical institutions, of Near Eastern Christians. In the circumstances the Sultan at the outset offered little opposition. Soon after their arrival at Smyrna in 1820 the first American missionaries to Turkey noted that "Christian missionaries may reside in any part of Turkey, so far as appears, without the least apprehension of interference from the Government." Others reported that "in the Turkish Empire may the missionary enter at every point and labor among them, with no Turkish ruler disposed, *of himself*,[2] to hinder or make him afraid of so doing. Wherever he finds nominal Christians, he may plant the standard of the Cross, and Moslems, if left to themselves, will look on with indifference. Only from the Christians may opposition be expected." Of Christian opposition, however, there was plenty. American convictions concerning the innate superiority of Calvinism to Eastern Christianity was not shared by Greeks, Armenians, Nestorians, or Maronites. The clergy of the Oriental churches were determined to resist heresy, even though it came in the guise of "regeneration." They had the welfare of their flocks to protect and certain vested interests to maintain. As priests they desired to retain their hold upon their peoples. As politicians they wished to strengthen existing loyalties to the Church, which was the principal cohesive force of the nationalist and religious minorities of the Ottoman Empire. As patriarchs and secular rulers they

[2] The implication being that Turkish authorities did sometimes interfere after persistent pressure from native Christians.

feared that defections from the communities over which they had jurisdiction might undermine their power and decrease their revenues. They knew heresy when they saw it; American missions must therefore be met with war to the knife.

Greek and Armenian ecclesiastics began systematic persecution of persons suspected of fraternizing with American missionaries. As the Ottoman Government delegated all religious jurisdiction and a measure of secular authority to the respective patriarchs, it was possible for the latter to wreak vengeance upon those who listened to the seductive message of American Protestantism. Merchants "found their shops boycotted; teachers and priests were banished; men and women were stoned in the streets, hung up by the thumbs, spat upon and smitten in the face, tortured with the bastinado, thrown into prison without open charge or trial; spies were everywhere." In Syria the Maronite patriarch pronounced anathema all Protestant missionaries and their converts, enjoining his followers not "to visit them, or employ them, or do them a favor, or give them a salutation, or converse with them in any form or manner, but let them be avoided as a putrid member and as hellish dragons." The Armenian patriarch excommunicated Gregorians suspected of Protestant heresies. As Protestantism had no status before Ottoman law, excommunicants were thereby deprived of important civil as well as ecclesiastical rights and became, in a measure, outlaws. American missionaries were therefore obliged to sponsor the creation of a separate church, with the usual secular authority over marriages, inheritance, educational and philanthropic establishments, community taxation and the like. A Protestant community was created by firman of the Sultan in 1850. But in the minds of Oriental Christians, Protestantism continued a menace alike to religious and nationalist unity. "In the name of patriotism for which both Armenians and Greeks are famous, the Eastern Churches raised repeated protests against such national decomposition" and promised to wage continued war upon heresy inspired from foreign sources. Meanwhile, Moslems looked with bewilderment and good humor upon the unseemly brawl.

The hostility of native ecclesiastical organizations did not cripple American missions. On the contrary, more dollars, more Bibles, more men and women were poured into the Near Eastern field by the American Board and, after 1870, by its Presbyterian allies. Medical missionaries — that is, students trained in both

medicine and divinity — went to the Near East and established mission-hospitals which were available to millions of people without regard to race, sex or religion; approximately half the patients, in fact, were Moslems who could hardly have come into contact with missionaries in any other way. Robert College and the Syrian Protestant College (now the American University of Beirut) were organized in 1864, and the Home School for Girls, opened in Constantinople in 1872, paved the way for Constantinople Woman's College.[3] Shortly thereafter the thirty-two American missionaries in Egypt were maintaining nine schools and a thriving college. Throughout the Near East by 1890 were to be found the American preacher, teacher and physician; the American printing press, disseminating the Bible in every important native tongue; and the American dollar, busily engaged in erecting buildings in which to house these diversified institutions. To all of this activity the Greek Government was hostile from the outset. During the eighties the Shah of Persia sharply curtailed the work of Christian missions, prohibited proselytizing among Moslems, and finally in 1889 forbade the establishment of additional foreign schools. The British administration in Egypt was not partial to Christian missions and has sometimes been accused of openly favoring Moslem at the expense of Christian education. But the first real difficulties created by a Near Eastern government for American missions were made by Abdul Hamid II, Sultan of the Ottoman Empire 1876–1909, and apostle of political and social reaction.

An irreconcilable enemy of the printing press, of education, and of everything else that went under the name of progress, Abdul Hamid viewed with alarm the widespread work of American missionaries. He was scornful of the traditional Ottoman policy of religious toleration as well as of all proposals for granting his subjects even a modicum of political, intellectual or religious freedom. Fearing foreign influence in any form, he could not well befriend missionaries who preached Christianity, who conducted schools in a foreign language, and who taught the ideals of the French and American revolutions. Armenians, the special and particular wards of the American missionaries, were the object of his intense hatred. Murder was one of his favorite political devices, and his administration speedily degenerated into grotesque misgovern-

[3] The Near East Colleges, including the three institutions here mentioned, have more recently severed missionary connections.

ment by an invisible army of censors, spies, and *agents provocateurs*. Massacre was simply murder on a large scale; hence without compunction he ordered wholesale killings of Christian Armenians and Moslem Wahabis. This was the kind of man with whom the missionaries had to deal. Since he maltreated his own subjects, he would show to foreigners only such consideration as was rendered imperative by diplomatic pressure and military threats. Much of the record of shame and blood which Americans have written down to the discredit of the Ottoman Empire in the past half-century is not so much Turkish as Hamidian.

In the situation of the American missionaries there were inherent difficulties which Abdul Hamid was not slow to exploit. Native Christian colporteurs, under American auspices, were hawking the Bible, hymn-books, tracts, and other Christian propaganda throughout the Empire. As there was little opportunity for the control of these publications by the censor, how could Abdul Hamid be assured that they were not seditious? American mission authorities occasionally invited governmental interference by evading petty regulations, pushing their work "faster than the slow firmans would sustain them." Abdul Hamid was sensitive on questions involving his sovereign prerogatives; therefore he made it uncomfortable for the foreigner who forgot that there were, after all, some limitations on exterritorial rights. American missionaries tended to demand the protection of the Government of the United States not merely for themselves but also for their converts, for native teachers in their schools, and for other Ottoman nationals whom they incorrectly considered their protégés. Many Armenians, moreover, went from American missionary schools to the United States and subsequently returned with American passports, under the security of which they proceeded, according to the Turkish Government, to propagate sedition.

In the midst of this political situation, loaded with dynamite, American missionaries were carrying on their work. It is denied that they actively encouraged and aided revolutionary activities. That they were in sympathy with Armenian nationalist aspirations cannot be doubted. American missions were an important factor in the political education of the Armenians according to western formulas. From American missionaries and mission schools Armenians learned anew to cherish their language and historical traditions; became acquainted with western ideals of

political, social, and economic progress; acquired more active discontent with their lot and developed an acute sense of superiority to their Moslem peasant neighbors. To the American missionary the Armenian national cause owes the education of western public opinion concerning the aspirations of Armenia. No historian of the modern Armenian nation can ignore the rôle of the American missionary in the development of nationalism among this tragic people to whom nationalism has been a pitiless executioner.

None of the foregoing may be said in extenuation of the conduct of Abdul Hamid, who sought by a campaign of premeditated and wholesale murder to wipe out the Armenian people and thereby at one stroke to end Armenian nationalism, to remove the pretext which solicitude for the Armenian cause offered British and Russian imperialism, and to deprive troublesome American missionaries of their principal constituency in the Ottoman Empire. For several years preceding the first organized massacres (1894) the Armenian provinces lived under a reign of terror. Ottoman irregular troops and Armenian revolutionary bands preyed upon the country and added to the suffering occasioned, as usual, by predatory Kurds. Cholera and famine, superimposed upon murder and arson, drove all classes of the population to a state of desperation. American missions and missionaries were attacked with seeming impunity; the usual demands for justice were met by the Porte with evasive and dilatory tactics. Permits for the establishment of additional mission-stations and schools were refused, native teachers and preachers were arrested and otherwise molested, a building in course of construction at Anatolia College, Marsovan, was burned by incendiaries. In vain did Secretary of State Blaine inform the Porte that the United States would insist upon the rights of its citizens "to teach and worship in the dominions of Turkey without interference or molestation." President Harrison in his annual message of 1892 informed Congress that there was a tendency in Turkey "to curtail the toleration which has so beneficially prevailed," that "harassing regulations in regard to schools and churches have been attempted in certain localities," that "irresponsible officials" have violated the domiciles and searched the persons of American citizens, and that "interference with the trading ventures of our citizens in Asia Minor is also reported."

Throughout the dreadful Armenian massacres of 1894–1896 not an American life was lost. But American missionaries were

compelled to stand by while an infuriated mob of hooligans and undisciplined soldiers destroyed scores of towns, sending up in smoke American along with Armenian property. They were obliged to witness the murder of some fifty thousand Armenians, of whom a considerable proportion must have been Protestants and the balance of whom were potential constituents of the American missions. They saw devastated the whole region in which they had invested hundreds of thousands of American dollars and the devoted labor of many American lives. They found themselves accused by both sides of being in part responsible for the holocaust — by the Turks of having incited the Armenians to open insurrection, by the Armenians of having "encouraged sedition and having promised more than they could perform." And when the lust for blood and fire had subsided, they found their diminished facilities overwhelmed by the demands of refugees and orphans for shelter, food, clothing, and the opportunity to begin life anew.

The heroism with which the missionaries met these terrible days was matched only by that with which they faced the new situation confronting them. They coöperated in the distribution of more than a million dollars of supplies for the stricken population of eastern Anatolia. They transformed their schools into orphanages and their mission compounds into hospitals. They substituted manual training for theology as a subject of major interest, in order that a destitute people might be made partly self-supporting. In short, they gave a fine demonstration of Christian charity in the midst of most trying circumstances. Gradually, too, mission work, as such, revived. In 1901, after tedious negotiations in which the Government of the United States was most persistent, the Ottoman treasury compensated the American Board to an amount in excess of eighty thousand dollars for the damage done to American mission and educational properties during the period of the massacres. This indemnity solved the most pressing financial problems and enabled the Board to renew a program which had been interrupted by the tragic events of the nineties.

Inevitably the question arose whether American missions might not insist upon diplomatic support on the part of the Government of the United States to the end that they might maintain and extend their work with freedom and security. This is a serious question, involved, as it is, in the broader question of the right of any American citizen abroad, on whatever errand engaged, to de-

mand the protection of person and property by the Government of the United States. As regards the missionary it is a particularly serious question, inasmuch as he frequently penetrates remote and dangerous regions, where he acquires valuable properties, exposes himself to the most determined prejudices of the local population, and is likely to be careless of his personal safety. A reading of the official correspondence of the United States with the Ottoman Empire and its neighbors indicates that the defence, support, and protection of missions has been the most pressing problem of American diplomacy in the Near East.

In general, the position of the Department of State has been that missionaries were to be protected, not as the adherents or propagandists of any particular faith, but as American citizens. As Lewis Cass, Secretary of State 1857–1860, put it, the purpose of the United States is not merely "to protect a Catholic in a Protestant country, a Protestant in a Catholic country, a Jew in a Christian country, but an American in all countries." Fifty years or so later the Solicitor of the Department summarized the American position as follows:

> The policy of the United States is to regard the missionary as a citizen, and, in the absence of specific treaties granting exceptional rights and privileges, to extend to him the protection ordinarily accorded to American citizens in foreign parts; to advance missionary enterprise in so far as it does not raise political questions and interfere with the orderly and constitutional development of the country in which the mission is located; to favor the mission in all proper ways; to protect the missionaries not only in their places of residence but in traveling through the country for the purposes of the mission; to secure for them the right to hold property, without which, in many cases, the efforts of the mission would be frustrated, and to obtain for them the right not merely to exercise in private but to profess in public the doctrines of Christianity, to establish schools for the education of their children and of the native population in whose midst they are situated, and to protect from assault hospitals and other charitable instrumentalities.

In other words, "missionaries and merchants stand upon an equality in the eye of the law; every man, whether he be preacher or man of affairs, is first of all a citizen of the United States, and, as such, entitled to his person and property so far as international law permits, and the right, whether he be tradesman or churchman, to follow his calling."

From the American point of view this position was unexceptionable. But in the minds of Near Easterners, it associated

American missionaries with Capitulations and other legal devices of western penetration, against which there was a rapidly rising spirit of resentment. Inasmuch as the missionary depended for success upon popular respect and good-will, the diplomatic protection thus afforded may have been more of a liability than an asset. It was undoubtedly true, as an American ex-Secretary of State said in 1906, that "the resentment of non-Christian countries because of the practice of exterritoriality is more likely to manifest itself against missionaries than other classes of foreigners." For good or ill the American missionary in the Near East claimed and received the protection of his government, and took whatever advantage was obtainable from the system of Capitulations.

It should not be understood, however, that the missionaries exploited American diplomacy or that American diplomacy exploited the missionaries. The claims of American missionaries on the Government of the United States, if more numerous and more insistent, were not different in kind from those which were advanced by American business men.[4] The United States, on its part, did not utilize the rights of missionaries as a pretext for seeking political or economic preferment, as France consistently made political capital of its Jesuits and Franciscans, and as Germany sought to make use of its Lutheran evangelists. There was no "gunboat policy" in Turkey, as there has been in China. In 1885 the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions officially suggested to the President of the United States that "the occasional presence of our Mediterranean fleet in Turkish waters, or the frequent visit of some of our ships of war at Smyrna, the Dardanelles, or Salonica — not as a menace, but as a reminder to the Turkish Government of the existence of the United States as one of the Great Powers of the world — would add very much to the influence of the American Minister, restore the credit and prestige of the American name, and contribute not a little to securing the rights and privileges of American citizens in accordance with treaty stipulations." Fortunately for both the missionaries and the reputation of the United States in the Near East, this suggestion was not adopted in Washington, and American naval forces have been despatched to the eastern Mediterranean only in cases of impelling necessity. Even murders of American

[4] This ignores for the moment the question whether there ought not to be a different standard of conduct for religious than for economic emissaries of the United States abroad.

missionaries, which occasionally occurred in the mountain fastnesses of Anatolia, were not handled in the Boxer manner. There were no military threats, no demands for excessive indemnities, no temporary occupations of territory by way of compensation for damaged national prestige.

But such claims as were made, however justly, by the American Government on behalf of its missionaries proved increasingly irksome to the Ottoman authorities. Unable to protect his own subjects from brigands, the Sultan was ill-disposed to bear responsibility for itinerant Christian preachers. Nor can it be assumed that there was genuine sorrow at the Sublime Porte at the death of an American missionary, except such regret as was occasioned by the knowledge that the outrage would bring representations from Washington. A Moslem government, aside from the political implications, could not look with complete indifference upon the spread of Christian missions within its jurisdiction.

It is hard to impress upon a westerner that, however firmly convinced Christians may be concerning the inherent superiority of Christianity to Islam, for Moslems there is no God but Allah and Mohammed is his prophet. Islam, moreover, like Calvinism, is not merely a religion; it is a social system. An invasion of propagandists of another religious and social system, even though their work be not directly concerned with making converts, is looked upon as a menace to the existing order. As individuals, missionaries in the Near East have been highly respected; as representatives of western society with special privileges under the Capitulations, they have been feared, suspected, even hated. One can imagine the reception which would have been accorded to Moslem missionaries in this country if the situations had been reversed—that is, if New England had been invaded by Moslem missionaries, supplied with adequate funds to erect mosques and Moslem schools, determined to educate young Americans in the ways of the Orient, and protected by treaties of capitulation preventing regulation by American civil authorities. No Near Eastern nation has been obliged, like China, to sign a treaty acknowledging the superiority of Christian principles and agreeing to tolerate their active propagation. But Christian superiority has been assumed from the start by the missionaries, who certainly would not have left America to preach a faith which they considered inferior. The same superiority appears to have been assumed by the Government and people of the United States, to

whom the missionaries look for protection and support. As the assumption of superiority of Protestant or Orthodox or Gregorian Christianity embittered the relations to American missionaries with Greeks and Armenians, so the assumption of the superiority of Christianity to Islam was a potent source of misunderstanding throughout the Near East.

Security of the properties which American missions accumulated in the course of several generations of effort in the Near East was another problem. These properties represented the investment of large sums of American capital, which might be said to be as much entitled to protection as any business enterprise. Such was, in fact, the contention of the American Board when its many properties in the Ottoman Empire were menaced and partially destroyed. In a remarkable letter written in 1895, Mr. H. O. Dwight, speaking for the Board, urged upon the Minister of the United States the view that American missions in Turkey were "of sufficient importance to warrant the somewhat persistent demands which we make for protection from the United States Government." He referred to the Christian minorities of Turkey as the "customers" of the American Board, who in future "will patronize our reopened schools and buy our reprinted books." He believed that "under these circumstances the saving of the lives of the American citizens now resident in Turkey in connection with these missions should not be regarded as the only, nor, indeed, as the chief point to be aimed at by the intervention of the United States"; there was also the problem of saving the investment and the clientele which had been built up by sixty-five years of labor.

Mr. Dwight's letter is authoritative and presents so unique a plea for diplomatic and, if need be, military support that it deserves to be quoted at greater length:

> During sixty-five years our society has been engaged in its operations in this country [Turkey]. From the point of view of a business enterprise, such as the treaties authorize American citizens to undertake and maintain in this country, the missions must be regarded as a mere association of American citizens which has chosen to invest capital in two main directions: 1. A large educational system. . . . 2. A large publishing and bookselling business.
>
> In order to induce the people of this country to value and pay for the goods which we place before them, Americans, chosen with great care for the purpose, have been sent to live among the people, to cultivate in them understanding of the value both of the education and of the books which we offer. Our aim has been to cultivate in the people not only a desire to buy our wares, but a willing-

ness ultimately to take over the whole financial support and future development of the establishments [thus liquidating the American investment] . . .

By incurring an expense for organization, equipment and maintenance of about $6,000,000, Americans have built up in Asiatic Turkey a business which already makes an appreciable cash return, and which has promised to realize our hope that it will be taken over entirely by the people who are our customers. We have 435 schools of all grades in the various provinces of Asiatic Turkey, and these schools are attended by 19,795 pupils of both sexes. We have also (it should be noted that our publications do not include any copies of the Bible, for this is published by the American Bible Society) a book trade with sales rooms and depots in 25 or more of the principal cities and with a somewhat extensive publishing house in Constantinople, which relies for its markets mainly upon the customers in the interior provinces of the Empire. For the maintenance and further development of our undertaking many thousands of people in the United States, who may be regarded as the stockholders of the concern, pay annually about $150,000 in addition to the revenue from tuition and from the sales of books and newspapers in Turkey, which amounts to about $70,000 a year. The sum of these two amounts may be regarded as the interest on the capital invested in the enterprise, since it is an annual sum put into the business. If we regard this sum of $220,000 as the interest of a capital which annually produces it, we may call that capital $7,000,000. This is a rough way of estimating the money value of the stock, real estate, equipment, and other property provided by Americans for our present operations in Asiatic Turkey.

Surely, even before the days of "dollar diplomacy," seven million dollars was a sum not to be ignored. One must marvel that Christian missions should choose to make such a frankly economic plea for support, even under the stress of the conditions prevailing in Turkey in 1895. But the plea is less a commentary on American missions than on an American public opinion which has permitted itself on only too many occasions to be approached on a dollar-and-cents basis, and which too often insists that benevolent enterprises "pay."

This association of missions with business enterprise took another form as well — a tendency on the part of missionaries to point out that an indirect effect of their activities was to promote American foreign commerce. It was claimed that mission fields are "the commercial hinterland of Christendom," that the missionary is a pioneer who opens to western economic penetration regions hitherto undeveloped. According to one of the best-known and most authoritative American writers on the subject: "It is the function — in large part the unconscious function — of missions to create conditions favorable to commerce. Their tend-

ency to stimulate the mind, to arouse energy, to quicken ambition, to bring native races into a sympathetic attitude toward western civilization, and to widen their knowledge of the world and its wonders, makes them helpful in promoting commercial intercourse." In short, missions offer a "moral subsidy to commerce."

One may well doubt the wisdom of attempting to link missionary endeavor, even by implication, with the development of American foreign commerce. Certainly in the Near East the services of the one to the other seem to have been exaggerated. Of the social influence of the American missions, on the other hand, there can be not the slightest doubt. But the services of the American missionaries in this respect were rendered not so much to the Near East as to the cause of western civilization, to the penetration of the Near East by a system of life and living which was none too well adapted to the Near Eastern peoples. The characteristics of the American economic order — industry, thrift, energy, ambition, speculation, high-speed production, an impatience concerning the old and a restlessness for the new, sacrifice of craftsmanship to output in quantity, failure to desire and to cultivate leisure — were for a long time neither admired nor emulated in the Near East. If they have finally overcome inertia and resistance, then the missionaries are partly responsible. But it should be remembered that there is even in the west no mean amount of scepticism concerning the beneficence of our mechanized and regimented society. In the east, the partial introduction of that social system has destroyed much of the color of life, has wiped out an indigenous civilization and erected in its place a hybrid which is neither ours nor theirs. The value of this to the Near East or to the world is yet to be demonstrated.

For the past twenty-five years conditions have compelled continuous introspection concerning American missionary endeavor in the Near East. Revolutionary movements in Turkey and Persia during the first decade of the twentieth century held out high hope that Christian missions might experience unprecedented intensification and expansion; the establishment of constitutional governments in the Ottoman Empire and Persia would, it was anticipated, inaugurate an era of freedom and tolerance. Early phases of the revolutions justified this optimism — the Young Turks, for example, not only permitted but encouraged the entry of Moslem boys and girls into American schools. But reaction at

home and interference from abroad[1] diverted the revolutionary movements from liberal into nationalistic channels. Among Arabs and Egyptians, as well as among Turks and Persians, there were increasing evidences of restlessness. Opposition to Capitulations, antipathy to things foreign, emphasis upon nationalist conformity, and secularization of education, became matters of greater moment than doctrinaire liberalism. The Balkan Wars, heralded throughout the west as a crusade against Islam, made immeasurably more difficult a lasting reconciliation as among the several religious and nationalist groups of the Near East. The pitiable spectacle of hundreds of thousands of Moslem refugees from Macedonia and Thrace trooping through Constantinople en route to misery and exile in Asia Minor chastened the spirit of many American missionaries and led them to question the wisdom of a policy confining their efforts to Christian minorities. Some fine gesture of Christlike charity on behalf of these miserable émigrés — comparable to the more recent work of the Near East Relief among the Greeks and Armenians — would have done much to clarify the situation, but it was not forthcoming.

Simultaneously complaints of Near Eastern nationalists against American and other Christian missions became more pointed and more bitter. Educated Moslems, who had no fanatical devotion to Islam, protested that American missionaries came to the Near East with only a limited education; possessed of deep-rooted prejudices against the religions and customs of the country in which they were to work; little disposed to live the life of the people but content to remain in their own little communities, which were as American as America; little inclined to understand the traditions, culture, and ideals of non-Christian peoples. Missionary tracts, it was pointed out, were almost always rhetorical and polemical; the terms "heathen," "infidel," "unspeakable" were sometimes applied to a people with whom the missionary had little acquaintance. The singing of "Onward Christian Soldiers" was considered an affront in Moslem lands. More radical followers of Islam identified Christian missions with the detested system of European imperialism. Furthermore, non-Moslems accused the American missions of winning Christians from one sect to another, thus, in their view, effecting a needless

[1] Consider the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the declaration of Bulgarian independence, the Turco-Italian War, the Anglo-Russian agreement of 1907, Russian maneuvers to oust Mr. Shuster from Persia, etc.

change in religious status while denationalizing the converts and divorcing them from their historical associations.

The Great War threatened to sweep American missions off the map of the Near East. Mission stations in Macedonia, Syria, western Persia, and northeastern Anatolia were directly in the zone of military operations; they soon found their property destroyed or requisitioned for military purposes. Practically every mission hospital was in some degree devoted to army medical service. Where the missions were not actually in the path of marching armies, they faced siege conditions — in Bulgaria and Turkey the censorship was rigid; entrance, egress, and travel were sharply curtailed; physical discomfort and disease were rampant. In Egypt the presence of vast British armies disorganized the economic life of the country and rendered almost impossible normal peace-time activities. In Asia Minor American missionaries witnessed the greatest tragedy of their long service in the Ottoman Empire: the wholesale massacre and deportation of the Armenian nation, among whom alone of all the Near Eastern peoples evangelical work had been apparently successful. Almost helpless throughout this terrible experience, the missionaries — particularly the women — showed marked courage and devotion; few believed that their chief wards were being removed for all time from Turkish soil. By reason of far-sightedness in Washington, the missionaries were spared the consequences of a declaration of war by the United States against Turkey and Bulgaria. Largely for this reason schools and colleges outside the war zone were permitted to continue with a minimum of interference. On the whole, however, war conditions compelled American missionaries throughout the Near East to devote themselves to relief work, to mark time pending the suspension of hostilities, or to leave the region as opportunities presented. When the Armistice came in 1918, the outlook for continued missionary work was indeed dark.

The succeeding five years failed to improve conditions. Violation of pledges made by Great Britain and France to the Arabs; the behavior of Allied troops of occupation in Constantinople; the unhappy Greek military venture in Asia Minor; the desertion of the Armenians to their fate; the bombing of Arab villages in Iraq by the Royal Air Force; the partial destruction of Damascus and the laying waste of large sections of Syria by the French — these and other post-war events convicted Christianity, in Moslem

eyes at least, of moral bankruptcy and developed a marked spirit of cynicism. The precipitate flight of Greeks and Armenians from Anatolia before and after the Smyrna disaster of 1922, and later the formal exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey, stripped Asia Minor of practically the last Christian constituents of the American missionaries in that region. Communism dominated the Soviet Republic of Armenia. In Syria and Greece the refugee problem overshadowed all others. In Turkey, by the Peace of Lausanne (1923), an end was put to the Capitulations, the principal guarantee that missionary work "would not be swept away at the caprice of some new government;" henceforth missionaries could no longer "consider themselves privileged advocates of a justice guaranteed from without." Officially the American Board recognized the new order of things but said: "It is difficult, if not impossible, for some friends of the Board to make this readjustment in their fundamental attitude towards the position of the American missionaries under Turkish rule."[6] The signing of the treaties of Lausanne, however, restored peace in the Near East and permitted the resumption of missionary activities, which had reached their lowest point in 1922.

Facing widespread hostility, their personnel reduced, their property in part destroyed, American missionary organizations in the Near East were obliged in 1923 to think seriously concerning their future. One decision was taken firmly and promptly — that, whatever the difficulties, the work of more than a century should not be abandoned. Another decision was taken almost equally firmly and promptly — that henceforth determined efforts should be made to minister to Moslems as well as Christians; where a direct approach was impracticable, social service, intellectual contacts, medical missions, and education should be utilized to the full. At a memorable conference held at Jerusalem in the spring of 1924 it was decided that there had been "great neglect of Moslems on the part of the Protestant Christian forces of the world" and that there existed "the necessity of a positive, constructive, irenic and sympathetic approach rather than the

[6] The United States Senate did not ratify the Turco-American Treaty of Amity and Commerce negotiated at Lausanne in 1923; there is therefore some doubt concerning the legal abolition of Capitulations as they affected Americans. In fact, however, no foreigners now enjoy exterritoriality in Turkey. The Capitulations were also abolished in the Class A mandates, but by treaties with France and Great Britain the United States has secured for its missions and schools specific rights to continue their work unmolested. An exception to this is Iraq, but it is understood that a similar treaty is under negotiation on its behalf. In Syria it is said that France would welcome the transfer of American Protestant missions to French Huguenots.

negative, destructive, polemic and unappreciative." These conclusions were sustained and amplified by the International Missionary Council, assembled at Jerusalem four years later, which repudiated any supposed alliance between missions and imperialism, which condemned non-Christian practices on the part of Christian nations, which expressed sympathetic understanding of Islam and other Near Eastern religions, and which urged the continuance of mission schools "even though there be no adequate opportunity for definite religious teaching." The American Board also showed a new spirit in its relations with the existing Oriental Churches by establishing at Constantinople in 1922 a School of Religion for the training of Christian (not necessarily Protestant) leaders in the Near East; this school, transferred to Athens in 1925, received the coöperation of the Greek Patriarch and others who theretofore had been hostile to American missions.

Gradually order emerged from chaos. The Greek Government — apparently desirous of antagonizing as little as possible American agencies engaged in refugee settlement — pursued after the Smyrna disaster a more agreeable policy toward American missionary work in Greece. For example, in 1924 the ban was lifted from the importation of Bibles in the vernacular, and there was no attempt at interference with missionary activities in the refugee camps; the American Board station at Saloniki took a new lease on life. Bulgaria, crushed by defeat in the Great War, welcomed the renewal and expansion of American missionary endeavor, although sharing in the world-wide movement "toward increase in the responsibility and control on the part of the native church and consequent decrease on the part of the mission." The schools at Samakov, furthermore, were transferred from missionary control to independent boards of trustees and became affiliated with the Near East Colleges under the name of the Sofia American Schools. In Persia nationalism and westernization proved to be thorns in the sides of American Presbyterians. Doubt was expressed whether, in view of increased interest of the government in national secular education, the American schools could continue to maintain their position. As for the missionaries themselves, they felt the necessity of the utmost caution, tact and patience — being, as the Presbyterian Board put it, "as wise as serpents and harmless as doves." In the face of thinly-veiled Moslem hostility only medical missions seemed to proceed with

success in Persia. In Syria the refugee problem and the nationalist revolt against French rule prevented any accurate appraisal of conditions. Enrolment in American schools and colleges in Egypt (particularly at Assiut and Cairo), on the other hand, was unprecedented; medical and even evangelical work also was in a prosperous state.

Turkey presented by far the most serious problem. Hopeful signs were the abolition of the Caliphate, the separation of church and state, the closing of reactionary mosque schools, the adoption of constitutional and international guarantees concerning individual religious freedom, the improved status of women, a generally increased religious and intellectual curiosity, an apparent willingness of the best-informed Turkish leaders to retain American schools even under missionary auspices, and a phenomenal increase in the number of Turkish Moslem students in attendance upon foreign-controlled educational institutions. Less hopeful were the nationalistic slogan that Turkey was to be developed for the Turks, the development of secular popular education, the rigid supervision of all schools for the special purpose of preventing religious propaganda, and marked hostility (in part fostered by the Turkish medical profession) to any considerable activity by foreign hospitals and foreign physicians. Evangelistic work continued to be conducted in Constantinople and a few other centers for native Christians; with this there was no interference from Angora, but neither the government nor public opinion would have looked with favor upon open and extensive efforts to convert Moslems to Christianity. The American Board frankly recognized that personal example and friendly contact were the only real hope for the continuance of missionary work in the Turkish Republic.

After a century, what shall be said of American missionary work in the Near East? Imposing statistics could be marshalled concerning the millions of dollars and the thousands of lives which have been given freely in the cause. But these would be inadequate as a tribute to the results which American missions and missionaries have achieved in this key position of the world. Some of the earlier missionaries — men and women like Cyrus Hamlin, Daniel Bliss, and Mary Mills Patrick — were scholars and sympathetic liaison officers between East and West. Others have been great teachers and beloved physicians. All have had to be possessed of the patience of Job. All carried with them from

America some of that reckless courage of the pioneer without which the Great West of our own country could not have been settled and without which much of the record of American activity in the Near East could never have been written. But courage is not enough. It is too early as yet to pass critical judgment upon missionary achievements as a whole.

There is one aspect of the situation, however, which should not be neglected. For almost a century American public opinion concerning the Near East was formed by the missionaries. If American opinion has been uninformed, misinformed and prejudiced, the missionaries are largely to blame. Interpreting history in terms of the advance of Christianity, they have given an inadequate, distorted, and occasionally a grotesque picture of Moslems and Islam. While consciously preaching good-will, they sometimes have unconsciously sowed the seeds of misunderstanding. In portraying conditions in the old Ottoman Empire, for example, they failed to point out that many of the sufferings of the Christian minorities were shared *in toto* by their Turkish compatriots. If the Armenian peasant was exposed to raids of Kurdish brigands, so was the Turkish peasant. If the Bulgar peasant was bled white by the tax-gatherer, so was the Turkish peasant. If the Greek merchant was treated with stupidity and cruelty by the *vali*, so was the Turkish farmer. And, in addition, the Turk alone was condemned until 1909 to compulsory service in the Imperial Ottoman Army, from which the Christian was exempt in return for payment of a small tax. Because the missionary left many of the characters and many of the facts out of his picture, the American people received an incomplete impression of who were sinners and who were sinned against. They were totally unaware that Moslems and Christians suffered almost equally under a rotten imperial rule. In order to raise funds, missionaries, and more recently relief organizations, have often exploited half-truths, with the result that the American mind became closed to the patent fact that all peoples of the Near East, regardless of nationality or religion, have been common victims of common misfortunes. Once the flood-gates are opened, they cannot be closed at will. But the new order means, fortunately, that the missionary must find a new approach not only to his constituents in the Near East but also to his friends and supporters at home; this means much to the cause of good-will and peace.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN POLICY

By General Tasker H. Bliss

SURVEY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS: 1928. EDITED BY CHARLES P. HOWLAND. New Haven: Yale University Press. Published for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York. 1928. 610 pp.

BY its historical approach this first volume of the Council on Foreign Relations' annual "Survey of American Foreign Relations" clears the way, on certain important lines, for the study of our present policies and for a determination of the proper course of their future development. The volume is not so much an objective study of our foreign relations as it is of the formulated principles of our government and of the traditions which more or less have influenced the acceptance and development of these principles. It is a most valuable contribution to the literature of the subject.

It scarcely seems too much to say that tradition is the essence of political institutions everywhere. Some of these are very high and noble. Yet it is possible that a tradition may be merely the memory of something that has long since served its purpose. It still remains as evidence of a historical fact; but it ceases to be an inspiration and aid to further natural growth and becomes like a throttling vine to a growing tree. There is not a nation which passed through the recent war that is not struggling against the influence of such traditions. The nations with which we have important relations have in varying degree the material advantages of a somewhat common civilization. But back of each are centuries of traditions unlike those of the others and which have bred different and perhaps antagonistic ideals and institutions. Perhaps — and there are those who think so — back of them all there is some common tradition which will in nature's time wake to life, become dominant and produce a unified system of political thought. This might result in a complete uniformity in the relations of man and introduce an era of universal peace.

Even statesmen who have to deal with conditions of today and tomorrow might indulge a pleasing moment in such speculations. But if they do they are soon confronted by the uneasy thought that the continuance of such a happy age requires a control of certain tendencies of human nature to which we do not give much attention. They see man always engaged in two forms of

warfare going on as well within as between states. Both originate in the ineradicable, but not uncontrollable, spirit of competition, the desire of man to get and keep the most he can for his well-being. One is silent, invisible and constant; the other is violent and sporadic. We associate the name of war with the latter; the former we think of as a peaceful struggle. Each aims at the same end by different means. Whenever the competitive struggle within the state failed to attain its end, private war resulted, until the state put an end to it for its own good; between the states it has often resulted in public war, the menace of which still threatens us because the states as a family will not yet apply to their relations with each other the means which they have separately employed to end private war. We ended private war not by destroying private competition but by regulating it and by providing and enforcing means for settling the disputes. Were it not for this we would have a recurrence of private war. We are making great efforts to put an end to the wars resulting from the competition of states in order that we may devote greater energy to the competition of peace, without as yet sufficient regulation of that competition, or sufficient assurance that all will resort to the means provided for settling the disputes growing out of it.

Therefore, statesmen still think of states as being like the trees of the forest. And they may learn a useful lesson if, with this thought in mind, they will allow their imagination a little play. As they walk through its glades and along the aisles of its over-arched branches — some noble trunks lifting their heads high as they sway to and fro in the strengthening breezes, lesser forms reaching towards the same goal, while still more lowly ones seem content to live their lives in the flickering shadows of their more exalted neighbors — it all appears at first sight to be a perfect metaphor of peace. Yet they know that in reality it is the scene of relentless war, none the less so because it is attended by no visible signs of violence. If the forest were a mass of sentient beings, but gifted only with the power of memory, it too would look — but backwards, not forwards — to its golden age. And it would find it in a time when its members were few, when their roots never overlapped, when none attempted to tap the life source of another, when the struggle of each was not with others of like kind but with inanimate forces within the soil common to all. If now the forest become gifted with reason as well as memory, it begins

to see that that happy age disappeared along with the conditions which made it possible; that those conditions can never be revived; and that if the silent war between the oak and the elm and the pine is ever to cease it must be by some regulation of their conditions of life in the exercise of their newly acquired reason.

When the statesmen and the citizens whose destinies they direct reach this point in their speculations they will admit — as they all do, though not all admit the necessary conclusion — that however varying in other respects nations may be, they are coming to an agreement, as the reasoning trees of the forest might do, on one common object; and that the attainment of it requires the rejection of the theory of an isolation that cannot be maintained, in favor of an active cordial coöperation.

Before considering the outlines of a state policy based on that assumption it may be profitable to note the growth of a policy — our own — which originated in an almost express denial of it.

To assist in such a study the "Survey of American Foreign Relations" (while following its guiding line of historical approach without expression of bias in connection with observed facts) traces the origin and development of four cardinal doctrines in American policy, — isolation, the Monroe Doctrine, the freedom of the seas and the open door. The first is the parent stock of which the others are necessary offshoots. Yet those others are a direct denial of the first. This fact shows how a tradition of something which had little real existence except in fancy may vitally affect some of the real things of life. Isolation, while perhaps believed and intended to be absolute, was not so from the beginning and soon became very limited. In its origin it meant only isolation from Europe and the peace-disturbing influences of European political institutions. At that time Europe was for us the world. A policy of isolation could not then have contemplated that our closest contacts with Europe would be made in the most remote parts of the earth.

Of course, the essence of the doctrine was self-defense. We had obtained our independence and forced its recognition on the world by war. This had resulted in the setting up of a form of government and of political institutions that were thought likely to excite hostility in European quarters, even where our struggle for independence had been looked upon with indifference or favor. Security seemed to demand a complete separation from that part of the world whence alone any danger was feared.

How, and to what extent, could that isolation be maintained? Plainly, to no greater extent than then existed. There could be no avoidance of a moral contact. Without knowing it or intending it, we ourselves, by the unpreventable influence of our peculiar institutions, began to wage a destructive warfare on all others. The prevention of the penetration of political cultures and ideals from either side to the other — that was impossible. No seas have ever been found so wide, no mountains so high, no deserts so arid and trackless, no fleets nor serried lines of armed men so strong, as to prevent the passage of winged thought. And for the student of our history it is a rather awesome thing to reflect upon, that during the first century and a half of our existence, when our policy was based upon the belief that we were ringed about by potential or probable enemies, it was not fleets and armies but the silent penetration of our ideals that overthrew dynasties, forms of government, political institutions which we professed to fear. We have won a bloodless war. The victory has destroyed many of the conditions that alone could justify such isolation as we ever had. Victory is great in proportion to the good use that is made of it, the conversion of enmity into friendship, the durability of the peace that follows. The responsibility for attaining this rests mainly upon the victor.

As to the possibility of physical isolation, we set ourselves from the beginning to destroy it. While still pinning our faith to it, we were doing more than any other people to devise the means to break down every barrier to physical and mental contact. By the acquisition of alien territory we thought we were pushing other peoples further away; we were only bringing ourselves into wider and closer contact with them. Our fathers had magnificent visions of our future extension of territory. They believed that our activities and influences would be largely confined within this domain and that we would remain a people physically and politically apart. They did not foresee the time when science would eliminate time and space; when their children would transmit their thoughts on the wings of lightning under the sea; when they would sail across its surface in fewer days than their fathers required weeks, and fly over it with a provision of three sandwiches for their journey; when the political institutions whose influences they dreaded would become assimilated to our own. Two peoples cannot remain aloof without giving up the idea of mutual trade. That was the last thing that our fathers intended.

Those who inherited the instincts of so many generations of explorers and traders neither could nor would stay at home. Men crowded across our land frontiers, bartered their goods in the Antilles and on the Spanish main and in every port of the world, everywhere spurning imaginary barriers. It was the beginning of the invisible struggle between the gradually interlacing roots of the forest growth. There being little regulation except the law of the strongest, this invisible struggle began — as is always the tendency among men — to take the form of threatened or actual violence. It resulted in a near-war with one European nation, an actual one with another. And these did not occur in defense of a doctrine of isolation but in a demand for the better protection of our rights in friendly contact.

All this was playing its part in gradually preparing the way for the Monroe Doctrine. This, primarily, embodied a method for our own defense. It was influenced by the belief, which had already become a tradition, that we could maintain, in part at least, our attitude of isolation. This, in a physical sense, had to be abandoned as the result of the growing intimacy of trade relations. In a political sense it seemed that it might be maintained by preventing foreign powers from extending (perhaps by actual invasion) institutions, inimical to our own, on any part of this hemisphere and thereby inevitably endangering our own peace. The doctrine was the necessary consequence of there being no sufficient regulation of international relations, and will doubtless be adhered to so long as that condition exists.

The Monroe Doctrine, crystallizing though it does a belief in the advantages of isolation, is in reality based upon the practical recognition of the advantages of international coöperation. It would be a mere form of words without such coöperation, moral and physical. When it became a cardinal doctrine in our national policy the spirit of the political institutions of all nations of North and South America was the same. The enemy of those of one was, potentially, the enemy of all. Therefore, though announced as a matter of self-interest to us, it breathed the spirit of a league of one group of political institutions against another antagonistic one. In a world governed by force, its general acceptance, whether a willing one or not, tended to preserve international peace and proved its wisdom. A tool that has been found good will not be thrown away until a better one is in our hands.

But, under this doctrine, the United States did not assume

rights of suzerainty. Interference with trade, for example, would have at once aroused the combined hostility of Europe and of our sister republics. And it would have been repugnant to our fundamental conception of international right. Had it been otherwise, this doctrine intended to preserve the peace would have fomented war. But if we guaranteed freedom of trade for Europe we wanted her to guarantee the same for us. As the Monroe Doctrine grew so did the doctrine of the freedom of the seas as a cardinal point in our national policy. Its essence is that on the part of all nations there shall, in time of war, be the minimum possible interference with sea-borne commerce. Nations which recognized the freedom of the seas in time of peace claimed, in the temporary character of belligerents, certain powers as being the ancient usage and custom. And probably no usage is more ancient. Attempts at its limitation began before historical times, for there are evidences of it in the earliest records. It is seen in the international custom to which the Romans, many centuries after it began, gave the technical name of *hospitium*. This originally indicated the status of a trader and his goods on alien soil where his very presence was an affront to the local gods, but which from motives of self-interest came to be tolerated and finally officially sanctioned provided he put himself in the custody of a native who became responsible for his compliance with the local customs of religion. In that term is the origin of all international law.

But as nations grew stronger one after another sought not the freedom but the dominion of the sea. She has been like Helen of Troy, "wooed of many suitors," each wanting her for himself. From the days of the Phoenecian, when the Mediterranean was "the sea," to well-nigh our own, each great sea power in turn has sought to betroth itself to her in the spirit of the words of the Venetian Doge who from the deck of the Bucentaur threw his ring into the Adriatic saying, "Desponsamus te, mare, in signum veri perpetuique dominii." None could effectually make it one *mare clausum* but there have been various *maria clausa*. When perpetual dominion could no longer be maintained over any part of the high sea the right to close it as far as they can, and dare, is still claimed by belligerents as a right of war. A nearer approach to this could hardly be made than was done in the recent war. And until the law thus made is changed we can say again with Grotius that in time of war our frontier is the enemy's coast.

Before this revival of an "ancient usage and custom" of war

there had been a tendency towards an amelioration of its rules relating to commerce on the sea. Commercial interests were more in control. None had a greater interest in this than the United States. A nation had not so very much to gain by a consistent attitude of peace if in peace it had to suffer the losses of war by the disruption of its commerce in the ceaseless quarrels of other nations. Gradually the doctrine of contraband of war was evolved, absolute or constructive, according to the circumstances of each case. Merchandise that was not so listed was assumed to be free from interference. But even this required the exercise of the harassing right of search accompanied by a more or less arbitrary and biased determination of the character and destination of the goods. And necessarily the list of contraband steadily grew.

The doctrine as developed was applicable under conditions that no longer exist. Nations went to war with limited and relatively small armies. They were a class apart from the general population. The war was a duel limited to these armies. Whether or not the civil population was well fed, clothed and supplied with medicines, the war ended with the defeat of one army or the other. But long before the World War there was foreseen and predicted the result when "nations in arms" go to war. When every agency of a government is involved in it, when not only the armed forces but all men, women and children must contribute their pounds or ounces of energy to the struggle, then every article of trade down to the food and medicines for little children and for the helpless sick in hospitals becomes lawful prize for the belligerent that can seize it, or at best may be taken for a price and sold. In addition, if a belligerent is strong enough he rations all neutral countries in a position to carry on their ordinary trade with his enemy, seizing or stopping all other neutral peaceful trade with them. Some think that such a course would be repugnant to American sentiment. It depends. An official of his government, writing recently on the effects of the blockade during the World War, says that after we entered the conflict "the American Government acted far more drastically and severely than the British." The severity of this kind of blockade may force many neutral states into the war as the only way to minimize disastrous interference with their trade, because if any favors are to be shown by the belligerent it will be only to those who help him. We often speak of the interdependence of modern states. The recent blockade proved that it exists to a degree never before conceived of. The writer

above referred to says: "Even after the coalition of the Central Powers covered half Europe with its conquests and occupations, its lack of sea-borne supplies created wants and deficits which, in their turn, created others, and in the end the entire populations of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey broke down under the strain created by these progressive discomforts and sufferings."

The fact remains that for a nation strong upon the sea the rigid and ruthless blockade is the most terrible and effective weapon in its armory. Such nations, knowing that this weapon will become still more effective as interdependence increases, will be loath to surrender its full use. Even another war fought on this issue, and another victor, might not compel it. For to this same weapon the latter may owe his victory. Probably nothing but international reason can do it. When a nation says, as some now do, that without the exercise to the full of this ancient usage and custom there will be no use in its going to war, perhaps the time has come when it will consent to use its reason in submitting to such a regulation of its so-called natural right as will minimize the chances of its ever having to exercise it at all. Until the great nations do this, the freedom of the seas in time of war will be the medieval Doge's *verum dominium* for the one that can control it. As long as it must remain a doctrine in our national policy, it imposes a duty upon us to do our best in formulating and directing the reason of the world in a matter so important for our own peace.

The doctrine of the open door necessarily grew with that of freedom of the seas. The sea may be free, yet a nation may impose restrictions on its trade from foreign countries. If these are uniform in application no particular nation can regard them as unfriendly manifestations towards itself. It is a principle of the common law of all civilized nations that uniformity of application is the essence of justice. It is to guard against inequality of treatment that the "most favored nation" clause is inserted in treaties of amity and commerce. The contention of the United States has therefore been that in her trade with any nation she is entitled to privileges equivalent to those granted to any other. The doctrine was originally of importance in our trade with the Orient. It may become of equal importance in connection with the "mandated" territories created by the Treaty of Versailles. Manifestly, in a world of trading nations it is a doctrine that makes for the maintenance of peace.

What bearing can these considerations have in the mind of the

citizen on his country's policy? None at all, unless they lead to the conclusion that most of the troubles of the world result from the unwillingness of the nations to agree upon certain basic things necessary to accomplish an object that they all desire. We and a good many others have declared in the most solemn terms for a policy of international peace and that we shall make it effective by the settlement of all our disputes by pacific means. That should be the first of the cardinal doctrines in a new national policy, and if it were sufficient as it stands it need be the only one. But it is generally admitted that as it stands it must be accepted only as a first step. And the next step — admittedly a slow one, but one that can be hastened — would seem to be a declaration, in specific terms, of the rights and obligations of states in cases that are and have been provocative of disputes and war. This means the preparation of a code of international law. No state can have a greater interest in this than the United States. We have before us four means for the pacific settlement of our disputes. The first two, diplomacy and conciliation, are generally ineffective when a state believes that it has a vital interest at stake. And in such a case a state will not tolerate an indefinite postponement of the settlement. There are two means left — arbitration and judicial procedure. We have declined to be bound to an appearance before an international court of justice because we claim that there is no sufficient law for that court to administer. If we remain bound by the declaration that we have made we may have to secure a decision in a vital case by arbitration when undoubtedly we would prefer to appeal to a clear-cut law which we had helped to make.

Therefore, it would seem that the intelligent citizen might well ask his Government to pursue stages somewhat as follows in recasting our national policy:

1. The recent declaration for a policy of international peace, signed August 27, 1928.

2. The codification, clarification and amplification of international law.

3. The retention of the present doctrines of our policy which make for peace, until in the gradual codification of law one or another becomes unnecessary.

4. The reduction of preparations for national defense only so rapidly as a growing international good-will enables all the great nations which are armed for the same purpose to agree upon reductions in just proportions.

BIOLOGY AND WAR

By Alexander M. Carr-Saunders

THE vogue of a doctrine depends more upon the will to believe than upon the intellectual conviction which it carries. The famous doctrine of "the biological necessity of war" has recently lost some of its former popularity. At the moment men are no longer disposed to look for a scientific justification of warfare. It is doubtful, however, whether the unsoundness of the doctrine is better understood now than formerly. Indeed the obvious conclusion to draw from the nature of the struggle for existence, as popularly understood, is that contest is in the nature of things. Warfare is only the name for human contests, so the argument runs, and warfare is therefore inevitable. Men may not draw that conclusion now, but this is not because they regard it as erroneous but because they shut their eyes to the whole matter. The day may dawn when the generalization will again have an appeal. It is nevertheless a false generalization and the more widely this is understood the less possible will it become to find so-called scientific excuses for war.

A good example of the form which this doctrine has taken is found in a passage from von Bernhardi. "Wherever we look in nature," he wrote, "we find that war is a fundamental law of development. This great verity, which has been recognised in past ages, has been convincingly demonstrated in modern times by Charles Darwin. He proved that nature is ruled by an increasing struggle for existence, by the right of the stronger, and that this struggle in its apparent cruelty brings about a selection eliminating the weak and the unwholesome." In this passage there are two assertions. The first is that war is in the nature of things. The second is that in the long run war promotes the welfare of mankind. Let us examine these assertions in turn.

It is doubtful whether the first assertion would have ever been made, in any case in this positive form, had it not been for the introduction of the phrase "struggle for existence." Darwin did not invent the phrase. He adopted it but was careful to say that he employed it "in a large and metaphorical sense including the dependence of one being on another." It is nevertheless inappropriate and it has proved to be misleading. It has not merely misled non-biological authors. Many biologists who wrote in the

decades immediately following upon the publication of "The Origin of Species" described that process, which they called the struggle for existence, in language which went a long way towards making inevitable the deductions by such lay writers as von Bernhardi. They painted a picture which gave the impression of an almost ceaseless and universal physical contest between animals. Some were hunters, others were hunted, others again were both. It was the era of "nature red in tooth and claw." In part they were hypnotized by the very phrase itself. In part they took a perverse pleasure in painting things red; the redder they could make them the more did their "scientific" picture differ from that of the theologians with their divinely ordered scheme of things.

We are, however, not so much concerned with the reasons why this misconception got about as with the fact that the position was misconceived. The extent of the misunderstanding is best realized if we examine what this process, going by the term "struggle for existence," means among plants. Only a small proportion of the seeds produced by a plant will germinate; most of them will fail to fall upon suitable soil. Only a small proportion of those which germinate will grow to maturity and produce seeds; many will perish because they are smothered by other plants, fail to obtain sufficient water or food, or because of one of the very many possible mishaps with which they may meet. The survivors are those which are both lucky and adapted to their surroundings. There must be luck because the best adapted organism cannot survive under extreme conditions — say of temperature or of desiccation — and some in every generation will be faced with the hopeless task of battling with impossible conditions. There must be some degree of adaptation, the more of course the better; otherwise even the relatively lucky would not survive. It is clear enough that the term "struggle for existence" can only be applied to this process in a very metaphorical sense.

Fundamentally the process is similar among animals. It is not similar in detail. Animals are usually gifted with the power of movement. To speak of them as struggling is therefore not quite as inappropriate as to use that term in connection with plants which for the most part are sessile. The term seems still less appropriate when applied to the higher animals whose movements are directed by instinct and intelligence. We may perhaps allow that to say that animals struggle is in a vague and general way

not incorrect. But we should be well advised not to say that they "struggle for existence" without some enquiry as to what does in fact go on under natural conditions. We should be even more careful, supposing that we agree to use the phrase "struggle for existence," not to jump without further enquiry to the conclusion that it implies the existence in nature of anything analogous to war.

We are still very ill informed as to what occurs under natural conditions. The difficulties in the way of observation are serious and the methods and habits of accurate observation are still in process of formation. It is at least clear that casual observation has overestimated the frequency and importance of clashes and physical contests between animals. Such clashes are dramatic and easily observed. They occur because many animals are carnivorous. When the lion, tiger, eagle or hawk pursues its prey, and especially when the hunted resists, there is a drama and perhaps a dramatic struggle. But there can be no doubt whatever that most animals perish, as do the plants, because, owing to ill luck or want of adaptation, they cannot cope with the particular surroundings in which they are placed. It is too hot, too cold, too dry, too wet or in some other way unsuitable — unsuitable for any organism of their type, in which case they are victims of bad luck, or unsuitable for some particular members of the species, in which case they are victims of lack of adaptation. Animals faced by these conditions, whether they survive or go under, may be said to struggle for existence with nature, if we care to use that term.

It does so happen that two species of animals sometimes contend against the same complex of natural surroundings and, while so doing, appear to contend with one another. Cases of this kind are fairly well known and are not infrequently regarded as examples of warfare among animals. It is imagined that this supposed warfare between species, which are sometimes closely allied, is comparable with war between nations or other human groupings. Let us look into the matter. Mr. Chalmers Mitchell has used the story of the thylacine and the dingo in Australia to illustrate this point. We may follow him. The thylacine, or Tasmanian wolf, is the fiercest of the marsupials which form the typical mammalian fauna of Australasia. It has much of the appearance and habits of a true dog. It has disappeared from Australia and is now found only in Tasmania; its place has been taken by a true dog, belonging to the highest grade of mammals, the dingo. The dingo may

have accompanied the earliest human immigrants into Australia in a semi-domesticated condition. However that may be, it is a comparatively late arrival in Australia and it supplanted the thylacine. But how did it do it? There is no evidence that it attacked the thylacine. A "struggle for existence" no doubt took place; but it was a struggle of both animals against a common environment. The dingo was better adapted than the thylacine to this environment; precisely how it was better adapted we do not know and for our present purpose it does not matter. Another case is that of the black and brown rats. In several countries the latter has been supplanting the former for many years, but there is no evidence of fighting between them. For certain reasons, which are not altogether clear, the brown rat is better adapted to our prevailing conditions than the black rat and is ousting it. In both these cases the struggle of each species is directly with the surrounding conditions and only indirectly with the other species. Similarly the most common type of struggle between members of the same species is also indirect. Two competing members of the species are more often than not contending directly with nature and only indirectly with each other.

If we are going to employ the phrase "struggle for existence" to describe happenings of this kind, we should remember that we can also employ it to describe the comparable contest which takes place in a competitive industrial system. Of two firms competing in the same market one may supplant the other because its methods and its wares are better suited to the needs of its customers who therefore patronize it and forsake its rival. If for firms we substitute independent producers, we can find a parallel in the industrial system for the most common type of struggle for existence which takes place between members of the same species. Two blacksmiths may compete in the same village and one may oust the other if his services are better adapted to the needs of the local customers. So far at least as the higher animals are concerned, all group struggles are of this indirect type. The advance of serried ranks to battle is simply not in the picture. There is nothing among them which in the least resembles warfare.

It is said, however, that at times among certain social insects, the ants and the termites or white ants, there is something in the nature of concerted fighting. There are various types among the members of these specialized insect communities and to one type the name of "soldier" has been given. There is no doubt that

bands belonging to these communities do go on foraging expeditions. It may well be that, if bands from different communities meet, they defend themselves. There is, however, some doubt about the occurrence of any fighting between bands which could properly be called warfare. Having named one type in the community "soldier," it is only natural to look for battles and to interpret any occurrence as an incident in a campaign, however far fetched such an interpretation may be. In any case, if fighting occurs among these insects, it is a relatively rare happening among a few very specialized species belonging to a part of the animal kingdom far removed from that of which man is a member. There is no warfare, or anything remotely resembling it, among the vertebrates, that vast group of animals including the fish among the lowest and mammals among the highest of its members. The possible occurrence of something resembling warfare among certain specialized insects is therefore irrelevant because it does not illuminate the position so far as it concerns man.

It is also true, however, that all competition between members of the same species and members of different species belonging to the vertebrate group is not indirect. Most of it is no doubt indirect. But there are also direct clashes. When they occur it is usually the case that one animal is captured and consumed by another without any contest. There may, however, be resistance and a fight. Nevertheless individual clashes of this kind, while they may take the form of fighting, cannot be called warfare. The very essence of warfare is concerted fighting — an attack by one band upon another. But this does not dispose of the whole matter. It may be that clashes of this kind, occurring as they do among man's nearer relatives in the animal kingdom, become "naturally" or even perhaps "inevitably" transmuted into warfare in the case of man. If this is so, it may still be possible to assert that, so far as man is concerned, war is in a sense in the nature of things.

Among mammals contests between males of the same species may take place at mating time. Such encounters are seldom fought out to the death. Otherwise serious encounters between members of the same species are rare. It would seem to be exceptional for members of the same species to fight for food or for territory. Physical encounters between members of different species are relatively common in connection with the carnivorous habit. More often than not such encounters do not take the form

of contests; the whale engulfs its prey by the million and no semblance of resistance is or can be shown. But in other cases the hunted animal has some powers of defense and the effort to capture prey may assume the form of a contest. Now man is partly a carnivorous animal. He was also formerly subject to attacks by carnivores more powerful than himself. In consequence he may be said to possess an instinctive tendency to pursue and to defend himself. Whatever view we may hold as to the presence of specific instincts, there is no doubt that man is so emotionally disposed as to desire to attack under certain circumstances and to reply to attack by defense under others. The problem is whether — these dispositions being in the nature of things — it can be said that war is the "natural" consequence.

The first point to observe is that these dispositions, while no doubt generalized rather than specific, were evolved primarily in relation to the hunting of other species and to the defense from attacks of other species. In other words, in so far as man's disposition to enter into contests is specific, it is directed towards members of other species. Now, biologically, there is no resemblance between species and nations. They are not groups of the same order, and any tendency that man may possess to enter into hostility with other species does not carry with it the implication that there is a tendency to hostility between national groups. But the combative disposition is perhaps, as we have said, more generalized than specific. It may be urged that man is disposed under certain circumstances to fight with his fellows. This is certainly true. From time to time we all have feelings which would be relieved if we knocked the other man out. Is war built upon this "natural" basis?

A glance at human societies in all stages of culture shows that it has not proved to be a very difficult task to curb and regulate these clashes. They have always occurred. They still occur. But they can be held in check. In modern times they do not present a serious problem. During the evolution of what we call civilization the need for putting a check upon personal violence has become less and less of a matter causing serious concern to governments. Evidently, so far as man is combative, he is easily capable of being tamed. Even, therefore, if war is founded upon combativeness, there is hope of eliminating it. But is it in fact so founded? The argument for this view is based upon an obviously weak chain of reasoning. It must be supposed that somehow this

combative disposition, originally evolved primarily in relation to other species, and now generalized but so feeble that the immediate results which it brings about — namely individual contests — can easily be checked, is aroused between groups of the order of nationalities. A very little common sense and knowledge of international affairs ought to be enough to dispose of it. In any case it is a very far-fetched argument and the best method of dealing with it is to ask whether any more reasonable explanation of the origin of war can be found.

It is not the case, as is sometimes asserted, that the most primitive communities are peaceful. Feuds are common among them. By a feud is meant an organized retaliation by a part of the community upon some other part. War, by which is meant an operation conducted in the name of the community as a whole, is not as frequent as among more advanced societies. The reason for this is obvious. By definition war requires a more advanced degree of social organization. But how do feuds arise and what is the relation between feuds and war?

In primitive societies feuds usually owe their origin to an act of violence inspired by combativeness. But they may also arise because a taboo has been broken or a regulation infringed. The incident, whatever it may be, is seen by primitive man in the light of that rigid scheme of things which his growing intelligence has fashioned. The incident does not fit in. Something must be done. But it is logic and not impulse which inspires action. Joint action to punish the offender is demanded and is often undertaken more in a spirit of fear than of combativeness. It is not possible here to inquire further into the tangled problem of the springs of human action. It is enough to point out that while impulses, combative and otherwise, play a part in feuds, they do not, in the ordinary sense of the word, cause feuds. Feuds are not collective manifestations of combativeness; they are customs — very much as mother-in-law avoidance is a custom and not an instinctive manifestation of hatred. It may be supposed that warfare grew out of the feud. There is indeed evidence from the comparative study of human society that this was what happened. That being so, there is no case for the view that warfare is in the nature of things. War is a custom or habit in the technical use of those terms and as such can be eradicated, difficult though the task may be.

It remains to say something about quite another aspect of the biological subject, namely consequences of war. According to some

writers, such as von Bernhardi, the results are beneficial; according to others, such as David Starr Jordan, they are disastrous. One thing at least is clear; the biological consequences of war can be very important. We do now know beyond any possibility of dispute that the physical and mental characteristics of men are what we find them to be owing in no small measure to the inherited basis with which they began life, and we know that like tends to produce like. We also know that the inherited basis which one man receives may differ in the most profound manner from that which another man receives. One man may have an inherited predisposition to develop a black skin, another a white skin; one may have an inherited predisposition towards genius and another towards idiocy. If we put these facts together, it follows that, supposing that persons with a certain inherited basis are killed off by war rather than persons with another inherited basis, black skinned men rather than white skinned men for instance, there will follow profound biological results. In this case the inherited predisposition towards a white skin will be relatively far more widespread after the war than before.

Granting this much as common ground, we are led to ask how it comes about that such different views as to the biological consequences of war are arrived at. It will have been observed that biological consequences follow upon selective elimination; that is to say, they follow when persons with a special kind of inherited predisposition are killed off. Now, broadly speaking, selective elimination may take either one of two forms. A group of whites may go to war with a group of blacks and eliminate them. We may call this group selection. It may also happen that a group of persons, consisting of some who by inherited predisposition are physically strong and of others who are physically weak, may go to war and that the weak may fall in battle. We may call this individual selection. In this latter case it is certain individuals in a group, and not a whole group (as in the former case), who are selected for elimination. Generally speaking, it will be found that those who believe that the biological consequences of war are beneficial are thinking of group selection, whereas those who take the opposite view are thinking of individual selection.

If we now set out to examine the evidence as to the results of either kind of selection, we discover it to be very meagre. The plain fact is that we have very little solid evidence to go upon. Nevertheless there is reason to suppose that both those who think

group selection to be beneficial and those who think individual selection to be injurious, have overstated their case. Let us consider group selection. It is maintained that whenever in the course of history one group has attacked, overcome and eliminated another group, and possessed itself of the other's territory, there is prima facie evidence of the biological superiority of the former group. Its members are presumed to have been by inherited predisposition stronger, more energetic, more intelligent. It is therefore to the good of the race as a whole that the better group should replace the less well endowed. When considering arguments of this type we may first note the fact that even in past times group elimination has been less common than is often supposed. It is probable that in many cases what is taken for elimination was in fact "smothering" — that is to say, that many of the defeated group, especially women, survived, though outwardly, owing to the adoption of the customs of the conquering group, traces of the defeated were lost. The defeated were smothered rather than wiped out. In later times group elimination falls entirely out of the picture. Not even the most bloodthirsty patriot on the Allied side hoped that the war would end by the elimination of some sixty million Germans and the occupation of the vacant lands by victorious Frenchmen. Waiving this point, there are two main things to be said about this line of argument. First, victory is no proof of biological superiority. Victory tends to favor the big batallions of populous communities, and populous communities as such are not superior to smaller communities. Victory tends still more to favor those best equipped with weapons. But superior equipment is no proof of biological superiority. The possession of superior weapons is at least as often due to superior luck as to superior intelligence. The white settlers in America eliminated, or nearly eliminated, the Indian aborigines. The former had been lucky in the sense that generations previously circumstances in Eur-Asia had prompted the use of iron and had inspired other inventions. Since the settlers were armed with iron weapons, gunpowder and so on, the issue of the contest was never in doubt. The invaders may also have been biologically superior but, even if they were so, it was not primarily on this account that they won and all but wiped out the aborigines.

Secondly, although such indices as we have invented to measure inherited predispositions show vast differences between one man

and another belonging to the same group, they show little difference between the average member of different groups. Take intelligence, for instance. There are immense differences in respect of inborn intelligence and inborn physique between individual Americans or between individual Englishmen. But as between the average Englishman, the average American, Frenchman, German or Indian there are either no differences or they are so small as to be difficult to detect. If this holds for national or racial groups in general, as, broadly speaking, it apparently does, then group elimination would not be likely to have serious biological consequences. With these considerations in mind we must greatly reduce the claims made for group elimination as productive of biological consequences. It is hardly operative in historical times because, as mentioned above, group elimination in the true sense is almost confined to earlier times. In those earlier times group elimination may have had some biological results and they may have been on the whole beneficial. That we may admit, but the admission does not amount to much.

Of individual selection we cannot say, as we did of group selection, that the differences are small and that therefore the results of selection can be of no great magnitude. The differences between individuals are vast; that has been sufficiently stressed. The question is whether elimination within the group following upon warfare is selective. The argument, as generally put, runs as follows. In former times when no one, or at least no males, were left at home and all went out to battle, when missile weapons were not employed and fighting was man to man, it may have resulted that in general the weak and slow-witted fell while the strong and quick-witted survived. Later, however, the situation changed, until nowadays only those above a certain standard of physical and mental fitness are permitted to fight. The weaklings and the mentally deficient stay at home. Among those who do go the strong are as likely to fall as the weak because of the introduction of missile weapons. The best types may even be the most likely to fall because they take the most risks. As the process of army organization becomes more scientific, the most intelligent, as judged by the latest methods available, are made officers. In this manner the officers of the American army were appointed in the war, and the number of casualties among officers was higher than among the rank and file.

On these lines an impressive argument is built up. In modern

war only the better endowed part of the community is exposed to risk. The feeble and half-witted stay safely at home. Certain statistics have been produced to demonstrate the unfavorable biological results of war. Tschuriloff made a careful examination of the figures of the height of recruits for the French army in the nineteenth century and came to the conclusion that the Napoleonic wars had a measurably unfavorable effect upon the physique of the French people. Nevertheless it is certain that these claims must be scaled down. It should be remembered that in battle itself there is no selection of women, that is to say of half the population. The number of casualties again is often exaggerated. It is forgotten that disease accompanies war and attacks the non-combatants, who may suffer more severely than the combatants. It is alleged that the soldiers, that is the physically fittest, get married more easily than the non-combatants and therefore tend to leave more children. Dr. Gini has lately stressed these counteracting factors and has made some investigations into the consequences of the last war. He finds, for instance, no evidence from Italian data that those among the professional classes who perished were of greater intellectual promise or achievement than their surviving colleagues. But even Dr. Gini does not go further than to question whether war has had unfavorable results on intellectual character and to suggest that the unfavorable results on physical characters have been exaggerated. It was indicated above that the claims made for group selection as a favorable factor should be very much reduced. Some reduction, but not an equal reduction, seems called for in the case of the claims made for individual selection as an unfavorable factor.

It thus seems possible that before the dawn of history the biological consequences of war were not unfavorable. Group elimination sometimes took place, and when it had any biological significance the upshot was more likely to be favorable than unfavorable. The same may be said of individual elimination in early times. It is also possible that war was at one time socially beneficial. There was little to destroy and the habit of acting in common may have helped to bring about social cohesion which is the basis of civilization. Had war been deleterious on all counts, it is difficult to see how the human race could ever have reached the beginnings of civilization. At a later stage in the story, however, conditions changed. Group selection ceased to

be of much account and individual selection was more likely than not to be unfavorable. Socially, warfare became a disaster of the first magnitude. But that is a matter which falls without the scope of a paper dealing with biology and war. To a biologist war presents itself as a habit or custom. Warfare may have biological significance but the causes are not biological. Men are not impelled to make war because, together with the rest of the animal world, they are subject to a scheme of things of which warfare inevitably forms a part. That doctrine is due to a misunderstanding of the struggle for existence. The sooner this is generally realized the better. As long as there is a danger of bewilderment owing to these misunderstandings, so long there is an obstacle to any effort to bring about a saner and better state of affairs.

The present position of the discussion as to the biological consequences of war demands a few more words. It has been emphasized above that the data upon which a sound conclusion must rest are very scanty. There is in fact an international committee at work upon the matter, and when that committee has concluded its labors it may be possible to make more definite statements. In the meanwhile all positive statements should be distrusted. But positive statements are often made. It has been pointed out how easy it is to build up a case for thinking that modern war leads to biological deterioration. There may, however, be fallacies in the argument. The matter must be put to the test of hard statistical facts. Now let us suppose, as may quite possibly turn out to be the case, that modern war is not so biologically deleterious as is affirmed by a number of writers who have the ear of the public. What will be the result? It cannot but come about that the public, when it gets to know the facts, will think itself deceived. There will be a reaction going beyond the point demanded by the demonstration and it will no doubt be thought that the whole case against war, sociological as well as biological, has been weakened. Thus these well-meaning popularizers of the doctrine of the biological dangers of war may turn out to have damaged in popular estimation, in any case for a time, that part of the argument against war which rests on secure foundations. Such is only too often the fate of good causes. They have to be saved from those friends who support them for unsound reasons.

TWO LESSONS IN COLONIAL RULE

By Raymond Leslie Buell

ONE of the outstanding problems in the world today is the relation of "advanced" and "primitive" peoples. The problem has many aspects; but perhaps its most concrete form is found in the field of colonial government. Should the colonial powers cut their colonial possessions adrift, or should they relentlessly resist any demands for freedom? Should they attempt gradually to prepare their wards for self-government? And if so, what means should be taken to realize this end? The avowed theory of every colonial power, including the United States, is that its native wards should be trained for self-government. The task has usually proved discouraging. The more authority accorded the people on the spot, the more they protest against their rulers. And today, whether in the Philippines or in Porto Rico, whether in India or in French Senegal, wrestling matches are in progress between the administration which is responsible to a far-away central authority and the legislature which is responsible to a native electorate.

The British have showed, in parts of the world at any rate, a peculiar genius in meeting the colonial problem. Because of their own domestic history and characteristics they have not carried with them to far-away dominions any constitutional or philosophical preconceptions of what should or should not be done. Pragmatists and common lawyers, they have been accustomed to meeting each problem as it arose, and have attempted to find a solution which for the moment best satisfies the conflicting interests involved. Within recent years, however, they have realized that while each problem must be decided upon its own merits, the cumulative effects of a policy of makeshift may be disastrous. They are coming to take a longer view.

IN EAST AFRICA

One of the most serious situations anywhere in the British Empire is found in East Africa. The chief factors in it have already been recited in FOREIGN AFFAIRS [1] and need only be summarized here. Covering an area of about a million square miles, the five territories of East and Central Africa — the colonies and protec-

[1] "The Destiny of East Africa," by R. L. Buell, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, April, 1928.

torates of Kenya, Uganda, Nyasaland and Northern Rhodesia and the Tanganyika mandate — contain a population of 12,000,000 natives, 28,000 Europeans, and about 50,000 Indians. A part of this area has a high altitude and semi-temperate climate, and especially in Kenya a settler population has taken up a permanent abode. Since 1919 a controversy has raged over British policy in Kenya. The charge has been repeatedly made that white settlement there has resulted in the loss of native land and in indirect compulsion of native labor. The question before the British Government is whether to extend the Kenya system into Tanganyika and Uganda; whether the white communities in these areas are eventually to be given responsible government; and whether these areas are to be federated with a view to the creation of a new Dominion.

In 1924 the British Government despatched a parliamentary commission to study affairs in East Africa,[2] and in November 1927 it appointed a second commission composed of Sir E. Hilton Young as chairman, Sir Reginald Mant, Sir George Schuster, and Mr. J. H. Oldham, for the purpose of studying the desirability of establishing some form of closer union in East and Central Africa, and of advising as to the form of constitution which should be given territories where non-native immigrant communities have become permanently domiciled. The Commission proceeded to Africa in December 1927, returned to London in the following May, and has now published its report.[3]

Obviously the value of the Commission's practical recommendations would depend upon its views as to the fundamental question whether white settlement is to be pushed in East Africa or whether native interests are to be put first. The Commission does not hesitate in stating its position. After declaring that "the contact between the white and black races in Africa constitutes one of the great problems of the twentieth century," it proceeds to state that the greater part of East Africa is not suitable for white settlement. For the most part the area must be developed by native production. East Africa should not be regarded "so much as a home for the white race, but as providing a source of supply of food-stuffs and raw materials. . . . The main contribution that European settlement . . . can make to the wealth of

[2] "Report of the East Africa Commission," Cmd. 2387 (1925) H. M. Stationery Office.

[3] "Report of the Commission on Closer Union of the Dependencies in Eastern and Central Africa." Cmd. 3234 (1929) H. M. Stationery Office.


BRITISH EAST AFRICA
Scale of miles
0 100 200 300
ANGLO-EGYPTIAN SUDAN
White Nile
Lake Rudolf
BELGIAN CONGO
UGANDA
KENYA
ITALIAN SOMALILAND
Juba R.
Lake Albert
Namasagali
Mbulamuti
Kampala
Jinja
Eldoret
ENTEBBE
Lake Victoria
Kisumu
Nakuru
Tana R.
MASAI RESERVE
NAIROBI
Lake Kivu
RUANDA
URUNDI
Usumbura
Mwanza
Moshi
Voi
Mombasa
Kigoma
Tabora
Tanga
Uiji
Lake Tanganyika
Albertville
Dodoma
ZANZIBAR
DAR ES SALAAM
TANGANYIKA
INDIAN OCEAN
Abercorn
Tukuyu
Lindi
Masasi
Kionga
Lake Nyasa
Rovuma R.
NYASALAND
NORTHERN RHODESIA
MOZAMBIQUE
SOUTHERN RHODESIA

the world will be the stimulus it can give to the vast potentialities of native production." The Government is under an obligation to create and preserve a field for the full development of native life; once this is done, non-native immigration may be encouraged, if there appears to be room. Even then the Commission expresses doubts as to the possibilities of white settlement, because of climatic and social considerations.

It is easy to lay down the general principle that native interests are to be protected. The difficulty comes in applying this principle. Perhaps the greatest value of this report lies in its detailed recommendations regarding land, labor, and native administration policy. The Commission answers the question how much land should be set aside for native needs by declaring that the native population should be guaranteed an area sufficient to enable it to maintain a reasonable standard of living according to present methods of agriculture, and also to provide for such increases of population as may be expected before the natives have time to learn better or more intensive methods. Such native lands should be demarcated as a reserve, and no land within the reserve should as a rule be leased to Europeans. In addition to these reserves, the Government should have the power to set aside other lands which individual natives might purchase, or which might be added to the reserves. If any land is left over after these rules are applied, it might be alienated to Europeans. Within the native areas, the Government has a duty of developing native production and of controlling markets. Europeans should not be favored in regard to railway rates and the service of agricultural and veterinary officers.

Moreover, the Commission is insistent that European enterprise should be controlled so as not to disrupt native life. Excessive demands for native labor on the part of European enterprise must be "most damaging to native society and to the proper development of native political institutions." The report significantly adds that "it is necessary to regulate the number of natives who go out for temporary employment from the reserves so that the number of adult males absent at any time is not so great as to endanger the proper development of native social life and political institutions, and on the other hand to provide that those natives who leave the reserves and settle down to permanent employment in non-native undertakings are properly cared for." It is the business of the Government so "to regulate the influx of

new settlers as to avoid creating demands for labor in excess of what can be supplied without disturbance of native conditions." The Government should prevent the destruction of tribal authority "until there has been time for the native people to assimilate the new ideas introduced by western civilization, and to adapt their institutions to new conditions." This enunciation of the principle that white settlement should be controlled so as to prevent excessive labor demands is of capital importance.

Having set forth these guarantees of native development, the Report proceeds to an examination of the political problem as it exists in Kenya. Here the settlers have been strong enough to secure eleven elected members on the Legislative Council. While this body still has an official majority, the elected members have often exercised a dominating influence. The Colonial Office in London is supposed to control the Legislature on behalf of imperial and native interests. But the convictions of the settlers have been so strong and so vociferously expressed that, according to the Commission, the Imperial Government has tended to surrender to the men on the spot. The remoteness of the controlling authority has been a great source of weakness.

Nevertheless, in the Commission's view, responsible government for Kenya is out of the question,[4] for it would mean that a small European community, outnumbered by the natives 200 to 1, would have the right to govern not only themselves but also the native (and Indian) population. The British settlers in Kenya are as representative Englishmen as are to be found in the Empire. But it is not a matter of individual fitness; it is a matter of conflicting interests. The Commission likewise rejected Kenya's demand for an unofficial European majority in the legislature on the ground that such a step would inevitably lead to responsible government. It also ruled out the idea of dyarchy or of separate white and black areas on the ground that native interests are inseparable from non-native interests.

After rejecting the proposals advocated by many Europeans on the spot, the Commission now makes two concrete suggestions: (1) The official majority on the Legislative Council of Kenya should be abolished in favor of an unofficial, *inter-racial* majority. (2) A High Commissioner and a Governor-General for Eastern

[4] The chairman of the Commission dissented from this opinion, holding that while an elected majority is not suitable for the present, such a form is "perfectly reconcilable with our general scheme for the constitution of the Eastern Africa territories." Cmd. 3234, p. 245.

Africa (Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika) should be appointed to hold the balance between various races and to lay down and enforce a uniform native policy.

The proposed Kenya Legislative Council should continue to have eleven elected European members. But it should also contain four unofficial Europeans appointed by the Government to represent the native interests. The Commission made this recommendation in the belief that at present there were no native individuals suitable to serve on the Legislative Council. The Commission realized the difficulty in a colony as small as Kenya of finding Europeans disinterested and courageous enough to represent native interests. But it believed that returning officials as well as others could be induced to accept such a rank. The eleven elected Europeans, the four nominated European representatives of native interests, together with Arab and Indian members, would constitute an unofficial majority. The Commission believed that there are certain matters in regard to which the interests of all racial communities are alike, and one of its purposes in advocating this type of unofficial majority is to open the way to an increasing realization by all parties of these common interests. When an issue arose between native and non-native interests, the Government representatives on the Council would hold the balance of power. The elected Europeans, under this arrangement, would not be able to pass a measure which the Europeans representing native interests opposed, unless the elected Europeans found the official members upon their side. This unofficial majority by standing together might pass measures to which the Governor was opposed; but he should retain the veto power; while the Governor-General for East Africa should have the power to "certificate" the passage of necessary legislation, including financial measures.

How is the Indian population to be fitted into the system? As a result of a bitter controversy, the Indian population of Kenya were given the right to elect, on a communal franchise, five members to the Legislative Council, in comparison with eleven elected Europeans. They declined, however, to accept this compromise, and still demand a common electoral roll. The Commission frankly states its belief that the franchise was given to the Europeans in Kenya too hurriedly. And it expresses the belief that it should be abolished before it has taken deeper roots, in order to prevent conflicts arising out of inevitable demands by the

Indians and detribalized natives. In its place, the Report advocates what it calls a "civilization" franchise applicable to all races alike. Though realizing its defects, the Commission, in view of the special conditions in East Africa, recommends that such a franchise should be based upon an educational and property test. While for the time being the number of elected Indian and European representatives on the Legislative Council should remain the same, the Commission states that "the ideal to be aimed at is a common roll on an equal franchise with no discrimination between the races." The High Commissioner should institute a test census to determine the approximate number of persons in each racial community possessing the proposed qualifications.

The Commission was insistent that a uniform native policy must be followed in all the East Africa territories. One policy could not be followed in Kenya, and another policy in Uganda and in Tanganyika. The natives were quick to see differences in policy, and they would develop a common consciousness. The Commission also believed that the effectiveness of Imperial control, supposedly exercised through local governors, should be increased. In a frontier community, there are few governors with stamina enough to resist the insistent demands of a European population. And it is to strengthen this control that the Commission recommends the appointment of a High Commissioner for Kenya, Uganda and Tanganyika. He should institute inquiries with the view of bringing about uniformity in native policy and of unifying the control of certain administrative services. At the end of a preliminary period a Governor-General for Eastern Africa should be appointed. The Commission declared that his most important duty would be to supervise native policy in all of these territories and to see to it that the fundamental principles laid down by the Commission in regard to land, labor and native administration were enforced. He should make an annual report dealing with broad aspects of progress and policy. Local governors would continue to correspond directly with the Secretary of State; but the Governor-General could issue instructions in matters on which he wished to be consulted.

Is it possible to fit Tanganyika, a mandated territory, into this federation or closer union scheme? The Commission believed that it is. It cited the terms of the mandate which authorizes the establishment of a fiscal and administrative union or federation between the mandate and adjacent territories. It cited the

precedents of British Togo and the Cameroons and of Ruanda-Urundi which have been incorporated with adjoining territories. The Commission states that the responsibility of Great Britain to the League in regard to Tanganyika will not be impaired by the establishment of federation. It might also have pointed out that in view of the uniform native policy to be laid down in East Africa, the mandates commission would have, in case of federation, an indirect influence upon policy throughout the whole territory.

Such are the outstanding provisions of this remarkable report. The Commission has been scrupulously fair to the European communities in East Africa. Nevertheless the report is a blow at the white settlement idea. It rules out responsible government and even European unofficial majorities. It rejects the argument made by British officials and settlers in the past that the semi-temperate climate of East Africa justifies a native policy which cannot be supported on the west coast. The Commission insists that the full development of the native population be guaranteed by the Imperial Government. It has converted the federation plan from a device to extend white settlement into a device to protect native interests more effectively. While it does not recite in detail the shortcomings of existing policy, the report as a whole is a quiet but fearless criticism of the policies which Kenya has followed in the past. The members of the Commission deserve the commendation not only of Englishmen but of the outside world for the intelligence which they have applied to one of the burning questions of the present day. If the British Government puts into force the recommendations of this report it will remove the basis of the criticisms hitherto directed against its East Africa policy. Nor can the report fail to have an important if not decisive effect upon the future of Africa as a whole.

IN CEYLON

Another important contribution to the science of inter-racial relations and of colonial government takes the form of the recently published report of the Donoughmore Commission on the Constitution of Ceylon, a report which shows a profound knowledge of the structure and purposes of administrative machinery and is crammed with political understanding.[5] The members of

[5] "Ceylon: Report of the Special Commission on the Constitution," Cmd. 3131. July, 1928. H. M. Stationery Office.

this Commission were the Earl of Donoughmore, Sir Matthew Nathan, Sir Geoffrey Butler and Sir T. Drummond Shiels.

Ceylon, a large island lying off the coast of India, was long ruled by the King of Kandy, and then fell successively under the domain of the Portuguese, Dutch and British. The island's chief resources are tea, rubber, cocoa and copra. Its population of about 5,000,000 is far from homogeneous, a fact which has increased the difficulty of administration. More than half of the people are Sinhalese, who in turn are divided into the Low Country and the Kandyan people. There are a little more than half a million Ceylon Tamils, who originally came from Southern India but who have become an integral part of the population and who are found in a large number of professional and clerical positions. There are 312,000 Moslems, the descendants for the most part of Arab traders, together with 15,000 descendants of Malays brought originally from Java by the Dutch. Indian immigrants to the number of 700,000 labor on the tea and rubber estates. Then there are 11,000 Europeans who carry on much of the business of the island, besides a small but important "Burgher" community, the descendants of Dutch settlers.

In an effort to give representation to these classes the government in 1910 established a legislative council consisting of eleven official and ten unofficial members. Of the latter, four were elected by the European, Burgher and Ceylonese communities and the remainder nominated by the Governor to represent for the most part racial groups. With the growth of education and the spread of political intelligence, which was reflected in the activities of the Ceylon National Congress, a demand arose for a council in which the people should have a majority of seats. In order to prevent the deadlocks which inevitably arise between a governor and an elected legislature with real power, the British have usually favored the system of official majorities. But they realized that they could not reject the Ceylonese demands, and hence cast about for a system which would meet the local demands and yet not impede the effective administration of the territory. The scheme, as finally adopted in 1920 and amended in 1923, established a Legislative Council containing 37 unofficial and 12 official members. In other words, the people were given a majority of seats. Twenty-three of the unofficial members were elected upon a territorial basis and the others (except for three nominated members) were elected by the racial or economic communities,

according to the principle of "communal representation." In other words, the Indian population was allowed to elect two representatives, and so on for the other racial groups. In case this Council enacted legislation to which the government was opposed, the Governor could veto it. But what if the Council refused to enact legislation? To meet such contingencies the constitution provided that the Governor could certify that the passage of any measure was of paramount public interest, in which case it might be carried by the official members on the Legislative Council alone.

Despite this ingenious attempt to break deadlocks, many criticisms arose in Ceylon. It was for the purpose of investigating these criticisms that the commission headed by Earl Donoughmore was appointed.

In its report the Commission finds that many criticisms were justified. The unofficial majority of the Legislative Council had no executive responsibility and had become a permanent opposition to the Governor and to the civil service. Although the system had provided the unofficial majority with an education in the problems of government, it had not given them any administrative experience and it had turned them into permanently hostile critics. In not a single case had the Governor used his "certificate" power, because of the political difficulties and ill-feelings which it would have aroused. Instead of coming to the support of his officials when attacked, the Governor usually bowed to criticism, and as a result the officials were left "bewildered and disheartened"; their morale and initiative had been undermined. Officials had been obliged to serve two masters. "It is obvious," says the Commission, "that political progress cannot be in the best interests of the country if achieved at the expense of administrative efficiency." The system is "an unqualified failure."

In proposing reforms, the Commission was confronted with the alternative which the United States Government faces in Porto Rico and the Philippines — either of going forward or of going back. In Ceylon, however, no responsible person recommended a return to the "Crown Colony" system and the suppression of liberties already granted to the people. "Apart from the well-recognized difficulty of taking back power once given, it would not seem the policy of justice or of statesmanship to have recourse to such a step, unless or until the inhabitants of Ceylon had manifestly failed to avail themselves of a chance of success-

fully managing their own affairs under conditions, which, unlike those at present obtaining, gave them a fair opportunity of doing so with success." On the other hand, the Commission does not recommend complete responsible government. The Ceylonese are not yet adequately trained in administration and the electorate consists of only four percent of the population. Moreover, there are no parties in the country. And even if there were such parties, the Commission does not think it wise to advocate the blind extension of a parliamentary system which was possibly already proving obsolescent at home. Every parliamentary session in London saw a more complete subordination of the House of Commons to the Cabinet, and the protest of the individual against his "supersession" in deliberative bodies has become almost world-wide.

What system does the Commission therefore propose? In the first place, it proposes that the Legislature shall continue to have its present unofficial majority but that it shall be reorganized so as to deal not only with legislative but with administrative matters. It is to be given the name of "State Council," and shall be divided into seven executive committees, each representing a department in the administration and each having a permanent official as secretary. Thus there shall be a committee on education, another on public works, and so on. Each committee shall nominate from its members a chairman who shall also be minister of the department concerned. In other words, a Ceylonese who is made chairman of the committee on public works shall also be minister of public works, and responsible therefore to the committee and the State Council. Under the minister will be a corps of permanent officials, both British and Ceylonese. This is the parliamentary system found in most governments of the world, with the added feature, apparently based on the commissions of the League of Nations and on the Swiss Government, that a legislative committee should immediately supervise administrative matters. In other words, the members of the committee will be given an education not only in the making of laws but in the actual day-by-day conduct of government. Collectively the Ceylonese ministers will constitute a Board of Ministers, and if the Council defeats their annual estimates or gives them a vote of no confidence they should resign. But (as in the case of the Swiss Government) the Commission did not think that there should be necessarily any collective responsibility and no provision is made

for a prime minister. There should be full and free discussion — mutual give and take between the chairman and the executive committee. It is only when the chairman finds himself in constant opposition to the majority, so that harmonious relations are endangered, that he should resign.

The Commission believed that the British authority should retain the power to check the indiscretions or abuses possibly arising out of this system.

It therefore recommends, first, that three ministers, called Officers of State, should not be responsible to the State Council, but should remain immediately responsible to the British Governor. These are the attorney-general, the treasurer, and the chief secretary. The attorney-general should supervise the administration of justice and the elections; the treasurer should be responsible for the preparation of the budget and disbursement of revenue; the chief secretary should be responsible for the drafting of legislation, public service administration and national defense. This division of departmental heads, seven being in the hands of the State Council and three in the hands of the British Government, is in certain respects similar to the division of executive heads in the government of Porto Rico.

In the second place, all the branches of the public service are to be manned by permanent officials, some of whom will be British, although responsible to a Ceylonese minister.

Thirdly, it is believed that certain safeguards should be erected to prevent the State Council from cutting the ground away from under the permanent civil service. The Commission did not believe that the State Council should be entrusted with the power to fix the salaries of these officials. Decision in such matters should be vested in the Colonial Office, although the State Council should be free to offer advice. Every ten years the Colonial Office should send to Ceylon a Periodical Salaries Commission to recommend a salary scale. Moreover, a Public Service Commission should be established to advise the Governor in regard to appointments and promotions (such commissions already exist in the Dominions and in India), thereby to a certain extent removing appointments and promotions from political pressure.

Finally, the Governor shall retain a right of veto. "For with every transference of responsibility to representative organs," says the Commission, "the Governor must be given such additional reserve powers as will enable him to see that this responsi-

bility is not wrongly exercised." Nevertheless, the Commission recommends that the Governor should as a rule not veto a bill unless it contained provisions of a character bringing it within categories clearly defined in the constitution, such as bills relating to defense, imposing racial disabilities, or affecting the administration of justice. In addition, he should retain the "certificate" power. Likewise he should have the power to veto administrative measures. And the Commission laid stress upon giving the Governor power to refer back to the State Council any measure in the hope that a compromise might be reached. In the view of the Commission, "the functions of the Governor will in general be negative rather than positive, supervisory rather than executive. He will no longer be responsible himself for the administration of the island; his duty will be, first and foremost, to see that those on whom the responsibility will now fall do not infringe the principles enunciated in the constitution for their guidance. . . . But he must inevitably play a large part in establishing the new administration on a sound basis. In this task he must be more active as a brake, as a stabilizing force, and as an agent for reassuring the nervous that he could be under a system of full responsible government. But he must equally avoid the other extreme. . . ."

In passing judgment upon the franchise question the observations of the Commission are more interesting still. It concludes that the system of communal representation, in which each race or religion votes separately for its members, has not worked to the best interests of the island. Religious tolerance is essential in a country desiring democratic institutions; and if tolerance exists, there is no need for the protection of a particular faith which the special representation of a faith implies. The aim of communal representation had been to develop friendliness between the different communities. But in the Commission's opinion the very existence of communal representation had tended to prevent the development of such relations; only by its abolition could a true national unity be developed. Increased and new claims for communal representation were being made, so that instead of ten such groups in the Council the number might readily become fifty. This criticism of communal representation is bound to strengthen criticism of the same institution in Kenya and in India.

The Commission also rejects the system of proportional repre-

sentation. But in order to prevent the Sinhalese from capturing all the seats, and in order to give the European community, among others, representation, the Commission proposes that after a general election the Governor should have the power to nominate to the State Council 12 unofficial members, of whom not more than six should be Europeans. In making such nominations the Governor should endeavor to make the State Council more generally representative of national interests. Altogether the new State Council will have 65 members elected upon a territorial basis.

At present the franchise in Ceylon is confined to men possessing certain property and literacy qualifications. As a result only four percent of the population may vote. Curiously enough, the Ceylon leaders, while advocating full responsible government, expressed satisfaction with the existing franchise. Fearing the establishment of oligarchy, and believing that the backward character of social and industrial legislation would be altered if the political circle were broadened, the Commission advocates a wider participation in the government. Its opinion seems to be that the greater the electorate the more difficult would corruption and manipulation become. Only by exercising the franchise could political intelligence be developed. The Commission believed that the property restriction was unsound. "A respectable citizen without property is more affected than an owner of property by the goodness or badness of the constituted authority. . . ." It did not even like the literacy test. Ability to read and write was no evidence of intelligence; the illiterate countryman with his "horse sense" is a better judge of character and wiser than many people with a little book-learning; newspapers and campaign literature sometimes give a less satisfactory view of candidates than thought and discussion in which it is possible for illiterate people to indulge. In Ceylon, where 45 percent of the children receive no education, a literacy test would have to be so elementary that it would be of little value as an educational goal. Many of the persons of low caste were illiterate, but they would be given a self-respecting status by means of the ballot. The franchise should not be confined to the educated classes because the development of responsible government required the influence of the rank and file. The Commission therefore recommends universal manhood suffrage over 21, and universal suffrage for women over 30.

Such is a sketch of the scheme proposed by the Donoughmore Commission. Its unique feature is that which invests administrative responsibility in the State Council. The plan has been vigorously criticized in some of its features by native members of the Legislative Council who feel that it does not grant them the authority they deserve.[6] There are no doubt British officials who feel that the plan goes too far. While attack upon two fronts may not be exactly pleasant, it seems to show that the kernel of the report is sound.

LESSONS OF THE TWO REPORTS

Such are the provisions of these two reports. They are important because of their conclusions and because of their method. The problem of East Africa is of more immediate importance than the problem of Ceylon. Yet, in one sense, both problems concern the method of governing a "mixed state" or inter-racial community — a problem of vital concern to the United States because of its negro population. The report of the Donoughmore Commission especially will influence the recommendations of the Simon Commission in India, and it should prove useful to those interested in the future of Porto Rico and the Philippines.

From the standpoint of method, these two reports are the embodiment of the scientific process applied to human relations. The members of the Commissions were economists, editors, professors, members of parliament, representatives of missionary enterprise. They were educated men, who knew how to read and to observe and to make use of experts placed at their disposal by the Colonial Office. Their reports are based upon evidence given by hundreds of witnesses representing every point of view; they reflect a sound knowledge of political science; they have obviously been motivated by a desire to do justice to every interest involved. It is in this method that the British Government is coming to excel; and it is this method that the United States Government needs to apply to its dependencies, and even more in its dealings with Haiti, Cuba and Nicaragua.

[6] See *The Times* (London), Nov. 2, 17, 1928. The Ceylon Legislative Council voted in favor of orthodox responsible government. To this Mr. Amery replied that it was quite impracticable to grant responsible government to Ceylon; while the Donoughmore report might be modified in detail, he would not accept any amendments which would destroy the balance of the scheme.

REGIONALISM AND NATIONALISM

By N. S. B. Gras

WE are born into the state as into the family. When we look backwards into the time before there was a state we experience a sense of satisfaction with the political community of which we are part. The ancient Egyptian and Roman, the citizen of the Catholic mediæval world, probably felt much the same way. Yet what they accepted as permanent has changed, what they thought of as the highest good is now regarded as faulty. It does not seem extravagant to conclude that there are always elements of decay at work within the political tree at the same time that rivals are struggling against it for moisture in the ground and for light from the sky. Some of our contemporaries, scanning the horizon, see signs of disaster to the state as it is now constituted mainly in the threat of a general war or in the development of revolutionary class warfare. But the elements of gradual decentralization and devolution that are contained within every state are likely ultimately to prove more potent because, as some might put it, they are more "insidious." One of the internal elements, the development of which may affect the nation both directly through political action and indirectly through political or social philosophy, is "regionalism."

Before the national state came into being, there was everywhere some kind of regionalism based on ethnic or cultural considerations. In Europe the tribal organization, though in many ways weak, was dominant. It might be West Saxon, Lombardic or Visigothic; it might be mobile or fixed. Sometimes it was strong in the face of enemies, always it was weak in the face of internal dissensions. As this loose tribal state grew more powerful, the local elements crystallized in the form of provinces. Some of these provinces had their day and disappeared. Others have persisted as ethnic, cultural, or economic entities down to the present time. Northumberland has gone, but Provence is a reality. Kent has lost its distinctiveness, but Tuscany still means a great deal. In present-day France the elements of regionalism are one of the leavening influences in national literature and popular thought.

As towns arose and as an urban middle class came into existence, a great deal of personal property was amassed — gold and silver, foodstuffs and clothing, weapons and tools — which was

used by the ruler to strengthen the state. The artisans, merchants and money-lenders of the town were willing to help the king in return for assistance against the landed aristocracy, the hereditary enemies of both. The wars that were fought between states led to some popular enthusiasm (for example, "St. George for Merrie England"), and the Church anointed the head of the monarch with a divine right which even he had not hitherto suspected. A civil service was developed to do the state's work and a military service to do its fighting. A treasury, or at least credit, worked miracles at home, while a consular and diplomatic service looked after interests abroad. The old nobility yielded or disappeared, while a new one without local roots came into being to serve the state. Distant trade, opened by regulated and joint-stock companies, brought enormous profits into the state. Colonization was made possible and privateering became a gentlemanly pursuit.

In order to increase its strength the state developed a mercantile policy. This was not peculiar to Lord Burghley or England, Colbert or France, but has come into being in widely different lands at various times — in North America as the work of Alexander Hamilton and Sir John A. Macdonald, in Germany as the contribution of Prince Bismarck, in Russia as the ambition of Count Witte. The aim was to help the state grow powerful economically so that it might be invincible in war. Make the shipping fleet strong, grow plenty of food, manufacture ironwares, export more than you import, and your state with its treasured past, its hallowed religion, and its superior culture will survive — perhaps even dominate all others. Keep all the people at work; they will then give no trouble at home and at the same time they will provide an abundance of wares for export and shut off the need for import. Gold must flow in — for the purposes of war or peace. And what wars became possible! The first Hundred Years' War was fought against France by England with only the backing of localities — particularly towns; the second Hundred Years' War (1689–1815) was fought with the backing of a mercantilistic state and a nationalistic spirit.

It was perceived even before 1700 by the Tory Free Traders of England, and after 1750 by the Physiocrats of France, that the methods and many of the concepts of the mercantilists were faulty. Wealth could be engendered better by throwing over the minute regulations of the past. Foreign trade could not produce a

favorable balance for long because ultimately the excess of exports is checked by the rise of prices at home, as David Hume showed. Let there be free trade and brotherly love among nations. Such was the doctrine of the most advanced nations, which the others were supposed to accept. And accept it they did — this *Manchesterthum*, as the Germans and Austrians call it — until they saw that it was not a universal doctrine but one suited only to well-developed countries.

But the point of interest here is that both the policy of mercantilism and that of liberal free trade were based upon an emphasis on material wealth. Both stressed the accumulation of goods, forgetting the welfare of human beings. Efficiency in production was erected as the national god. Lands were enclosed for effective agriculture; mines were opened and men sent into dark holes to gain their livelihood; factories were established, where first women and children were worked to the limit of endurance and then the men were brought in. Apart from adopting some ameliorative legislation, the state accepted and furthered all this. The state had done the needful thing, but had gone too far, and had forgotten that it was the instrument of all the citizens and not just of the wealth-owning classes. As a challenge to this condition arose various kinds of social reconstruction theories, commonly described by the word socialism. They started in England, France and Germany and spread elsewhere. As always, the protagonists of the new doctrine went far both in their advocacy of a new order and in their denunciation of the old. Probably the chief contribution of socialism in this respect is to correct the emphasis in life rather than to create any new organization of its own.

We are led naturally to speculate whether the state has not made another mistake, and whether this mistake also is not going to lead to a reaction and a change. The state has grown fat and strong on the exploitation of one region at the expense of another, just as formerly it followed the interests of the capitalist and middle classes to the exclusion of the welfare of the proletariat. Just as socialism came in to correct the class emphasis, so regionalism will have to rise, in fact is rising, to offset the tendency to favor one region and neglect another. It seems inevitable that regionalism, a movement mainly of the middle class, as socialism is of the proletariat, will prove a serious challenge to the national state as it exists today, in part directly through political action

but more especially through the development of political ideas. It will help to form a social point of view which is broader, more rational and economic, and more progressive, than the national point of view.

The bearing of regionalism upon nationalism can be brought out only by an examination of actual regional developments in the modern world and by the growing emphasis which a few social scientists are putting upon the regional point of view. Business men have seen the situation — or, rather, have felt the pinch — but they have not yet formulated a regional theory of general application. Since there are different kinds of regionalism, with varying promises of success, we must stop to consider them as they are.

In New England the Puritan spirit once dominated all the activities of life. Then as it began to be rivalled in the nineteenth century by the more free attitude which was held by the incoming Irish, French Canadians, and others, it began to spread to other parts. The system of slavery was one of the things which it came into contact with and which it could not tolerate. There is no thought here of taking sides on that particular issue. The fact of interest to us is that when America destroyed slavery and established a great national party of virtuous feeling and virtuous traditions, Puritanism lost New England but conquered America. The South's regional point of view was not respected.

But it cannot be said that either ethnic or cultural regionalism died in America with the destruction of slavery and the national victory of Puritanism. In the Southeast there is a strong Anglo-Celtic civilization; and in Quebec and on the fringes of New England there is a French-Canadian group with a point of view that resists many elements of progress. In the Central Northwest there is a great Lutheran body of Scandinavians and Germans that has much in common, though it is not absolutely homogeneous. The question is whether the American nation is going to respect these and other regional peculiarities, or whether it will squelch them in favor of a sublime uniformity.

There are economic regions in America also — the cotton belt, the spring-wheat belt, the winter-wheat belt, the dairy belt, and others less easily recognized. Each of these develops its own ways of thinking and its own political policies based on economic conditions. But they one and all are transient, the temporary reflections of a condition that is changing, not through design or na-

tional policy, but through internal changes brought about by the boll-weevil, the black-stem rust, and the like.

In Canada we see a most interesting case of regionalism arising from a lack of regard for economic needs. Over sixty years ago when the Maritime Provinces were being brought in to form the Dominion, there were grave misgivings among many of the people concerned. Time has proved the sceptics right. Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Prince Edward Island have seen some of their natural resources exhausted and many of their enterprising children, unable to find a satisfactory living at home, tempted off to other parts. Villages have remained villages, and towns have struggled on without growing. No commercial center has arisen. No outstanding institutions have come into being. There is hardly a single object of great local pride. Here is Old World stagnation in the New Hemisphere!

To redress this regional grievance a firm protest has been made under the leadership of F. B. McCurdy of Nova Scotia. The evils have been pointed out in speech and writing, and at times the alternative of a union with the United States has even been adumbrated, though certainly more as a threat than as a measure of practical politics. Where *can* the products of this region be sold? There are lumber and fish and coal. Theoretically, these might be sent to Quebec and Ontario, but actually the distance makes this too expensive. Boston would be the obvious market, but in this direction stands the high tariff wall. Of course there is the mother country across the seas. But in economic matters she is a stern parent, giving no great favors to sons and daughters. The Maritime Provinces can fish far afield, and send their lumber to the West Indies for fruit; but that is not enough. If only they could receive regional treatment, if only they could go to the nations of the world as a unit and bargain! They know they have something to offer. But in the face of such aspirations stands an established fact: they are a part, an insignificant part, of Canada. They have the privilege of watching their sister Ontario become industrial behind the supporting buttresses of the national tariff. Halifax and St. John can tabulate the increases in population and wealth of Montreal and Toronto. It is no mean boast that you are a Canadian; but it is not very profitable for you to belong to the dead or dying part of Canada. The Dominion guarantees to Canadians much that its citizens hold dear, including a good system of education and a parliamentary government. The loyalists

of the Maritime Provinces must take satisfaction in these things. But still, Canada to them does not stand for economic opportunity or common justice in trade. Canadian politicians have not been entirely unmindful of the situation. The Maritime Provinces have been left with a parliamentary representation somewhat above their strict due, and one of the railroads that serves them has long been a national charge. The main situation, however, remains as before. Canadian nationalism is not an unmixed blessing to all parts of Canada.

There is still another sort of economic regionalism — metropolitan regionalism — and it is the most likely to challenge the state in a way to be heard, because it represents rich, well-organized, and somewhat self-sufficing communities.

The outstanding illustration of metropolitan regionalism is London, which started early to climb to a position of economic preëminence and which went farther than any other center in the Old World. As early as the sixteenth century it began to organize the trade of a wide hinterland, and gradually became the clearing house in rivalry with Amsterdam. It was largely to help London that the navigation laws were passed. These later came to be oppressive to the American colonies, but they served the useful purpose of helping to build up a big commercial city, with great men of business, warehouses, docks and ships. Since it was the joint-stock trading companies of London which had done the early colonizing in Virginia and had paved the way in Massachusetts, it was not unnatural that the trade laws should be framed so as to favor the city which had exerted itself to lay the economic foundations of an empire. Commercial regions had existed before, but the ancient and mediæval towns usually found some obstacle in the way of their developing a hinterland. Athens and Venice could grow only so far, without coming into competition with rival neighbors. Lisbon had a shallow background, as had the Phoenician towns of early days, though they sent their ships far afield and prospered. Paris had a large area in which to extend its influence, but until the French Revolution the provincial barriers helped to keep Paris from attaining commercial greatness. London was, in short, the first to have a great and rich region at its feet, and the first to link up such a region with trade in foreign parts, the Baltic and the Mediterranean, North America and southern Asia, the West and the East Indies.

London's hinterland was in no sense a compact area but was

quite irregular, extending along the coast of England, up the navigable rivers, and inland wherever the neglected roads were passable for pack-horse or ox-cart. The metropolis procured coal from Newcastle, woolen cloth from Yorkshire, wheat from Norfolk and Hampshire, and tin from Cornwall, and for these it paid in linens from Ireland, glass from Venice, spice from the East, furs and tobacco from America, and sugar from the West Indies. Never did there exist a region in a truer sense. Here was a large group of men living in varying but close degrees of economic and social dependence one upon another. Of course they were hardly aware of the implications of the situation. To them London was the great *political* metropolis, and the region, like the rest of England, appeared to be made up of bishoprics and counties, with their local institutions, their schools and fairs.

Ever since the sixteenth century London had been gaining in capital resources and in financial knowledge and skill. From a city dependent on Antwerp and Amsterdam, London came to be the center of world finance. It was a real milestone when the Bank of England was established. But that bank remained a London bank until, in the early nineteenth century, it established branches in the hinterland and in the north. Then as the joint-stock banks grew larger and larger through consolidation, the concentration of financial activity in London became more and more marked. It was in London that the capital for investment was available. The governments of the world went there, as did private persons who needed a large loan. London, long the discount market for England, became also the investment market for much of the world.

Here, then, was the most highly commercialized and financial region of the world, with a rich hinterland of agriculture and with some mining and manufacturing, having as its nucleus the metropolitan city of London. As a commercial organization it had an entity, but of course no isolation. To it went wares and people, ideas and news from the whole world. And from it emanated contributions, both material and cultural. From the days of the Spanish Armada to the battle of Trafalgar the English navy had to fight for the supremacy of London. But from Trafalgar to the battle of Jutland, London found nothing that really constituted a threat. The pound sterling sat securely on its throne, with absolute commercial sway over its hinterland, a strong influence in the north, and economic mandates on every continent.

Two circumstances made it possible for London to develop into an economic metropolis. One was internal free trade and the other was a location favorable for overseas commerce at a time when overseas connections were vital.

America has been the child of England in more ways than one, and most of the inheritances have been accentuated and magnified. Whereas England had one great metropolitan region, America has ten or twelve, either developed or developing. In the East, the rival cities of Boston, New York and Philadelphia succeeded in carving out territories of commercial dominance, especially following the construction of the Erie Canal. In the West, first Chicago and St. Louis, then the Twin Cities and Kansas City, established themselves supreme in their economic provinces. In the South, New Orleans apparently has lost; and on the borders, Cincinnati and Baltimore have had indifferent success. On the Pacific, it remains to be seen whether there is room for but one metropolis or for three. San Francisco's rivals, Los Angeles to the south and Seattle to the north, both have serious handicaps.

As a result of industrial development, the Southeast now seems likely to become the first metropolitan region in the whole southland, probably with Atlanta as the center. If trade with South America and with the Orient should develop considerably, as may well be the case, St. Louis and San Francisco would gain heavily. Under such circumstances perhaps Chicago alone of the older regions could hold its own relative position. If Canada and Mexico should ever come into the great North American nexus, then other regions of the United States would probably forge ahead, notably the Central Northwest and the Gulf Southwest. How much the Boston area would gain by the addition of the Canadian Maritime Provinces without the island of Newfoundland is problematical. At any rate, New England does not possess either the coal of the Maritime Provinces or the iron of Newfoundland. It must struggle on somehow without them.

New England has had plenty of struggle since 1921. Indeed we have here the ripest regional experience on the North American continent. First came the rise of Boston to a position of some commercial eminence, largely as a result of its coastal trade and local inland traffic. Lacking a great river artery, Boston was helped further by the growth of railroads. Industries concentrated their selling and buying there. Finally came Boston's undisputed financial hegemony throughout New England. The region steadily

increased the utilization of its resources and built up a surplus; not without losses, however, and not so rapidly as some other regions. Now it is threatened, some say with decline, others say simply with the necessity of further economic readjustment.

New England was at its highest point, in comparison with other Eastern regions, from 1820 to 1850. After that, it lost in general agriculture to the more westerly states, in wool to the far West, in commerce to New York City, in shipbuilding to the middle Atlantic states, in automobiles to Michigan; and now, in the manufacture of the coarser textiles, it is losing to the South, and in the making of coarser shoes to the Mississippi Valley. Its raw cotton, wool, hides and iron come from far afield. Its coal must be brought from increasing distances as the eastern mines are gradually depleted. Add to these handicaps the old age of the district. Businesses, long established and long successful, have tended to stagnate. This is said to be true in accounting. It is admittedly the case in marketing, the old commercial system being still much relied upon, advertising being indulged in but sparingly, and market analysis being conspicuous by its neglect. Styles lag and displays have been infrequent and undistinguished. Factory machinery has become antiquated, and its overvaluation for tax purposes is a severe handicap to production. Much of the trouble has been summed up as a decline in personnel. Textile manufacture has long been the occupation of gentlemen whose main concern has been income rather than effective production. Perhaps the influence of the dead hand of trust companies, though real, has been exaggerated. Certainly there has been a long continued social selection which has persuaded many of the most enterprising younger men to move to other parts. Thus has a situation long familiar to Old England visited her namesake in the New World.

In the period from 1921 to 1925 there was gloom everywhere in New England, and in spots blank despair. The harbors seemed empty, the railroads were languishing, interurban lines were being given up, more farms abandoned, many factories closed, and industrial towns hard put to it to continue. Industrial plants were a drug on the market and water power was sold, or about to be sold, for domestic lighting and heating. Of course much of this was after-war retrogression and was common to several regions. But the intensity of certain phases of it and the combination of

all, were peculiar to New England. Only the invested capital of the region saved it from further decline.

In 1925 the New England Conference and Council, representing six states, came into existence; and for one reason or another within three years there was an improvement in outlook and in certain instances also in fact. Nowhere in America, perhaps in the world, has there been more stock taking, self-analysis, planning for the future. Governors, representatives, legislators, chambers of commerce have become active in local economic affairs. Talk and study have been followed by action. Panicky firms about to move away have been induced to remain. New industries have been established in towns where they would not compete with old ones. A search is being made for unused resources. And at last New England has been persuaded to advertise. The common boosting attitude of business in other regions has been brought in to help out the sale of products which excellence alone could not dispose of.

A new regional philosophy has come in with the new organization. It seems that probably not permanent decline but re-adjustment is at hand. Many of the recent fears are set down as mere panic. Let some of the industries go; others remain and new ones can be established. Let the region patronize its own products. The region must also fight for its rights at Washington. Some think there should be lower duties on the raw materials imported and higher duties on finished goods in order to protect the region's products. The Interstate Commerce Commission should give more favorable railroad rates, and the Shipping Board has been persuaded (1928) to the plan of reducing ocean steamship rates. A federal "Truth in Fabrics" law should be passed to prevent undue competition from the inferior wares of other districts. There should be a reduction of taxes on the small corporations so numerous in New England. The present system of exempting certain non-industrial securities from federal taxes should be abolished so as to direct capital into New England's industries. The Great Lakes project should be encouraged so as to provide power for northern New England and a demand for many regional products. No national subsidy is to be tolerated for western agriculture.

In short, New England is formulating its wants. It may err in its reasoning as to what is possible and what is advantageous, but it is developing a policy. Here is regional mercantilism more fully

formed than in the Maritime Provinces of Canada or in the Central Northwest.

But New England is not the only American region which has become self-conscious. The Central Northwest, roughly the Ninth Federal Reserve area, has been much distressed since 1918. It has a great, though undeveloped, hinterland, from the Twin Cities of St. Paul and Minneapolis to the Rocky Mountains. But it has no foreland. Between it and New England lie lakes and mountains. The lakes freeze in winter and the mountains are always hard to climb. And Ontario pokes itself right across the intervening space. There is no direct easy passage from Boston to the Twin Cities, no water-level route, no great transportation system.

In spite of these handicaps the Central Northwest flourished — up to about the end of the late war. The Panama Canal, however, has invited Eastern shippers to send their wares to the Pacific Coast by sea; one great northwestern railroad has gone into bankruptcy partly on this account. Because of the continuous raising of wheat the region no longer can be made to yield the excellent hard spring variety so much in demand for the making of bread. Another wheat (durham) has come in to take its place as a crop, at least in part, but the mills of Minneapolis languish. They must either pay the duty on Canadian wheat, as yet unspoiled by rust, or bring in the hard winter wheat from Kansas. To complete the misery, favorable railroad rates were taken away from the Twin Cities. Now much of the milling that used to be done in the region can be more profitably carried on elsewhere. After the war, too, this region suffered from the same disadvantage that all agricultural regions found themselves in as compared with industrial regions: the prices of their wares fell, while those of manufactured goods remained high. Banks failed, stores were unoccupied, farms deserted, and people moved from place to place seeking better conditions.

Relief will doubtless come in part through the development of the Pacific Northwest and the commerce that will originate there. But forests have been depleted, fertility skinned off the soil, and much of the best iron ore carried off for use in other parts. In order that the long period of re-adjustment may be faced as intelligently as possible, regional efforts at organization and planning have been undertaken. The bankers and the chambers of commerce have been active, but so far with little apparent result.

Something may come from the plans of a group of scholars at the University of Minnesota, who are investigating the needs of the region and working to develop a regional consciousness. A regional atlas will soon be finished. Studies have been made of the marketing situation and are now to be made of the region's transportation facilities. Again we see, as we saw in the case of New England, that it is a regional decline or re-adjustment that leads to conscious planning and coöperative effort. Man seems to have become competitive and individualistic; only when he is goaded by necessity does he combine with others and think socially about economic problems.

To aid in exploiting our national resources the Department of Commerce has divided the United States into nine regions and has undertaken a survey of each. One argument for doing this was that the Government ought to do in the field of domestic commerce what it had for some time been doing in the field of foreign commerce. The first of the regional surveys, called the "Commercial Survey of the Southeast," appeared in 1927. The district in question is put down as one of the "definite economic provinces," possessing "homogeneity in fundamental economic factors." It has a long growing season, plenty of timber, and great resources of coal and iron. Undeveloped at present, it has promise of a great future. It remains to be seen, incidentally, whether Atlanta is going to be able to concentrate in its hands the big business affairs of the region.

After these few instances of the dissection of the nation — by many thought to be one and indivisible — into its component parts, we perhaps ought now to try to define a "region" more exactly. A state we can define. It has an organization and boundaries, a name and a flag. It has a recorded history. But what is a region? Clearly it is non-political and non-administrative. This is what makes it rather difficult to comprehend. All we can say is that it is a territory which possesses enough of the measure of sameness to distinguish it fundamentally from its neighbors.

There are regions that are almost wholly climatic, regions where as yet man plays little part. There are culture areas such as Clark Wissler has found existed among the primitive Indians in America. There are the black-bread and white-bread areas of Europe. There are the Rivieras of the Old and New Worlds with their marked "consumer's economy." Inland there are the "goitre belts" where unacclimatized people live at their peril.

But the regionalism that is of greatest importance is metropolitan. Here we have an area inhabited by producers and consumers who from a radius usually of over a hundred miles look to one big center for marketing their products and securing their supplies. Not all of the people of the region are equally strongly or equally continuously under the sway of the commercial metropolis; but all are at times dominated by it, except perhaps those living near the borders of two or more areas.

Nourished in a friendly fashion by the state, the metropolitan region, without any formal sort of constitution and until recently without plan, has grown to be a potential rival of the state. Born of a mixture of physical and economic convenience, it promises to take on a measure of cultural unity. Under the guidance of business men of large calibre, it is likely in America to develop a policy that leads at once to the conservation of regional interests and the advancement of general social welfare. Rooted as it is in the facts of nature rather than in political expediency, it promises to have vitality and endurance.

The direct effect of regionalism may be to make the state weaker politically but stronger economically and socially. Or the region, looking to regional convenience, may make new alignments leading to the creation of new states, or to international states (European, American, and so on), or ultimately to a world state. All this is of course the purest speculation. But it is a part of intellectual candor at least to recognize that the Maritime Provinces of Canada would be better off in the metropolitan region of Boston. Similarly, there is room for one great metropolis at Seattle or at Vancouver, but not for one at each. The disrobing of Vienna and of Constantinople are crimes against metropolitan regionalism which are bound to cost dear. It is a curious fact that few peoples have followed the Scots of Scotland in accepting material betterment as the foundation of social and cultural advance.

But what we would rather emphasize here is not the direct but the indirect effect of regionalism. It is true that the state was not the result of man's deeply laid plans: it grew, and only later did men learn how it had happened. The state was a social evolution. But conditions are different today; we are much more politically, economically and socially conscious. We are evolving a whole congeries of elaborate studies in various social sciences. It is just here that regionalism promises to have its

most immediate influence. Gradually there is being built up an enormous body of information about human activities not primarily centered in the state. It is significant that we no longer study political economy but economics. The science of government is much broader than political science. As rivals to the state and its subdivisions, there are the family, the association, the mob, and the religious group. But there is also the super-state of some kind; and alongside of it should be placed the region, which, because it is nearer to the individual, is likely to exercise a more potent influence over him.

The magnificent sweep of anthropology is not limited by anything so insignificant as the frontiers of the state. Geographers today pay little attention to political boundaries in their studies. Sociologists are making local and regional studies without much thought of the bearing on state or national groupings. American historians have long been compelled to pay attention to a rather crude kind of regionalism under the name of sectionalism. Economists are now beginning to consider regional prices of goods, services and credit. Lagging behind, but hopefully repentant, is political science, the study of government, which has long been concentrating all its attention on the state's relation to the deity, the dynasty, to its own social classes, and to other states. Time will have to elapse before students of government come fully under the influence of the new non-national point of view; and more time still before citizens can hear a new voice. Then it may be recognized that there has occurred an emancipation as great as the divorce of social thinking from theology and from ethics. In this emancipation of the social sciences from political prepossession and domination, the growth of regionalism, born of the need of a nicer adjustment of man to his immediate environment, will probably play a prominent part.

GREECE SINCE THE RETURN OF VENIZELOS

By William Miller

AFTER more than four years' absence from political life, Mr. Venizelos on July 4 of last year became Prime Minister of Greece for the fifth time, and in the subsequent General Election obtained such an overwhelming victory that he became the constitutional dictator of his country. Only fifteen Royalists, including only one Royalist leader, Mr. Tsaldares, were elected, and even such a Royalist stronghold as the Peloponnese returned Venizelist deputies. The Royalists have taken their defeat like sportsmen; the bitterness between them and their opponents has sensibly diminished; and, if some extremists still refuse to have converse with Mr. Venizelos, the less intransigent admit that the Greek people, tired of frequent political changes, wanted a strong man at the head of the Government. On his side, the Premier has been generous to his adversaries. He included two Royalists in his Cabinet and has praised the Royalist opposition in the Chamber for its objective and useful criticism.

Like the late Lord Salisbury, Mr. Venizelos is specially interested in foreign policy, and as soon as he had recovered from the *dengue* fever he started on a diplomatic tour to Rome, Paris, London and Belgrade. In Rome he negotiated with Sig. Mussolini, signing on September 23 a treaty of friendship, arbitration and judicial settlement. On that occasion he made the statement to a journalist that "a Dodecanesian question does not exist between Greece and Italy, just as a Cypriote question does not exist between Greece and Great Britain. Just as Cyprus, during the half century of the British occupation, has not prevented the best relations between Greece and the latter, so the Dodecanese cannot and should not prevent the development and strengthening of relations of friendship and trust between Greece and Italy."[1] At the same time he expressed the opinion that the signature of this treaty of friendship "cannot fail to have a fortunate influence upon the relations between the Italian administration and the Dodecanesians." Two months later, Dr. Skevos Zervos, the leader of the Dodecanesians in Athens, pointed out in the *Messager d'Athènes*[2] (which, although considered to be semi-official,

[1] *Hestia*, Sept. 26, 1928 [2] Nov. 24, 1928

maintains complete independence in this question) that experience so far had not confirmed the Premier's optimistic forecast. Nevertheless, official relations between Italy and Greece have improved, although unofficial Dodecanesians continue to write about their "question." Sig. Grandi, Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, visited Athens in January and received marked attentions from the authorities, and the Italian officials have taken several opportunities to show courtesy to the Greeks.

To be friends with both Rome and Belgrade is almost as difficult as to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. But Mr. Venizelos has attempted this difficult feat. As far as Belgrade is concerned, no Greek statesman is better qualified for the task, for he is personally popular there in memory of the Græco-Serbian alliance concluded under his auspices in 1913, and more recently he offered to serve his country by becoming Minister in the Jugoslav capital. But the Greeks have had difficulty in negotiating with Belgrade because there has been no durable Government there with which to negotiate. The arrangements for the existing "Serbian free zone" at Saloniki have caused the usual oriental delay; one concession that Belgrade demanded, that of importing munitions of war through Saloniki into Jugoslavia, no Greek Government could permit. For if the imported munitions were used against a Power with which Jugoslavia was at war, that Power would bombard the "Serbian free zone," and in so doing hit Saloniki. Moreover, to import munitions from the Ægean across Macedonia would tempt the Bulgarian *comitadjis* to blow up trains after the fashion of which they gave a sample in September 1927. It is regrettable that, although they have been neighbors since 1913, few Greeks know anything about Jugoslavia, and few Jugoslavs anything about Greece.

With Turkey, negotiations about outstanding difficulties have not been more successful, owing principally to the attitude of the Turks. At a moment when it seemed likely that Mr. Venizelos might accept the invitation to go to Angora, whither Sig. Grandi had preceded him, the Turkish press opened an attack upon Greece. The late Turkish Minister in Athens, Djevad, was personally popular, but the Turks are proverbially exasperating as negotiators, because they are past-masters in the art of procrastination. The famous dragoman of the British Embassy at Constantinople, Mr. Fitzmaurice, once remarked to me: "There is only one place in which to negotiate with the Turks — the battle-

field." The assessment of the relative values of Turkish properties in Greece and of Greek properties in Turkey lends itself to interminable discussions, and the good offices of Sig. Grandi have not yet produced a Græco-Turkish agreement. This is the more unfortunate because the Greek Government has no longer either the wish or the interest to be hostile to Turkey. Hellenism has practically ceased to exist in Asia Minor; and the Moslems have almost wholly evacuated Macedonia.

Mr. Venizelos has expressed the desire to be on good terms with Bulgaria, and there is no longer that strongly anti-Bulgarian feeling in Greece which made people apply the name of "old Bulgarian" to anyone whom they disliked. It is recognized that a direct railway communication with Bulgaria would benefit Greece; and the "Macedonian question," which so sorely perplexed diplomatists at the beginning of the century, has been solved so far as Greek Macedonia is concerned. The Greeks are willing to give the Bulgarians a commercial outlet on the Ægean at Dedeagatch, or even at Saloniki, without, of course, a territorial corridor, but they justly view with disapproval the proposed suspension of the Bulgarian reparations. Mr. Venizelos emphasized in the Chamber the injustice which would be inflicted by the Great Powers upon Greece if they reduced her quota of the Bulgarian reparations without reducing the Greek war debt to themselves. This, he added, would hinder those close relations between Greece and Bulgaria which he desired. As an earnest of this, the Chamber ratified the agreement of December 1927 concerning Greek refugees and Bulgarian property. But the Greek Government has notified Great Britain, France and Italy that in case the payment of the next two half-yearly Bulgarian reparations be postponed, it will neither apply this agreement nor pay its debts to Great Britain, nor yet submit for the ratification of the Chamber the arrangement made by Mr. Kaphandares for the settlement of the debts to France. Greece argues that an ex-ally should be as well treated as an ex-enemy. But experience since the war has shown that nations are apt to act upon the principle that, while the Bible bids us love our enemies, it does not expressly bid us love our allies. In the present case, Greece has all the greater reason for complaint because after the Demirkapu incident with Bulgaria in 1925 she was not allowed to deduct from the reparations due to her from Bulgaria the amount of compensation which she was ordered to pay to Bulgaria.

With Great Britain the relations of Greece are excellent. The doubts with which a portion of the British press regarded the unexpected return of Mr. Venizelos to power, owing to his possible financial policy and to the probable effect which it might have in retarding domestic "reconciliation," have been largely dissipated. A big British fleet, always the best form of British propaganda, visited Greek waters in January and had a cordial reception, and the Greek Government has asked for, and obtained, a new British Naval Mission, to arrive when that headed by Captain Turle completes its term of service this spring.

The United States have been the subject of enthusiastic praise in the Greek press in consequence of the speeches made in Congress upon the subject of the loan to Greece. American institutions, notably the Græco-American "Athens College," play a considerable part in Athenian life; and, now that it is installed in its new quarters in the garden-city of Pyschiko, that school will be able to develop its activities still further. The fact that the Chairman of the Refugee Settlement Commission has always been an American and the Vice-Chairman an Englishman, and that Dr. Hill, the former Director of the American School of Classical Studies, who has lived twenty years in Greece, has latterly acted as their substitute, has closely connected Anglo-Saxons with the great work of the reconstruction of Greece. Mr. Venizelos is desirous of prolonging the life of the Commission beyond next spring, when it would probably end, by entrusting it, on a smaller scale, with the settlement of agriculturists upon the lands which will have been reclaimed by the drainage of the Vardar and Struma valleys. He has recognized the importance of Macedonia, the future granary of Greece, by his decision to decentralize the administration, cutting the red tape which ties it to Athenian bureaucracy, and bestowing large powers upon the Governor-General. This will doubtless be a politician of the first rank, probably Mr. Michalakopoulos, who has been Premier and Foreign Minister and who lately made a tour of inspection throughout his future province. Saloniki, the "second capital" of Greece, possesses such importance and its problems are so special that it cannot be satisfactorily governed from Athens, just as its University, intended to produce agriculturists and industrialists, cannot be conducted on the same lines as the Athenian.

Peace, external and internal, is the greatest blessing which a statesman can bestow upon Greece, for her most urgent problems

are those of internal administration. Since the return of Mr. Venizelos, government departments have admittedly been more active and questions are solved more rapidly. The influence of the Premier is felt in every Ministry. Working thirteen hours a day, speaking on almost every departmental problem in the Chamber, never missing a public function, he is the one man upon whose decision everything in the last resort depends. Now this system has also its drawbacks. Mr. Venizelos cannot know the details of technical subjects, which he sometimes decides; yet the details are the essentials. If he justly receives the credit for all that succeeds, he will inevitably be blamed for all that fails, and he is not infallible. At his age can he, even with the examples of Gladstone, Clemenceau and Pashitch before him, continue work at this terrific pace? He has, indeed, appointed an Under-Secretary to the Premiership, to relieve some of the strain; but in democratic Greece people like to talk with the leading man, not with his understudy, and daily a crowd may be seen waiting outside the Premier's office. His long continuance in power is desirable, if for no other reason than that frequent changes of government prevent the adequate study and prompt solution of questions which are far more important than tinkering with the political machinery and rearranging Ministerial portfolios so that various worthy persons may erase the adverb "formerly" before the word "Minister" on their visiting-cards or so that a fresh Premier, after a few months of office, may be addressed as "Mr. President" for the rest of his life. In Greece the best government is that which will stay in power, so that people can get on with their business without interruption, and the worst enemy of the best government is the desire to have something better. The Greek Republic has had ten administrations in five years.

The work of the Chamber has also been accelerated. At last the Senate, projected in 1924, has been created, and Greece today, for the first time since the revolution of 1862 abolished the Othonian Senate, possesses a second chamber. Whether it will prove to be a useful addition to the constitution or another source of friction, an assembly of sages or an asylum for old men, an American Senate or a House of Lords (without the social prestige), remains to be seen. The Council of State, abolished in 1865, and restored on paper in 1911, has now begun to function under the presidency of Mr. Raktivan, a former Speaker of the Chamber. More important in practice than these alterations of the constitutional machinery

is the serious attempt to improve the health and sanitary condition of the country, with the assistance of doctors sent by the League of Nations. If the terrible lesson of the *dengue* epidemic be taken to heart, it will be an example of the Italian proverb that "not every evil is bad." To the strong hand of the Premier is due the settlement of the long-pending question of the Town's Police, a force under the direction of a British officer, Sir Frederick Halliday. General Pangalos, who owed his elevation in part to the rival force of gendarmerie, had rewarded the latter by transferring to it from the police the duty of conducting criminal investigations. This has now been restored to the police, to which is assigned the complete jurisdiction over Athens, the Piræus, Corfu, Patras and (in the future) Saloniki, while the gendarmerie looks after the smaller towns and the country-side. The plague of brigandage which infested Epirus and the adjacent districts of Macedonia, and culminated in the arrest of the two Kaphandarist candidates, Messrs. Mylonas and Melas, during the late election campaign, and of the Dutch Vice-Consul and his wife, has been stamped out and the chief brigands handed over to justice.

Mr. Venizelos found General Pangalos, who had been arrested in 1926, still untried. In October he granted an amnesty for all political offences committed since 1925, and this included Pangalos, but the ex-dictator was re-imprisoned on the charge of firing on the people during the elections of last August. He was, however, released on bail, and is now living in obscurity. Some of the evil which he did, however, lives after him, notably the contract for the electrification of Athens by the system of 220 volts, which "Power and Traction" managed to obtain during his domination and which the present Minister of Communications, Mr. Chrestamanos, has been trying to alter in the interest of the public safety. This episode furnishes an example of the danger to small states of granting big contracts to foreign companies. In this case the danger is not merely moral but physical, for several persons have died from the shock of the "homicidal current."

Another reform of great benefit to tourists has been recently effected. Every visitor to Greece knows the horrors of landing in small boats, especially in bad weather. Originally due to the lack of quays, the practice was perpetuated in the interest of the boatmen, who had a monopoly and were resolved to keep it. Now, however, passengers are landed direct on to the quays at all Greek ports where quays exist, while the boatmen, as is just, have been

compensated in proportion to their age out of a fund provided by a small tax on landing. Great stress is laid upon the desirability of increasing the tourist traffic as a source of revenue. Mr. Venizelos has an extensive roadmaking program — it is a century since the first road in Greece, from Pylos to Methone, was made by the French expeditionary force, and that from Athens to the Piræus was not made till 1835. There are still rural districts where the nearest doctor is a couple of days distant by mule-track. The great development of motor-traffic in Greece has facilitated travel in a manner unknown to the English guidebooks, the latest of which is twenty years old. In these days when classical education is rarer, the apostles of Greek travel would do well to lay less exclusive stress upon the antiquities and more upon the natural beauties of the country. They might also endeavor, by erecting hotels in high places, on the lines of Troodos in Cyprus, to keep in Greece during the summer those well-to-do Greeks who are now compelled to travel two or three days' journey abroad in search of a cool "hill-station." But for all these practical and ultimately remunerative reforms money is wanted, and there is a limit to the issue of loans. Efforts are also being made to check the increasing tendency of the rural population (as clearly shown by the census of May 15, 1928) to flock into the towns, and it is proposed to put a tax upon bachelors, in view of the fact, also revealed by the census, that the female population is in excess of the male — a phenomenon not noticed before 1920. The difference — 52,214 — is not yet large, and the taxation of bachelors in Greece is complicated by the custom of the celibacy of a brother until his sisters have married, and by the cost of living — last December 19.11 times what it was before the war — which tends to raise the age of marriage. During the last six months of 1928 the index-figure fell a little, from 19.47, but the cost of several articles of consumption increased, and salaries have not risen in the same proportion.

Thus while Greece has made undoubted progress during this Venizelist administration, there are difficulties ahead. The Premier, like Gladstone, is thought to know mankind better than individual men. His appointments have sometimes been criticized on the ground that, being a man of spotless integrity himself, he is apt to imagine that other persons have the same standard of public morality. This was one of the causes of his fall in 1920, because the proverb *noscitur a sociis* was applied to him by his

opponents. As Gladstone said that he was not a Gladstonian, so Mr. Venizelos might say that he is not a Venizelist. It is unfortunate that one of the most upright and sterling characters in Greek public life, Mr. Kaphandares, cannot collaborate with him after the difficulties between them last May, for which the separation of Gladstone from Lord Hartington supplies a parallel. Now the former leader of the Liberal party has only two followers in the Chamber, where Mr. Papanastasiou alone of the Republicans raises any opposition to the Premier's proposals. The other leaders who were prominent during the last five years have been temporarily eclipsed, among them the so-called "stratocrats," who played such decisive parts in the earlier years of the Republic. One marked advantage, indeed, of Mr. Venizelos's hegemony is the complete subordination of the military element. His authority is such that he can keep ambitious generals in their proper places, and the familiar phrase of official communications to the press that "the army is entirely engrossed with its duties" is now true. Nothing did Greece more harm abroad than the exaggerated reputation which she obtained for *coups d'état*. That is now a thing of the past, for Mr. Sophoules, the Minister of War, is the first lieutenant of Mr. Venizelos, and the presence of the latter in power is a guarantee of civil government.

It was the February protocol of 1830 which declared Greece to be an independent state. If nothing unforeseen happens before next year's celebration of the centenary, it will be possible to record that the country's condition is much improved from what it was immediately after the Asia Minor disaster. This is the more creditable to the Greek people's vitality—its characteristic in all ages—in view of the immense economic losses caused by the Corinth earthquake, the inundations, and above all the *dengue* fever last year alone. It is calculated that 85 percent of the Athenian population were laid low by that epidemic, so that the number of working days lost was in the aggregate enormous, besides the large sums expended in combating it.

The diplomatic situation of Greece has, as I said, improved. It remains to be seen whether Mr. Venizelos will achieve in the field of internal and social legislation successes similar to those which he reaped in foreign policy during his first three Premierships. Bismarck attempted both tasks, but with unequal results; Trikoupes, the most eminent of dead Greek statesmen, succeeded in both. Especially difficult for Greece is the financial problem,

which is the keystone of the arch, and which requires expert knowledge not usually within the range of statesmen's acquirements. Numerous British Chancellors of the Exchequer have been duffers at arithmetic, but they had the advantage of being supported by an expert permanent civil service such as does not exist in Greece. Besides, Greece has the expensive task of developing provinces such as Macedonia, which the Turks neglected for five centuries, of connecting Macedonia with Epirus by rail, and of completing the settlement of the refugees. Here the prompt grant of the projected American loan would assist, for the delay has caused necessary reductions of the program.

To prophesy what will happen in Greece is the privilege of hasty visitors; but a calm survey of the last few months encourages optimism. If Greece can have a few years of firm and stable government, her immediate progress should be assured. But the problem of one man rule everywhere is the same — the question of the successor. Happily, there is less interest than formerly among Greeks in politics as a profession. Other interests have arisen to challenge that once all-absorbing theme. Greece is becoming more industrialized; sport has ardent votaries; the rising generation looks forward to other careers than the quest of governmental posts, for business pays better; and the newspapers devote considerable space to social questions. If the Premier reserves his energies for the larger issues, leaving details to competent subordinates, and if no event disturbs the peace of the neighboring states — for there are danger spots alike at Belgrade and at Tirana — he may be able to add to his past record as a great Foreign Minister the less spectacular but more permanently useful one of a regenerator of his country's internal life. Extension of territory characterized the first acts of his career in Greek public life, its intensive cultivation should mark the last.

THE RUSSIAN PEASANT SPHINX

By William Henry Chamberlin

"OH thou great All-Russian Sphinx, it is not easy to be thy Oedipus." Thus Ivan Turgeniev apostrophized the Russian peasant. And a sphinx the peasant has been, even since the educated classes of the Russian cities began to take an interest in his welfare. The Slavophiles of the last century saw in the peasant, with his strong village community organization, the *mir*, and his supposed loyalty to the Tsar and the Orthodox Church, the Russian primitive Christian. The romantic revolutionaries of two generations ago, and the Social Revolutionists who took over many of their ideas, hailed the peasant as the natural communist, who only needed to be freed from the oppression of Tsar and landlord to set an example to the whole world in spontaneous coöperative farming. The Bolsheviks regarded the peasant as a small producer who must be conciliated during the period of active revolution but who ultimately must somehow be fitted into a Marxian collectivist order of things.

Fifteen years of war, revolution, civil war and post-revolutionary reconstruction have demolished some mistaken conceptions about the peasant and revealed him more as a normal human being than as a mysterious idol in a sheepskin coat. The idea of the peasant as a faithful son of "Holy Russia," imbued with heartfelt devotion to Tsar and Church, has been smashed beyond any conceivable reconstruction. Also exploded is the fallacy that the peasants are naturally inclined to communism. They were thorough-going revolutionaries so long as it was a question of sacking the large estates and dividing up the land among themselves. Once this process was completed they became, for the most part, zealous upholders of the rights of individualist private property: and after a decade of mingled economic pressure and economic persuasion by the Soviet authorities, barely two percent of the peasants have been induced to try their fortunes in collective farms.

Russian peasants often say of themselves: "We are a dark people." And the Russian village is dark with the shades of poverty, neglect and technical backwardness. One cannot generalize too sweepingly about such a huge country; some parts enjoy a higher living standard than others. But an idea of the prevalent

poverty may be obtained if one considers that the average yearly income of an adult peasant is officially estimated at 217 rubles,[1] that approximately three peasant households in ten have no working cattle, while only about one in five possesses more than one working animal,[2] and that the countryside as a whole is split up into 25,000,000 little holdings, averaging little more than ten acres. These holdings are obviously too small for profitable extensive farming, and very few Russian peasants are occupied with those forms of farming which can give a high yield from a small area.

The war was a primary factor in changing the psychology of the Russian peasant. Two million Russian soldiers, most of them peasants who had previously seen little outside their native villages, were captured in the great German offensives and worked in Germany as farm laborers or in other capacities. Here they were able to contrast German farming methods and the living standards of the German peasants with their own; and the effect was very marked. In traveling through the Russian villages I have often noticed that the returned war prisoner is the most staunch advocate of new ideas and new practices.

Revolution and civil war also shook the Russian village to its depths. True, the peasant did not take the initiative in formulating the issues of the civil war; he was rather an object to be propagandized and mobilized, conscripted and subjected to requisition by Reds and Whites. Yet this competing propaganda inevitably had some effect on his mind; and there were times when by obeying or resisting a mobilization he gave his crude answer to the political problem as to whether the Whites with their returning landlords or the Communists with their grain levies represented the greater evil.

Now every young peasant who is called up for service in the Red Army gets a Communist course in citizenship along with his

[1] See "Control Figures of National Economic Life," pp. 494–495, published in Moscow in 1928 by the State Planning Commission.

[2] The following tables of percentages, showing the distribution of working animals among the peasants of Russia proper, without certain Asiatic and Caucasian regions, were supplied to the writer by the Commissariat for Agriculture.

	1924	*1925*	*1926*
Without working cattle	31.0	30.6	30.4
With one head	51.4	52.3	50.2
With two head	12.5	12.4	13.8
With three head	3.1	2.9	3.5
With four or more	2.0	1.8	2.1

Later figures were unobtainable; but the process of change is obviously very slow.

military training. How many of these officially inculcated ideas he retains when he goes back to his home and turns again into a peasant is another question. But this army educational work is a factor, along with the rural reading-room and the occasional radio installed in some of the larger villages, tending to make the peasant begin to think about problems which were almost entirely outside his sphere before the Revolution. Another link between the government and the peasants is the *Krestyanskaya Gazeta*, or *Peasants' Gazette*, a little paper which appears twice a week and is entirely addressed to a peasant audience. Its circulation fluctuates with the seasons, but has been as high as a million.

The *pomyeschiks*, or Russian country squires, have been literally swept off the face of the countryside by the impact of the most thorough-going agrarian upheaval in history. One could travel from one end of the Soviet Union to another without finding, except by the rarest accident, a manor-house still owned by a private family. Gone forever are the "noblemen's nests," the low-built country residences where Turgeniev's heroines learned French and music and read the verses of Pushkin and Lermontov. Not a few of them were burned or razed to the ground in the course of the Revolution; the others have been transformed into rest homes, schools or public buildings. The few *pomyeschiks* who somehow managed to go on living in their native estates through the period of civil war were forced to depart under the terms of a Soviet decree issued several years ago, since it was feared that their influence on the peasants might be harmful.

The Soviet Land Law, which is without a parallel, to the best of my knowledge, either in Europe or in Asia, vests the title to land in the state but permits anyone to use it, on condition that he farms it with his own labor. The amount of land allotted to any peasant is determined by the size of his family and the amount of land in the possession of the village community. It must be remembered that the individual homestead system is very little practised in Russia, although it is sometimes found in the Ukraine. Instead of having a separate farm, in American or West European fashion, the Russian peasant lives in a village, which may be a tiny hamlet of a dozen houses or a large settlement with several thousand inhabitants, and goes out every day to work on his share of the village land. If, for instance, the amount of village land permits an allotment on the basis of one

dessiatine (2.7 acres), then a family of seven, consisting of a father, mother and four children, with perhaps an old grandmother, would be entitled to receive seven dessiatines, while a newly married couple would receive only two. A person convicted of buying or selling land is liable to a sentence of three years in prison; but old habits disappear slowly and surreptitious land sales sometimes take place.

If farming ability could be parcelled out as evenly as land the Soviet system should ensure the maximum of equality among the peasants. But experience has shown that it cannot be, and in every village one finds more or less clearly defined classes of *kulaks* (literally "fists"), or rich peasants; *seredniaks*, or middle-class peasants; and *byedniaks*, or poor. This division into classes became natural and inevitable when the New Economic Policy gave the peasants a certain amount of freedom in disposing of their products. Those peasants who emerged from the civil war with more cattle and machinery, those who were better farmers and traders, began to forge ahead of their less fortunate or less capable brethren in the acquisition of this world's goods. The emergence of a new class of rich peasants on the ruins of the old *pomyeschik* system of large landed estates was hampered and checked, but could not be altogether prevented, by the workings of the Soviet Land Law. While land cannot legally be bought or sold, it can be leased over a period of several years from one peasant to another. It is estimated that between six and seven percent of the arable land is held on a leasehold basis, and, contrary to the general practice elsewhere, in Russia it is the rich who must rent land from the poor. A familiar arrangement is for the poor peasant who cannot till his own holding to lease it to a richer neighbor, with the understanding that the crop shall be shared equally.

Who is a *kulak?* This is one of the most difficult and delicate questions of Soviet political economy. Communists who take a more indulgent attitude toward the peasant as an individualist producer are inclined to list among *kulaks* only persons who definitely exploit their neighbors by lending money and machinery on usurious terms or who hire labor throughout the year. But a stricter view, and one which is quite often applied by village officials (especially since the Fifteenth Congress of the Communist Party, which declare for an offensive against the *kulak*), is that any peasant who has raised himself above his fellows in

wealth is a *kulak* and must be subjected to heavy taxation and various forms of administrative discrimination. This stricter view is exemplified in the case of a certain Komarov, a farmer of the Northern Don region, discussed in *Pravda* for August 14, 1928. Komarov, it seems, was a former merchant who before the war owned a large farm of several hundred acres. He was expropriated, of course, during the Revolution, but under the New Economic Policy he had succeeded in building up a new farm of some eighty or ninety acres, which he made profitable by concentrating on the production of meat and cheese. He owned eighteen cows, two bulls and four horses, took prizes at local agricultural exhibitions, and contributed letters on agricultural subjects to the press. In other countries he would probably have acquired the reputation of being a progressive and useful farmer, and even the local Soviet authorities were inclined to intercede for him. But the writer who discussed his case in *Pravda* sternly condemned him as a "new and more cunning type of *kulak*."

Estimates of the number of *kulak* farms in the Soviet Union vary with definitions of the term, but they probably do not exceed five percent of the total number. Thirty-eight percent of the peasants are freed from the agricultural tax on the ground of extreme poverty. In between the *kulaks* and *byedniaks*, come the mass of the Russian peasants, who fall under the heading *seredniaks*. In the heat of the civil war Lenin laid down as the guiding rule of Communist policy in the village: "Reach an agreement with the *seredniak*, leaning firmly only on the *byedniak* and never for one moment stopping the struggle with the *kulak*." This maxim, applied with variations of emphasis at different times, has on the whole guided the agrarian policy of the Soviet Government.

In the early part of 1925, to be sure, there was an apparent relaxation of the struggle against the richer peasants. With a view to conciliating the masses of the peasants and increasing agricultural productivity, the burden of the agricultural tax was lightened; restrictions on leasing land were relaxed; and the process of hiring agricultural laborers was made simpler and easier. But this moderate agrarian policy was of comparatively short duration. The opposition in the Communist Party, headed by Trotzky and Zinoviev, raised the cry that the conquests of the Revolution were being surrendered to the *kulaks*. And, curiously

enough, the dominant group in the Communist Party leadership, while suppressing and outlawing the opposition, took over and began to apply many of its critical suggestions in regard to agrarian policy. So the law excluding *kulaks* from participation in Soviet elections was enforced more rigorously; the agricultural tax was distributed in such a way that its main burden fell on the richer peasants, while larger and larger percentages of the poor were exempted from taxation; and more strenuous efforts were made to organize the poor peasants against the rich and to recruit more Communists from the ranks of the agricultural laborers and poorer villagers generally.

Some observers have interpreted this gradual reversal of the moderate agrarian policy of 1925 as a tactical political manœuvre, designed to disarm the opposition by carrying into practice some of the measures which they advocated. But the fundamental reasons for the shift go deeper than this. A class of rich peasants, of independent individualist producers, is a political and economic anomaly in the Soviet state. Not only is it a challenge to Marxist principles to see the rich peasant rising on the shoulders of his poorer neighbors, but the whole Soviet economic system, which depends very much on centralized planning and price adjustments, is menaced if the wealthier peasants concentrate in their hands the grain reserves of the country and hold them back for higher prices than the Soviet state organs feel able to pay.

A genuine tug-of-war between the Government and the more prosperous peasants occurred during the winter of 1927 and the spring of 1928 and seems likely to go on indefinitely. As early as the fall of 1927 it became evident that the peasants were holding back their grain to a degree which not only destroyed any possibility of exporting it but even seriously menaced the bread supply of the cities. How did this "grain strike" come about? It is very hard to answer this question. There is certainly no widespread secret organization among the peasants which could coördinate their activity or instruct them all to do the same thing at the same time. And yet they sometimes display an uncanny faculty for apparently unconscious spontaneous action, as when they deserted from all parts of the front and swarmed on the landlords' estates in 1917.

Faced with a severe crisis of grain supply, the Soviet Government introduced a series of "extraordinary measures" which

were at least mildly reminiscent of the period of militant communism which preceded the New Economic Policy. Maintaining its fixed prices unchanged, it instructed the local Soviet officials in the countryside to get the recalcitrant peasants' grain at any cost. A number of richer peasants and private traders who were offering prices above the fixed rates were punished with exile and imprisonment. The masses of peasants were placed under strong pressure to give up their surplus grain. In many cases the free markets in towns and villages were closed.

This strenuous policy produced both good and bad results. It fulfilled its immediate purpose of obtaining the grain. But it left an unmistakable spirit of smoldering bitterness not only among the *kulaks*, but among all peasants who had any surplus grain to lose. The Central Committee of the Communist Party, meeting in plenary session in July 1928, decided that while the "extraordinary measures" had served their purpose of overcoming a crisis of grain supply it would be inadvisable to erect them into a permanent system. So it was agreed that future grain purchases should be voluntary, that there should be no more compulsion to subscribe to state loans, and that the peasants, as a further stimulus, should receive a fifteen percent increase in prices paid for their grain. At the same time it was declared that the offensive against the *kulak* must go on and that more attention must be paid to stimulating socialist and collectivist forms of agriculture, in the form of *sovhozes* (state farms) and *kolhozes* (farms organized by coöperative groups of peasants). The following plenary session of the Central Committee, which took place in November, did not reflect any very substantial change from the position of July; its long resolution on agriculture advocated the policy of simultaneously encouraging collective and individualist forms of farming.

According to figures which are to be found in the resolution of the November session of the Party Central Committee, the Soviet Union to-day has only 90 percent of the pre-war area under grain cultivation, 80 percent of the pre-war grain production, and 56 percent of the pre-war amount of marketable grain. And this with a population which is already more than ten percent greater than in pre-war times and is growing rapidly, especially in the cities! In the light of these figures it is easy to realize why white bread has vanished from the Russian cities and why the huge building in Moscow which displays the sign

"State Grain-Exporting Company" somehow conveys an ironical suggestion.

The situation with the so-called "technical cultures" — flax, hemp, cotton, tobacco, sugar-beets, etc. — is somewhat better, but still far from satisfactory. The area under cultivation is estimated at 58.5 percent higher than the pre-war figure, but the yield per acre has declined, as compared with the pre-war level, in the following substantial proportions: cotton, 25 percent; flax, 32 percent; hemp, 15 percent; sugar-beets, 10 percent.[3]

This same decline in yield is noticeable in the case of grain, where 90 percent of the pre-war acreage yields only 80 percent of the pre-war crop. This fact is all the more ominous because, despite the large belts of rich black earth in various parts of the Soviet Union, Russian peasant agriculture has always been notoriously backward.

What are the causes for these marked declines? The change in the system of land-ownership is undoubtedly an important factor in diminishing the supply of grain available for sale and export. Before the war the big estates of the *pomyeschiks* and the large farms of the *kulaks* produced about three-quarters of the marketable grain. The middle class and poor peasants produced between them little more than was needed for their own consumption. The agrarian revolution has annihilated the big landlords and reduced substantially the productive capacity of the *kulaks*. Whereas the landlords before the war are estimated to have supplied to the market over four and a half million tons of grain and the *kulaks* almost eleven million, the Soviet state farms in the year 1926–27 produced only about six hundred thousand tons of marketable grain and the *kulaks* about two million. The surplus production of the poor and middle class peasants has increased somewhat, but not nearly enough to compensate for the sweeping reduction in the number of large scale farms.

The marked tendency of Russian farms to split up into smaller and smaller units is another unfavorable element in the situation. There are now from 25,000,000 to 27,000,000 homesteads in the Soviet Union, as against 16,000,000 before the Revolution. This is attributable partly to increased population, partly to the unwillingness of younger peasant families to go on living with their parents, and partly to the desire to escape taxation, which falls more heavily on larger and richer homesteads.

[3] See *Rabochaya Gazeta* for Nov. 3, 1928.

The Soviet "class policy" of crushing the rich and favoring the poor peasants is not the least of the factors which account for the decline in grain production and the lowered yield per acre. The Soviet land system keeps far more land in the hands of incapable farmers than would be the case if free trade in land were permitted and no artificial restrictions were placed in the way of the growth of the *kulak*. Mr. Y. A. Kakovlev, Vice-Commissar for Workers' and Peasants' Inspection and editor of the *Peasants' Gazette*, has published in his little book "Za Kolhozi" ("For Collective Farms") a series of charts illustrating the productivity and cost of production in various types of peasant homesteads. Here one finds that the poor peasant in Pskov Province averages 8.2 poods (a pood is equal to 36 English pounds) of flax to a dessiatine, while his richer neighbor, working on the same soil, gets 15.2. The poor peasant in Kiev gets 26 poods of rye to the *kulak's* 50.9. Constant harrying of the *kulak* may be good politics, good Communist ethics or good Marxism; but the figures show that it is not good agricultural production.

The Communists are really confronted with their most difficult dilemma when they face the problem of how to deal with the individual peasant producer, whose disappearance was predicted by Marx, but who is still here in Russia, 25,000,000 homesteads strong. If the present policy — merely cutting down the peasant who raises himself a little above his fellows — were to continue, the outlook for the future of Russian agriculture would be dark indeed. It would almost inevitably remain on a low level, with little surplus production; and both the foreign trade and the industrial development of the country would correspondingly suffer.

But the Communists are determined that things shall not remain as they are. They see an outlet in the large-scale collectivization of agriculture through the agency of state and collective farms. They argue that giving the *kulak* a free hand in the village would not only destroy the prospect of building up in Russia a genuine socialist state, but would also be disadvantageous to the masses of the peasantry, because for every strong farmer who would emerge under a *laissez-faire* agrarian policy several poor and middle class peasants would go completely to the wall.

The Communist with an eye of faith sees the present Russian peasant villages — with their tiny holdings, divided into uneconomic strips and patches of land, their primitive implements and

their backward farming methods — transformed into big state or coöperative productive units, equipped with tractors and the best modern machinery and turning out harvests comparable with those of Western Europe and America. It is a long road, however, to the realization of this dream. At the present time the state and coöperative farms (*sovhozes* and *kolhozes*) are mere islands in the sea of individual peasant homesteads. The Soviet Union now has 32,500 coöperative farms, with 375,377 families and 1.15 percent of the total planted area, and 4,794 state farms, with 126,076 workers and employees and 1.27 percent of the total planted area.[4]

The *sovhoz* is managed, in principle, like the state factory. It is a fairly large tract of land, usually a former *pomyeschik* estate, which the government succeeded in salvaging in the midst of the orgy of peasant land seizure. Its workers are paid wages, like factory workers, and the proceeds of the enterprise, if there are any, belong to the state. It is supposed to be a model farm and is sometimes operated in connection with an agricultural experimental station. Financially these state farms have not been successful, their total losses up to January 1, 1928, being estimated at eight million rubles.[5] However, their advocates contend that their book losses in some cases are due to the fact that they furnish the neighboring peasants with valuable agricultural aid at moderate rates.

Quite different in character is the *kolhoz*, or collective farm. It is an association of peasants who decide to pool their land and work it in common. These collective farms are strongly encouraged by the Government and receive first consideration in the allotment of land and credits. They are of three types: *communes*, where the members live together and share the proceeds of their labor equally; *artels*, where they live together, but are paid according to labor; and the looser *tovarischestvos*, or coöperative groups, in which the members band together to work the land but usually retain their own homes. It is this loosest form of association which is most common. The chief obstacles to the spread of coöperative farming are psychological. Again and again I have heard peasants express the fear that in a collective farm they would become involved in constant family quarrels and that they would have no guarantee against lazier members of the group who

[4] These figures were furnished to the writer by the Soviet Central Statistical Department.
[5] See article of K. Kindeev, in *Pravda*, September 29, 1928.

would try to live on the labor of the others. A system of payment according to work performed has been introduced in most of the coöperative farms; but the peasant's instinctive fondness for "his own" farm, for his own land and chickens and pigs and geese remains and is not easy to overcome.

The struggle between old and new forms in the village is by no means peaceful. The "extraordinary measures" of grain requisition and the heavy taxation collected in the autumn of 1928 left their heritage of rankling bitterness, especially among the more prosperous peasants. Attacks upon Communists and active Soviet agents in the villages became increasingly frequent during the latter part of 1928; and from August 15 until October 15 there were 44 murders of village officials and correspondents,[1] besides 33 attempted murders and numerous burnings of houses of individuals and property of the newly formed coöperative farms, which are a special object of antipathy to the richer peasants. The Soviet authorities retaliated by treating these village murders and attacks as counter-revolutionary crimes and shooting a number of persons implicated in them. In as much as Soviet agrarian policy, especially since the Fifteenth Party Congress, is avowedly designed to repress the rich and to help the poor, one may wonder why its application has provoked so many murderous assaults in the country districts. There are few Russian villages where the poor peasants do not outnumber the rich ones by ten to one.

The issue of this contact of Karl Marx with the Peasant Sphinx, this daring attempt to turn grandsons of serfs into practical communists, equipped with the most modern machinery, depends on so many factors that one hesitates to venture a prophecy. It depends on the stubbornness with which the present agrarian policy is carried out, on the tenacity of the resistance of the more prosperous peasants, on the success of the still experimental state and collective forms of large-scale farming, on the ability of the cities and the industries to weather the informal internal blockade which the discontented part of the peasantry is consciously or unconsciously attempting to impose. Whatever the issue, the effort to extend socialism from industry to agriculture, to end the chronic dualism of the collectivist city and the individualist countryside, is the most absorbing and most important episode of the Russian revolutionary drama.

[1] See *Pravda*, Oct. 27, 1928.

AMERICAN SUPERVISION OF THE NICARAGUAN ELECTION

By H. W. Dodds

ON January 1 Nicaragua witnessed for the first time in her history a peaceful change in party government. On that day General José Maria Moncada, the successful Liberal candidate, was inaugurated as President to succeed don Adolfo Diaz, Conservative. For this historic *eleccion libre*, United States supervision under Brigadier General Frank R. McCoy was responsible. Acting as personal representative of President Coolidge, in accordance with the Stimson agreement which ended the sanguinary revolution of 1926–27, General McCoy successfully superintended a large organization of American and Nicaraguan election officials to the satisfaction of both political parties. Conservative and Liberal leaders alike declared that the American supervision was fair and just, a most happy outcome to months of delicate negotiation.

Rarely have so much thought and effort been applied to the mechanical task of conducting an election. Measured by the standards of our election machinery at home, the Nicaraguan poll, down to the work of the humblest precinct boards, was a model of efficiency. Yet the mechanics were but part of the job. By far the greater effort went to maintaining a pre-election atmosphere of freedom and fairness for all parties and persons.

The result was sufficiently close to demonstrate the shallowness of the charge that the United States, during the years in which the Conservatives were in power, had deliberately supported a small minority party because it alone was friendly to us. Of a total of 133,000 votes cast, General Moncada received a majority of 20,000 over don Adolfo Bernard, his Conservative opponent. Although election day fell in the season of heaviest rains, and in spite of bandit threats in the disturbed northern sections of the country, ninety percent of those who had registered voted. Such a high registration and vote had never been experienced before.

The election was the fulfillment of a most important item of the Stimson agreement of May, 1927, between the government of Nicaragua and the rebellious Liberals under General Moncada. When Colonel Stimson arrived in Nicaragua in April of

that year he found the country rapidly degenerating into anarchy. There seemed no hope that either side could within a reasonable time organize the country on a peaceful and orderly basis. Under the promise that the United States would supervise a presidential election in 1928, Colonel Stimson prevailed upon the opposing leaders to declare the war off. This election was not merely to be "observed" by a few American representatives, but an American was to sit as chairman of every election board — national, departmental and local — with a deciding vote in all electoral matters and appropriate police powers to make the supervision effective.

Since the day of her independence Nicaragua's story has been one of bitter feuds between Liberals and Conservatives, with the spoils of office and revenge the chief motivating factors. With the possible exception of a slight divergence in attitude towards the Catholic Church, there are no appreciable differences in principles or practices to provide a basis for choice between the two parties, but the average Nicaraguan is nevertheless a violent partisan of one or the other. In reality the two parties are much like two opposing gangs, and their political struggles can best be interpreted in terms of gang warfare.

Measured even by our own standards, which admittedly are none too high, the 1928 campaign was therefore a dirty campaign; but appraised in the light of traditional Nicaraguan elections it was clean and uneventful. While the party arguments consisted chiefly of personal charges and counter-charges, there was a marked absence of the customary intimidation, bribery and fraud for which the party in power at the moment is generally responsible. President Diaz as chief executive of the nation and titular head of the Conservative party coöperated fully with the American Mission. But his spirit of fair play involved him in serious quarrels with subordinate leaders who could not understand why the traditional advantages of the party in power should not be utilized to the utmost. General Moncada likewise insisted that his subordinates refrain from wrongful practices and work in harmony with the Americans. But since he was leader of the "outs" his attitude was a more natural one.

The legal authority for supervision by the United States was contained in an executive decree promulgated by President Diaz on March 21, 1928, after Congress had refused to pass a transitory law containing similar provisions. Facing downfall through

revolution, the Conservatives in 1927 gladly acceded to the proposal for a supervised election in 1928. But once the danger of revolution had been removed, the prospect of a "free" election lost its attraction to some of the government leaders. By order of General Chamorro, who had been warned by the United States that because of his violent seizure of power in 1925 and 1926 he would not be recognized if elected president, but who commands a strong personal following in the Conservative party, the passage of the necessary provisions was defeated in the lower house of Congress, although the upper chamber approved them. Legislation by executive decree thereupon became necessary to fulfill the government's commitments to the Liberals, who in 1927 had surrendered their arms and returned to their homes to await the verdict of the ballot box.

The executive decree of March 21 suspended the normal election law of Nicaragua and authorized the new National Board of Elections to adopt substitute regulations with full force of law. Each of the two parties had one representative on the National Board; the chairman was General McCoy, who properly possessed the deciding vote. In each of the thirteen departments a departmental board with bi-partisan membership was organized under a United States chairman. In the same manner local precinct boards were established under the immediate jurisdiction of the departmental boards, in the ratio of one board to approximately five hundred voters. On each of the 432 precinct boards a Marine private or non-commissioned officer sat as chairman. The departmental chairmen were United States Army and Marine officers. General McCoy's executive and advisory staff were also United States Army officers, with three exceptions. Like the departmental chairmen, they had been carefully chosen, knowledge of Spanish and previous experience with Latin peoples being among the required qualifications.

Opponents of our Nicaraguan policy have criticized the employment of the military upon a mission of this kind. Army officers are said to be brusque and autocratic, and a certain percentage of army officers may indeed be. With respect to the Nicaraguan electoral mission, however, the present writer can say that he has served on other similar missions and that never has he found a group which individually and collectively displayed such a thorough understanding of their mission and such knowledge of Latin psychology and sympathy for the Latin viewpoint.

General McCoy himself was the soul of patience and courtesy. He willingly spent long hours in conversation with Nicaraguans of all ranks and creeds. No complaint was too frivolous to receive his personal attention. Meetings of the National Board, which could easily have degenerated into choleric recriminations (for Liberals and Conservatives generally have no political dealings with each other), were conducted with good nature and at least surface friendliness. With two exceptions all decisions of the National Board were unanimous — a creditable feat, as anyone conversant with Central American politics will agree.

As the United States Government was at first determined that it should be a civilian election, the problem of personnel for the 432 local boards seemed the most difficult of all. No one knew how a sufficient number of Spanish-speaking Americans could be secured to serve as precinct chairmen and alternates. At best, such a large group of miscellaneous civilians would have been an irresponsible lot, attracted by the novelty of the work or by the pay, some with unfortunate habits, unable to maintain themselves and quick to succumb to malaria and other hazards of the rainy season in the jungle. Furthermore, the salary and transportation expenses of more than four hundred American civilians, as, if and when obtainable, appeared prohibitive.

The problem of satisfactory personnel was solved by the Nicaraguans themselves. On their own initiative both parties proposed that Marines serve as chairmen of local election boards because, they said, "the Marines are so much more impartial than the other Americans who come here." While this must not be interpreted as any reflection upon Americans in Nicaragua, other than that some do become more or less acknowledged partisans, it was recognized that the Marines were a disciplined organization, each member of which could be held strictly accountable for his conduct. When our government was advised of Nicaraguan sentiment, permission to use the Marines as election officials was readily granted. Happily, the service of the enlisted personnel proved eminently satisfactory. It became necessary to remove but two precinct chairmen for misconduct, a gratifying record which could not possibly have been equaled had a miscellaneous civilian personnel been employed.

The electoral regulations promulgated by the National Board followed in general the Nicaraguan law of 1923 which modernized the country's electoral machinery. Five days of registration were

provided and each prospective voter was required to register personally in the precinct in which he lived. Full opportunity was given for challenges at registration and election, with appeal from the decision of the precinct boards in challenged cases. Since seventy percent of Nicaraguan adults are illiterate the ballots were so designed as to enable a man to mark the party of his choice even if he was not able to read and write. Although illiterates had the right to request assistance in marking their ballots, few did so. This, together with the fact that complaints and contests generally had been settled before election day, enabled the voting to proceed expeditiously and uneventfully. No case of disorder occurred in connection with the voting, in itself a record for Nicaragua.

The weeks preceding the election were busy ones for the American personnel. Scores of complaints were filed by both parties. Although it was obvious that many were based on groundless rumors, each one was immediately investigated and the facts reported to the complainant. Dozens were found to be without basis in fact, but if the complaint was well founded and the fault lay with the American personnel, corrective measures were taken at once. If the trouble related to a government official, prompt representations and a request for correction were made to the appropriate government authority. The fact that the old partisan police, often more feared than the criminals they were supposed to suppress, had been replaced by the new non-partisan *Guardia Nacional* under American officers, simplified the police problem and removed an ancient means of repression and abuse. Although countless disquieting rumors were investigated, it is to the credit of both political parties that at no time was any evidence of wholesale or organized fraud discovered.

Free use of the national telegraph and telephone services, which heretofore had been the exclusive perquisite of government propagandists, was extended to Liberal electoral officials as well. Depositories of *aguardiente*, the national alcoholic beverage, were put under the control of the National Guard to prevent withdrawals for bribery or other illicit purposes. Sale of liquors was prohibited before and during registration and election days, a measure which did much for peace and order on these occasions. At the request of both parties, a red stain was adopted to mark the fingers of voters on election day to prevent repeating. In every precinct the voting was over before the fixed hour.

The count of the ballots was made in the first instance by the precinct chairmen, whose reports were reviewed by the departmental boards. The final canvass was made by the National Board and involved no serious differences of opinion.

The Conservative party, in power since 1910, came to the election torn by factional fights and supporting a compromise ticket. General Emiliano Chamorro and Dr. Cuadra Pasos, the party chiefs, are rivals of long standing. The former had used his full power to defeat the law in Congress giving control over the election to the Americans; the latter favored the fulfillment of the party's promise of 1927 and was himself a candidate for the nomination. Chamorro, unable to make himself the party's nominee because of our government's warning that he would not be recognized, selected a rich though politically unknown coffee planter to contest the nomination with Cuadra Pasos. After weeks of struggle the party united on don Adolfo Bernard, the sugar king of Nicaragua. He had never before been active in politics and is held in high respect by all. However, he did not take an active part in the campaign other than to contribute heavily to the party war chest. He is not a dramatic figure and the internal strife within his party plus the grievances accumulated against it during its eighteen years in power worked his defeat.

General Moncada, the Liberal candidate, was general-in-chief of the Liberal revolutionary army of 1926–7, and as such negotiated the agreement with Colonel Stimson which brought the revolution to an end. His military exploits made him a natural contender for the nomination and he was chosen unanimously by the Liberal Grand Convention as the party's candidate for president. He proved a sagacious leader on the electoral field as he had on the field of battle.

Having suffered eighteen lean years under Conservative governments, the Liberal party workers forgot, for the duration of the campaign at least, their personal quarrels and concentrated their complete energies upon winning by legitimate means. On the other hand the Conservative party carried the burden of an open breach between its two national leaders and of innumerable personal quarrels between minor chieftains. The Conservative party furthermore was in the unfortunate position of a party which though in power was unable to utilize many of the traditional methods of a government party. In so far as President

Diaz and the American supervisors frustrated the overt efforts of the government's followers to employ unfair methods, the Conservative party lost prestige with the voters. To an ignorant voter a government which could not favor its workers was not entitled to respect, and in the last days of the campaign a tendency to climb on the Liberal bandwagon became apparent.

A word as to stories afloat that third parties, particularly those opposed to the intervention by the United States in Nicaragua, were denied places on the ballot and thereby were deprived of an opportunity to voice sentiments which might be embarrassing to our government. There are two and only two political parties in Nicaragua. No third party able to maintain a continued existence has ever appeared on the scene or has for a moment threatened the dominant position of the two historic parties. The war of 1926–27 was between these two parties and the supervised election was a means of settling a two-party dispute and bringing peace to the country. In Central American countries it is not uncommon for politicians to undertake to organize ephemeral third parties and sometimes to proceed so far as to put their names on the ballot. But the effort has generally sprung from a desire to use the new party for trading purposes or as a stalking horse to reduce the popular vote of one or the other of the two historic parties. Moreover, the Nicaraguan constitution provides that if a presidential candidate does not receive an absolute majority of popular votes the election devolves upon Congress, and in this fact may often be found the reason for the sporadic efforts to inject a third party into elections.

There was talk, early in 1928, of the formation of an *autonomista* party opposed to United States' participation in Nicaraguan affairs, but nothing ever materialized. The local newspapers, with more perspicacity than some American observers have shown, recognizing the personal interests of the *autonomista* leader (who by playing both ends against the middle in years past found himself for the moment without a party home) laughed him out of court. After unsuccessful efforts to secure signatures to *autonomista* petitions (the papers reported that only two hundred signatures could be secured) the whole matter was dropped.

Several months later the so-called Liberal-Republican party requested that the National Board of Elections grant it a place on the ballot. This group was organized in 1924 by Dr. Luis

Corea who returned to Nicaragua, after many years' absence in the United States, for the express purpose of running for president. In that year, however, Dr. Corea failed to gain ten percent of the votes, which under the old electoral law of Nicaragua was necessary to establish his group as a continuing party. Between 1924 and 1928 his party maintained only a paper organization and presented no candidates in the intervening Congressional elections. In the absence of evidence that there existed any public opinion seeking expression through a Liberal-Republican party, such as might have been evidenced by popular petitions, newspaper support or statements of political leaders, the National Board of Elections ruled that in accordance with the precedent of Nicaraguan law Dr. Corea's party should not be deemed a continuing party. Dr. Corea is not an *autonomista*, and his sudden resumption of interest in Nicaraguan politics in 1924 and 1928 (he had become an American citizen during his residence in the United States but resumed his Nicaraguan citizenship when he ran for president in 1924) has never been explained.

The fact is that in the 1928 election the realistic voters of Nicaragua, recognizing that a free election was a call to fundamental party loyalties, refused to take any third party movement seriously, and held the contest within the old party lines.

The problem of maintaining law and order was most acute in the northern jungle departments where life and property have never been as secure as in the rest of the republic. Banditry, which has always been more or less common there, prospered amidst the disturbed conditions of the late civil war and several roving bands still prey on the inhabitants. Sandino, whose shrewd publicity methods have rendered him a more important figure in the United States than at home, is the nominal commander of two or three small detachments which occasionally engage marine patrols but live by looting their own countrymen. As a result of bandit threats and more particularly in consequence of the cruel murder of a Liberal propaganda group by one of Sandino's lieutenants, many rumors of general disorder arose and the citizens in the troubled area became greatly alarmed. At once Marine and *Guardia* forces were augmented and special measures were taken to prevent a repetition of the outrages. These measures were so successful that registration and voting in the remote departments were heavier than in 1924, the only year in which

conditions had previously approached a free election. For this the Marines and *Guardia* deserve great credit. Their task was more difficult than anyone unfamiliar with jungle territory and the operation of bandit bands can readily appreciate.

During the electoral period the enforcement of simple police regulations and punishment of criminal offenders in even the most peaceful departments became a problem of great delicacy. Deserved arrests for drunkenness, theft, assault, and sometimes even murder frequently brought complaints from the party leaders that law enforcement was in fact political persecution. If the offender happened to be a person of some local importance politically it was most difficult to convince his associates that his arrest was not for the purpose of discrediting their party. The members of the *Guardia Nacional* had therefore to perform their police duties with the greatest care, avoiding in all respects the appearance of evil. It is to the credit of this young organization that charges of favoritism and partisanship were received about equally from both sides during the heat of the campaign.

The supervised election has provided for the time being a basis for peace in the century-old political feud in Nicaragua. When the result was known the defeated Conservative candidate promptly congratulated the victorious Liberal, an act of courtesy unprecedented in Nicaraguan politics. On inauguration day precedent was further broken when the retiring President and the President-elect rode together to the inaugural ceremonies. President Moncada has promised the Conservatives that they will not be molested in life or property under the Liberal régime and that it will not be necessary for them to flee the country, as defeated leaders have usually done after a change of government. While many Conservatives are uneasy, indications are that the majority will remain to test the President's promises.

Even if one election has not transformed the political habits of the people it at least has provided a physical exhibition of a new method of changing governments and should form a useful precedent for those Nicaraguans who regret the bitterness and irrationality of the traditional party struggles and who wish to eliminate the unhappy cycle of destructive revolutions.

CHINA'S NEW TARIFF AUTONOMY

By Walter H. Mallory

"TARIFF autonomy for China is no longer an aspiration; it is a fact," said Dr. C. T. Wang, Foreign Minister of the National Government of China, in an interview on January 9, 1929. He further stated that the negotiation of new tariff agreements with the Powers had removed one important cause of dispute which for years has hindered the establishment of amicable relations. The much-discussed schedule was put into force on February 1, 1929. The day was proclaimed a holiday in Nanking and Shanghai. Demonstrations and parades were held in the flag-bedecked streets, volunteer speakers told those who would pause to listen what it was all about, and students distributed handbills explaining the significance of China's new relationship with other countries.

The tariff question has been a source of friction between Chinese and foreigners for many years. In the eighteenth and the early part of the nineteenth centuries the legal rates of duty were low; but the schedules were not published, and opportunity was thus offered for corruption in the administration. Irregularity and uncertainty developed a controversy so bitter that it ended finally in war between Great Britain and China.

In the treaty of Nanking which followed this conflict, in 1842, China was made to agree that her tariff duties should be at fixed rates, and the next year a tariff schedule of 5 percent *ad valorem* was adopted on both imports and exports. This remained the standard until the Washington Conference, although it was several times, by revision, brought up to an "effective 5 percent." In the Nine Power Treaty signed at Washington in 1922 it was agreed that the schedule should be revised, that a 2½ percent surtax and higher surtaxes on "luxuries" should be authorized and that a conference should be held in Peking to arrange the conditions and to consider the abolition of "likin" or transit taxes, which for years had been a source of irritation to Chinese and foreign traders alike. This conference was the last occasion that the foreign Powers have enjoyed to deal unitedly with China. The Chinese delegation, led by the present Foreign Minister, Dr. C. T. Wang, declared in the opening session that they would be content with nothing less than tariff autonomy, a question which it was beyond the scope of the conference to decide. China had, therefore, to be satisfied with an acceptance of this point "in principle." The conference failed to reach an agreement after several months of labor.

It will be interesting, perhaps, to consider the means employed by the Chinese under the leadership of C. T. Wang to gain the victory which in 1922 had seemed a forlorn hope indeed. Although many factors, including anti-foreign riots, boycotts, and a change of heart of some of the Powers, have had their share, China's success in breaking down the united front of the foreign nations has been her most powerful weapon. After the Boxer uprising in 1900, and the resulting protocol, the Powers who were signatory to that instrument always spoke with a united voice on all matters having to do with the tariff. The diplomatic corps at Peking maintained a formal organization and dealt with China through its *doyen*. This procedure continued until the Great War,

when of course a distinct cleavage developed in the diplomatic ranks. At the end of the war China negotiated new treaties with Germany and Austria. They were no longer "Protocol Powers." Then a little later Russia dropped out of line, and became a vigorous proponent of every measure designed directly or indirectly to make less tenable the position of the other Powers. Meanwhile, with each passing year China's demands for autonomy became more insistent, and this despite great political disorganization and civil strife. This prolonged note of determination was punctuated by occasional outbursts of violence, and was sustained by a carefully exploited public opinion at home and abroad. It finally became necessary for the Powers to choose between the two apparent evils of having increasingly bad relations with China, or injuring at least temporarily the structure of their business relations with her. The latter course was followed, and on July 25, 1928, the United States led the way by formally recognizing China's right to fix her own tariff rates. It is held in many quarters that in thus acting alone the United States gave the *coup de grace* to the already badly battered unity of the diplomatic corps at Peking.

The American treaty, which has since been ratified by the Senate, contained the usual "most favored nation" clause, and it was believed by some that our action was but a gesture to gain a preferred position in China, for it was little expected that the other Powers would take similar action. But the American lead was quickly followed. China's announcement that a new tariff schedule was to be applied on February 1, 1929, doubtless provided a further urge, for no single Power desired the task of resisting alone. Japan has not, at the time of writing, signed a new tariff treaty, although it is understood that she agrees to tariff autonomy "in principle."

The new schedule is considered on the whole to be moderate. The list covers 718 items divided into 34 categories. The rate on imports varies from 7½ to 27½ percent *ad valorem*, with an excise of 32½ percent on cigars and cigarettes. The only items on the free list are cereals and flour, and books, maps and periodicals. The rates are considered only provisional, and will be given a year's trial. The statement of President Chang Kai-shek that they will be further increased at the end of that period seems to indicate that the trial is not an effort to arrive at a schedule which will be most beneficial to China's trade, but that the present schedule represents all that China may expect to collect today without serious trouble with other countries.

It appears that American trade will carry a large share of the burden of the increased rate. The old rate, it will be recalled, was a uniform 5 percent, with a surtax of 2½ percent. More than 80 percent of China's kerosene imports are of American origin, and the bulk of rolled tobacco also comes from this country. The following table will show the new rate which applies to the five principal items of our exports to China:

Article	*Percent of total U. S. exports to China*	*New Tariff Rate*
Kerosene	33.8	31%
Tobacco Products	21.7	40%*
Cereals	16.2	Free
Metals	7.4	10%
Machinery	3.1	10%

* Including an excise of 32½ percent.

The new duties have, of course, immediately been added to the cost of all imported articles, and this will doubtless cause a sharp rise in the cost of living, particularly in the larger port cities. The necessary adjustment in wages will as usual lag, and hardship can be anticipated in some quarters. But an examination of the schedule shows that this burden will fall on the Chinese who are most able to bear it, and on the foreign residents in China. The fact that cereals, the principal article of consumption of the toiling masses, are duty free, will be a distinct benefit, particularly in view of the present wide-spread famine. The ordinary Chinese do not use foreign products to any extent, and the well-to-do can probably afford the difference. The foreigner who must live in western style and who imports a large proportion of his food, most of his clothing, and practically all of his equipment, will need to make the largest adjustment.

The Nationalist Government has agreed to abolish "likin," the vexatious internal tax on goods in transit. Further, it is reported to have made agreements with several large foreign companies that all charges will be collected at the ports and that should additional taxes be exacted in the interior, these will be remitted by the central government. There is strong doubt whether the Nanking régime has yet established sufficient control over the petty war lords in the hinterland to be able to curb their predatory instincts.

Whether or not China will use her new-found power wisely is yet to be seen. The government's effort to disprove the argument which foreign opponents to autonomy have so freely voiced — that it will act without due regard to economic laws and for the principal purpose of obtaining funds for the support of unscrupulous factions — may provide the necessary urge to apply the new prerogative with temperance and along lines which will not be too great a burden on the structure of China's foreign trade. Foreign business men who have opposed autonomy will be glad to be proved wrong; and the many well-wishers for the Nationalist cause will rejoice if the new responsibilities which China's leaders have undertaken are discharged with fidelity to the best interests of the country.

COMPARATIVE NAVAL STRENGTHS

The Washington Conference, which closed February 6, 1922, limited the number of Capital Ships and Aircraft Carriers. Other naval classifications — Cruisers, Destroyers, Submarines — were not limited. The following tables are based on "Navies of the World," prepared by Hon. Frederick Hale, Chairman Senate Committee on Naval Affairs (Senate Committee Print; U. S. Government Printing Office, 1928); "Fleets" (British Empire and Foreign Countries); Command Paper 3034 (H. M. Stationery Office, London, 1928); and other sources. Figures given in the various sources do not always agree in details. So far as possible the data of each country has been used for that country.

TABLE I. CAPITAL SHIPS

Power	Built		Actual Ratio of Tonnage	Tonnage to be Arrived at in 1931	True Ratio to be Arrived at in 1931
	No.	Tons			
United States	18	525,850	4.72	525,000	5.00
British Empire	20	556,350	5.00	525,000	5.00
Japanese Empire	10	301,320	2.71	315,000	3.00
France	9	197,670	1.77	175,000	1.67
Italy	5	109,220	.98	175,000	1.67

TABLE II. AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Power	Built, Building or Authorized		Total Tonnage Allowed by Treaty	Actual Ratio of Tonnage	Allowed Ratio of Tonnage
	No.	Tons			
United States	4	92,200 (a)	135,000	4.13	5.00
British Empire	6	111,450	135,000	5.00	5.00
Japanese Empire	3	63,300	81,000	2.84	3.00
France	1	21,160	60,000	.94	1.67
Italy	None		60,000	0.00	1.67

(a) Including the aircraft carrier authorized by Congress on February 7, 1929, tonnage estimated at 13,500 tons, but not yet appropriated for at date of printing.

TABLE III. CRUISERS, FIRST LINE (a) UNLIMITED

Power	Built		Building		Authorized or Appropriated for		Total		Ratio of Tonnage
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	
United States	10	75,000	8	80,000	15	150,000(b)	33	305,000	3.60
British Empire	54(c)	303,940	8	76,600	5	43,200(d)	67	423,740	5.00
Japanese Empire	26	143,955	6	60,000	1	10,000	33	213,955	2.52
France	9	69,050	3	30,000			12	99,050	1.11
Italy	12	67,370	6	40,000	2	20,000	20	127,370	1.50

(a) In addition, the Powers have second line cruisers, over effective age of 20 years, as follows: United States, 22 totaling 179,425 tons; British Empire, none; Japan, 9 totaling 71,434 tons; France, 6 totaling 64,770 tons; Italy, 1 of 7,234 tons.
(b) Authorized by Congress February 7, 1929, but not yet appropriated for at date of printing.
(c) Includes Yarmouth (5,250 tons) on disposal list.
(d) Tonnage estimated; including three cruisers (26,600 tons estimated) to be laid down shortly, but not yet appropriated for at date of printing.

TABLE IV. DESTROYERS, FIRST LINE (a) (UNLIMITED)

Power	Built		Building, Authorized or Appropriated for		Totals		Ratio of Tonnage
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	
United States	262	312,479	None		262	312,479 (b)	5.00
British Empire	162	198,045	20	27,900 (c)	182	225,945	3.62
Japanese Empire	96	103,160	19	32,300	115	135,460	2.17
France	46	60,441	22	50,200	68	110,641	1.77
Italy	73	76,978	16	29,336	89	106,314	1.70

(a) In addition, the Powers have second line destroyers, over effective age of 16 years, as follows: United States, 8 totaling 5,936 tons; British Empire, 3 totaling 2,100 tons; Japan, 4 totaling 3,500 tons; France, 4 totaling 2,175 tons; Italy, none.
(b) Exclusive of light mine layers.
(c) Tonnage estimated.

TABLE V. SUBMARINES, FIRST LINE (a) (UNLIMITED)

Power	Built		Building, Authorized or Appropriated for		Totals		Ratio of Tonnage
	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	No.	Tons	
United States	112	83,607	2	5,520	114	89,127	5.00
British Empire	52	43,190	18	27,720 (b)	70	70,910	3.98
Japan	62	58,417	13	21,590	75	80,007	4.49
France	39	35,539	43	53,616	82	89,155 (c)	5.00
Italy	37	15,243	25	21,368	62	36,611	2.05

(a) In addition, the Powers have second line submarines, over effective age of 13 years, as follows: United States, 10 totaling 3,852 tons; British Empire, none; Japan, 6 totaling 1,749 tons; France, 4 totaling 2,043 tons; Italy, none.
(b) Tonnage estimated.
(c) Including submarines for coastal defense of less than 700 tons, as follows: built, 11 totaling 6,600 tons; building or appropriated for, 12 totaling 7,560 tons.

TABLE VI. NEW NAVAL CONSTRUCTION

This table shows the principal new naval craft, in both the limited and unlimited categories, appropriated for or actually laid down by the Powers since the Washington Conference.

Type or Class	United States				British Empire				Japan				France				Italy			
			Total				Total				Total				Total				Total	
	Laid Down	Appro. For	No.	Total Tonnage	Laid Down	Appro. For	No.	Total Tonnage	Laid Down	Appro. For	No.	Total Tonnage	Laid Down	Appro. For	No.	Total Tonnage	Laid Down	Appro. For	No.	Total Tonnage
Capital Ships					2		2	67,400(a)												
Aircraft Carriers	2	1(e)	3	79,500(b)	2		2	41,100	2		2	53,800	1		1	21,160				
Cruisers	8	15(e)	23	230,000(b)	15	2	17	166,600(b)	15	1	16	128,285(b)	8	1	9	81,950(b)	6	2	8	60,000(b)
Mine Layers					1		1	6,740	1	1(c)	2	3,000(b)	1		1	5,212				
Destroyers (all classes)					10	12	22	30,425(b)	38	13	51	72,480(b)	50		50	92,640(b)	28	4	32	49,656(b)
Submarines (all classes)	3		3	8,200	14	7	21	31,865(b)	28	5	33	48,834(b)	63		63	70,539(b)	21	6	27	23,440(b)
Gunboats and River Gunboats	6		6	2,790	4	1	5	1,144(g)	4	2(c)	6	1,352(d)	1		1	750				
Mine Sweepers					2		2	1,890	6		6	3,690					10		10	6,652
Submarine Tenders					1	1	2	32,000(b)	2		2	17,000		1	1	6,000				
Oil Tankers									3		3	46,200	1	4	5	71,915	7	1	8	42,552

(a) Constructed under terms of Washington Treaty to replace 4 pre-war vessels to achieve parity with U. S. fleet.
(b) Tonnage estimated.
(c) No data.
(d) Excluding tonnage of the two gunboats appropriated for but not yet laid down.
(e) Authorized by Congress February 7, 1929, but not yet appropriated for at date of printing.
(g) Omits tonnage of ship appropriated for.

SOME RECENT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

By William L. Langer

NOTE—FOREIGN AFFAIRS will supply its readers, *post free*, with any book published in the United States, at the publisher's regular list price. Send orders, accompanied by check or money order, to Book Service, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 25 West 43rd Street, New York City.

General International Relations

DIE SOZIOLOGISCHEN GRUNDLAGEN DES VOELKERRECHTS. By Max Huber. Berlin: Rothschild, 1928, 101 pp. M. 4.

A competent and suggestive essay by the former president of the Hague Tribunal.

THE LEGAL EFFECTS OF RECOGNITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AS INTERPRETED BY THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES. By John C. Hervey. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1928, 184 pp. $3.00.

The author examines the effects of over two hundred American and English decisions. His work is important in studying the possible implications of the recognition of Russia.

POLITICAL HANDBOOK OF THE WORLD, 1929. Edited by Malcolm W. Davis and Walter H. Mallory. New Haven: Yale University Press (for the Council on Foreign Relations, New York), 1929, 204 pp. $2.50.

This is a revised and enlarged edition of the volume published last year, and is marked by the same careful editing. The programs of the political parties, the composition of the parliaments, and the characteristics of the press of the various countries are again set forth, and a list of the more important periodicals devoted to international affairs has been included. During the last twelve months general elections have been held in 27 countries and the cabinets of 35 countries have been entirely changed or reorganized. All these changes have been included in the new volume, and the information has been brought down to January 1, 1929. In addition, a section on the United States has been added. This is a most useful book to all those who wish to follow intelligently the course of political events in other countries.

CONSTITUTIONS MODERNES. By F. R. and P. Dareste, J. Delpech and J. Laferrières. Paris: Sirey, 1928, 670 pp. Fr. 70.

The first volume of a new and entirely revised edition of Dareste in four volumes. This volume covers Albania to Greece, with texts and critical notes of great value.

1918–1928. A SHORT HISTORY OF THE WORLD. By C. Delisle Burns. New York: Payson and Clarke, 1928, 473 pp. $3.50.

This survey of the world's history since the conclusion of the war is perhaps the best introductory account now available. The author not only reviews the leading political events of Europe in the last decades, but gives adequate stress to economic and social problems and their reactions. Above all, he aims to set forth the interdependence of modern nations and devotes much space to the evolution of the situation in the non-European countries. The book is well-informed and thoroughly readable, while the viewpoint of the writer is distinctly moderate and understanding; if anything, somewhat too optimistic.

DIE DIKTATUR IM ANMARSCH. By Hartmut Piper. Leipzig: Weicher, 1928, 103 pp. M. 2.50.

The author foresees a new age of enlightened imperialism, in which the national states, under dictators, are welded together for common cultural tasks by a supernational agency.

PSEUDO-SECURITY. By James M. Spaight. New York: Longmans, 1928, 182 pp. $5.00.

After analyzing the clauses of the Covenant and the various attempts to secure peace since 1918, the writer comes to the conclusion that only a pseudo-security can be arrived at by these methods.

DEMOCRACY ON TRIAL. By F. A. W. Gisborne. New York: Longmans, 1928, 222 pp. $4.20.

A series of stimulating essays ranging from the problems of the prevention of war and the work of the League to the question of a white Australia and the awakening of the Orient.

BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE. By Florence B. Boeckel. New York: Macmillan, 1928, 601 pp. $2.50.

A valuable handbook for peace workers, reviewing what has been done and what can be done to promote international good-will.

INFORMATION ON THE RENUNCIATION OF WAR, 1927–1928. By J. W. Wheeler-Bennett. London: Allen and Unwin, 1928, 192 pp. 8/6.

The documents covering the negotiations for the Kellogg Pact, followed by an analysis of the text.

WAR AS AN INSTRUMENT OF NATIONAL POLICY. By James T. Shotwell. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1929, 320 pp. $3.50.

Among the numerous books dealing with the Kellogg Pact, this study by an eminent historian closely connected with the efforts made in the direction of peace in the last decade, is bound to hold a leading place. The actual account of the negotiations is perhaps the least important part, though the author has added materially to our knowledge of the unofficial activities connected with the international discussions. The really significant part is the setting of the pact in the general problem of war and peace. Professor Shotwell's discussion of the nature of war and the inherent difficulties in the way of its abolition should help to clear up some current misconceptions. Of his analysis of the text of the pact itself little need be said, as this is bound to be more or less a matter of opinion. To some he may seem too optimistic, but his view is of importance as coming from a writer who is unusually well-informed.

THE WASHINGTON CONFERENCE AND AFTER. By Yamato Ichihashi. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1928, 455 pp. $4.00.

Professor Ichihashi's book belongs with the important original treatments of the Washington Conference. As Secretary and Interpreter to Viscount Kato he was in a position to follow closely the course of the negotiations and to learn to understand the conflicting viewpoints. He draws a clear distinction between the work of the Conference in regard to the limitation of naval armaments and that concerned with the problems of China and the Pacific. Each phase of the discussions is taken up in detail and the obstacles in the way of agreement are discussed dispassionately. The later part of the book is devoted to a survey of the developments of the Conference and the agreements, thus making possible an evaluation of the work of 1921. Altogether this is a useful and thoroughly interesting book.

FOREIGN INVESTMENTS. By Gustav Cassell and others. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1928, 240 pp. $3.00.

Harris Foundation Lectures dealing with the problem both theoretically and practically, by G. Cassell, T. E. Gregory, R. R. Kuczynski and H. K. Norton.

POST-WAR MONETARY STABILIZATION. By Gustav Cassell. New York: Columbia University Press, 1928, 109 pp. $2.50.

Julius Berr Lectures at Columbia, in which the Swedish economist reviews the monetary problem in its international aspects.

International Relations of the United States

AMERICAN DIPLOMACY IN THE MODERN WORLD. By Arthur Bullard. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1928, 133 pp. $1.50.

Three stimulating lectures by a well-known writer and correspondent, surveying the American position in regard to problems of peace and disarmament.

AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS. By John M. Mathews. New York: Century, 1928, 713 pp. $4.00.

A general text, stressing the later period.

LA POLITIQUE ÉTRANGÈRE DES ÉTATS UNIS. By. J. Gachon. Paris: Alcan, 1928, 252 pp. Fr. 15.

A brief review of American policies as seen from across the Atlantic.

AMERICA'S AMBASSADORS TO ENGLAND, 1785–1928. By Beckles Willson. London: Murray, 1928, 510 pp. 21/.

A survey of Anglo-American relations along the line marked out by the author's earlier books.

ASPECTS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS. By K. Capper Johnson and John M. Frankland. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928, 126 pp. $2.00.

The first Oxford-Yale prize essays, dealing respectively with the significance of the American Revolution in the development of the British Commonwealth and the influence of international trade upon British-American relations.

THE GRAIN TRADE DURING THE WORLD WAR. By Frank M. Surface. New York: Macmillan, 1928, 707 pp. $6.00.

An exhaustive treatment of the work of the Food Administration Grain Corporation during the war, equipped with valuable statistics on this phase of the food situation.

THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS. By William Cameron Forbes. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1928, 2 vols., 634, 636 pp. $12.50.

This complete survey of the Philippines by the former Governor-General is an authoritative work of reference. The author has drawn not only on his own experience and papers, but has spared no effort to collect material from all available sources. His long and varied connection with Philippine problems lends added weight to his account and to his opinions. The first volume is devoted largely to a description of conditions and to the administrative régime since the American occupation began. The second is primarily political and traces the evolution of the attitude of the natives, the emergence of the independence movement and the history of the Philippine parties.

Western Europe

DIE WIDERLEGUNG DER VERSAILLER KRIEGSSCHULDTHESE. By Alfred von Wegerer. Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1928, 237 pp. M. 7.20.

An imposing piece of scholarly writing. The author, who is editor of the well-known periodical *Die Kriegsschuldfrage*, concerns himself here not with the question of the origins of the war as such, but with the verdict of the Commission appointed by the Peace Conference to investigate the question of responsibility for the war. He examines first the source material upon which the Commission worked and has no difficulty in

showing how incomplete, and in some respects untrustworthy it was. He then dissects the whole report of the Commission bit by bit, making use throughout of all the voluminous material now at the disposal of the historian. The rest of the book is taken up with the German objections and ultimatum of the Allies. It need hardly be said that the writer leaves the Commission's report and the assertion of Germany's sole responsibility a mere shred. Whether the mere proof of the untenability of the Allied thesis is sufficient to effect a revision of the treaty or the deletion of article 231 is another question.

AU SERVICE DE LA FRANCE. By Raymond Poincaré. Volume V. Paris: Plon, 1928, Fr. 25.

The latest volume of the important memoirs of the war President of France, dealing with the invasion of France in 1914.

LE COLONEL DRAGOUTINE DIMITRIEVITCH APIS. By M. Boghitchevitch. Paris: Delpeuch, 1928, 168 pp. Fr. 12.

A former Serbian diplomat now in exile brings together all that is known of the famous leader of the Black Hand.

WITHOUT CENSOR. By Thomas M. Johnson. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1928, 421 pp. $5.00.

The war correspondent of a New York paper rewrites his battle accounts as they would have been if uncensored.

DIE EUROPÄISCHEN BILDER. By Paul Seelhof. Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1928, 275 pp. M. 7.

A fascinating series of dramatic essays, reviewing the development of the European situation from 1870 to 1914. The author is well-informed and gifted with unusual insight.

LA MOBILISATION FINANCIÈRE DE LA FRANCE EN 1914. By Georges Gremier. Paris: Sirey, 1928, 182 pp. Fr. 25.

A valuable contribution, equipped with numerous official documents.

BRIAND. By Alfred Aubert. Paris. Chiron, 1928, 284 pp. Fr. 12.

A fine sympathetic biography.

ALSACE ET LORRAINE AU DESSUS DES PASSIONS. By Andrée Viollis. Paris: Ottinger, 1928, 208 pp. Fr. 15.

All is quiet along the Rhine and the Moselle.

LA GUERRE QUI VIENT. By Commandant Sorb. Paris: Tallandier, 1928, 224 pp. Fr. 10.

Germany is preparing her revenge under the cover of peace pacts. France must look for an attack by air and with gas, the Hun coming through Belgium and backed by the Bolsheviks.

L'ÉVACUATION DE LA RHENANIE? By General Mordacq. Paris: Tallandier, 1928, 328 pp. Fr. 1.25.

Another book to be read in connection with the Kellogg Pact. According to the writer, immediate evacuation is tantamount to inviting an attack.

DIE BELGISCHE NEUTRALITÄT UND DER SCHLIEFFENSCHE FELDZUGS-PLAN. By Johann V. Bredt. Berlin: Stilke, 1929, 216 pp. M. 10.

Easily one of the most illuminating and important books on the whole Belgian question. The author, a German deputy and professor at Marburg, not only reviews the problem of Belgian neutrality before and during the war, but shows that the famous German Chief of Staff intended to concentrate on the Belgian frontier in case of war, but without executing a *coup de main* against Liège. His hope evidently was that the

French would become so nervous that they would first violate Belgian neutrality. Here again Moltke changed the plan of campaign in disastrous fashion, although the author admits that there were important considerations to explain this. The book throughout is scholarly, enlightened and well-balanced.

HISTOIRE DE LA BELGIQUE CONTEMPORAINE, 1830–1914. Brussels: Dewitt, 1928, 408 pp.

The first volume of a splendid coöperative work, with chapters on the formation of the Kingdom, the evolution of institutions, and economic history. Attention should be called especially to the chapter on Belgium's relations to the Great Powers, written by Terlinden, the director of the foreign office.

THE SPANISH PAGEANT. By Arthur S. Riggs. Indianapolis: Bobbs Merrill, 1928, 416 pp. $5.00.

Impressions formed during twenty-five years of study and residence.

CATECISME LIBERAL. By Josep M. Vilá. Barcelona: Llibreria Catalonia, 1928, 177 pp. Pes. 3.

A Spanish formulation of the liberal program.

NOTAS SOBRE PORTUGAL. By Alicio Garcitoral. Barcelona: Sociedad General Española, 1928, 105 pp. Pes. 2.

Political observations on the Portuguese dictatorship.

DIAZ. By Alberto Baldini. Florence: Case Editrice Barbèra, 1928, 263 pp. L. 15.

Diaz glorified in a competent study of the campaign after Caporetto, by the editor of *Esercito e Nazione*.

DALLA DEMOCRAZIA CRISTIANA AL PARTITO POPOLARE ITALIANO. By R. Murri. Venice: La Nuova Italia, 1928, 210 pp. L. 7.

The author throws considerable light on the evolution of the Italian peasant movement under the leadership of Don Sturzo.

MAKING THE FASCIST STATE. By Herbert W. Schneider. New York: Oxford University Press, 1928, 403 pp. $3.00.

One of the really good books on the Fascist movement. The author is thoroughly versed in the subject and approaches it without preconceived notions and without undue credulity. With great skill he describes the emergence of the Fascist movement from the confused interventionism of the war period. The reactions of nationalism, imperialism, futurism and syndicalism upon each other are clearly brought out. In describing the Fascist state the author is careful to stress the lack of a concise program and to bring out the various viewpoints within the movement. The chapters on the Corporate State and on Fascist Culture are to be especially recommended, while the extensive appendices, containing documentary and other source material not readily available, as well as the detailed bibliography give the volume a unique value.

LE RÉGIME FASCISTE ITALIEN. By Francisco L. Ferrari. Paris: Spes, 1928, 374 pp. Fr. 25.

Another study of high merit. The writer, working with all available material, subjects the régime to a minute analysis and critique, but maintains throughout a scholarly and objective stand.

FASCISMO E CULTURA. By Giovanni Gentile. Milan: Traves, 1928, 208 pp. L. 18.

The great theorist of the movement enlarges on its non-political implications.

ITALIA E JUGOSLAVIA. By U. Nani. Milan: Libreria d'Italia, 1928, 144 pp. L. 5.

A review of the relations between the two countries in the past decade.

IMPERIALISMO SPIRITUALE E IMPERIALISMO MATERIALE. By G. Zoppola. Venice: Istituto Manin, 1928, 144 pp. L. 12.

The spiritual kind is Fascist and Catholic, the materialistic type is Jewish and Masonic.

IMPERIALISMO PAGANO. By I. Evola. Rome: Atanor, 1928, 160 pp. L. 10.

Europe must be freed from the democratic Christian tradition. Back to pagan imperialism and the *Machtstaat*.

SIAMO MEDITERRANEI. By S. Roggero. Genoa: Istituto Editoriale Genovese 1928, 200 pp. L. 12.

The why and the wherefor of a leading Fascist slogan.

EMPEROR FRANCIS JOSEPH OF AUSTRIA. By Joseph Redlich. New York: Macmillan, 1929, 547 pp. $5.00.

At last a really great book on the later period of the Hapsburg Monarchy! No one is more competent to write on the subject than Professor Redlich, an authority on constitutional history, for years a deputy and the Empire's last finance minister. He has not written in emulation of Ludwig or his kind, but has followed the great traditions of scholarship in writing a biography which gives the person of the Emperor the proper background. The life of Francis Joseph is inseparable from the history of his time and his country, and this book is at the same time a fine character study and a searching analysis of the whole Austro-Hungarian problem. Much space is devoted to the early years of the Emperor and the influences, personal and other, which went into the formation of his character and outlook. It would be impossible to do justice to Redlich's work in a few words. Suffice it to say that it should be read by everyone interested in European problems.

FRANZ JOSEPH I. By Karl Tschuppik. Dresden: Avalon, 1928, 669 pp. M. 18.

This study suffers by comparison with the preceding, but on the whole it is creditable and attractively written.

FRANZ FERDINAND. By Theodor von Sosnosky. Munich: Oldenbourg, 1929, 255 pp. M. 9.

Another outstanding performance and by far the best book on the Archduke. The author, a prominent historian, definitely explodes the idea that Francis Ferdinand was the leader of a war party or that he desired war at any time.

KAISER KARL. By Arthur Graf Polzer-Hoditz. Vienna: Amalthea, 1928, 652 pp. M. 16.

The best biography of the last Austrian Emperor, written by his chief of Cabinet and containing much new information.

DIE KATASTROPHE. By Edmund von Glaise-Horstenau. Vienna: Amalthea, 1928, 525 pp. M. 15.

The writer, who was formerly director of the Kriegsarchiv in Vienna, has written an admirable account of the collapse of the monarchy and the emergence of the succession states. This book should be read in connection with the memoirs of Masaryk and Beneš, as it puts their activities into a different light.

OESTERREICHS WEG ZUM ANSCHLUSS. By Gerhard Höper. Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1928, 168 pp. M. 5.

Stresses the desirability of economic union as the necessary first step to political union.

SCHICKSALSGEMEINSCHAFT. By Friedrich Immanuel. Munich: Bayerischer Volksverlag, 1928, 400 pp. M. 8.50.

Elaborates the theme of Austro-German community before and during the war, in connection with the questions of war guilt and Anschluss.

DIE AUSWÄRTIGE POLITIK DES DEUTSCHEN REICHES 1871–1914. Edited by A. Mendelssohn-Bartholdy and F. Thimme. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1928, four volumes, M. 160.

Authorized abbreviated edition of the German documents.

VOR DEM EINTRITT AMERIKAS IN DEN WELTKRIEG. By Horst von Falcke. Dresden: Reissner, 1928, 304 pp. M. 6.

An important book, in which the former German Consul-General in New York gives an unvarnished account of German propaganda and activities.

DIE ENTSTEHUNG DER DEUTSCHEN REPUBLIK. By Arthur Rosenberg. Berlin: Rowohlt, 1928, 285 pp. M. 6.

The secretary of the parliamentary investigating committee gives an admirable analysis of the domestic developments since 1871.

DAS AUSSENPOLITISCHE PROBLEM STAAT UND WIRTSCHAFT IN DER DEUTSCHEN REICHSPOLITIK 1880–1914. By Rudolf Ibbeken. Schleswig: Ibbeken, 1928, 285 pp. M. 6.

Traces the influence of economic problems upon German foreign policy and discusses such matters as colonial activity, international finance, commercial treaties and the Bagdad Railway.

ZEHN JAHRE DEUTSCHE GESCHICHTE. By various writers. Berlin: Stollberg, 1928, 556 pp. M. 20.

This is a first rate coöperative survey of German history and problems since 1918. Oncken writes on the historical development, Noske on the defence against Bolshevism, Gessler on the organization of the new army, Rheinbaben on foreign policy, Müller on social legislation and Dooifel on the German press.

STATE AND SOVEREIGNTY IN MODERN GERMANY. By Rupert Emerson. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1928, 293 pp. $3.50.

An admirable work reviewing the political theories of the German jurists in the period since 1871.

DENKWÜRDIGKEITEN. By Colmar Freiherr von der Goltz. Berlin: Mittler, 1929, 468 pp. M. 15.

The important reminiscences of the famous organizer of the modern Turkish armies.

MEIN KRIEGSTAGEBUCH. By Kronprinz Rupprecht von Bayern. Berlin: Mittler, 1929, three volumes, M. 45.

An imposing mass of material on the conduct of the war, useful for the student of military affairs.

WANDERJAHRE-KRIEGE-GESTALTEN. By Generaloberst Alexander von Kluck. Berlin: Eisenschmidt, 1929, 232 pp. M. 10.

A dispassionate apologia, revealing von Kluck not only as a great commander but as a fine personality.

VON DER MARK ZUR REICHSMARK. By Karl Elster. Jena: Fischer, 1928, 480 pp. M. 22.

The first really scientific history of the inflation. Equipped with elaborate statistics.

GERMANY UNDER THE DAWES PLAN. By Max Sering. London: King, 1929, 251 pp. 10/6.

The English translation of one of the best single treatments from the German side of the whole reparations problem.

LA LIQUIDATION FINANCIÈRE DE LA GUERRE. By Augustin Delattre. Paris: Alcan, 1928, 200 pp. Fr. 15.

A serious scholarly treatment of the German debt, the Dawes Plan, the Allied Debts to America, etc.

ZEHN JAHRE FREMDHERRSCHAFT AM DEUTSCHEN RHEIN. By Karl Wachendorf. Berlin: Reimar Hobbing, 1928, 290 pp. M. 6.

A well-documented review of the Ruhr occupation and the separatist movement.

LE SLESVIG ET LA PAIX. By A. Tardieu and F. de Jessen. Paris: Meynial, 1928, 393 pp. Fr. 50.

A detailed account of the problem in the period from January 1919 to January 1920, as seen from the Allied standpoint.

Eastern Europe

GESCHICHTE DES BALTENREGIMENTS. By Wilhelm Baron Wrangell. Reval: Wassermann, 1928, 160 pp. M. 7.50.

An authoritative account of the struggle of the Baltic Germans against the Bolshevists, by the commander of the famous Baltic regiment.

LES VICTOIRES SERBES EN 1914. By Lieutenant-Colonel Desmazes and Commandant Naoumovitch. Paris: Berger-Lebrault, 1928, 124 pp. Fr. 10.

An excellent account of the Serb campaign in 1914.

LA QUESTION DES DÉTROITS. By Ali Fuad. Paris: Savouret, 1928, 184 pp. Fr. 30.

The author sketches the earlier history of this knotty problem and discusses the settlement reached at Lausanne.

DER KAMPF ZWISCHEN TSCHECHEN UND DEUTSCHEN. By Emanuel Rádl. Reichenberg: Stiepel, 1928, 208 pp. M. 5.

An eminently sane book, in which a Czech professor fulminates against the exaggeration of the national idea and calls for intelligent coöperation between the Czechs and the German minority.

UNGARNS VERGEWALTIGUNG. By Lajos Steier. Vienna: Amalthea, 1928, 1007 pp. M. 30.

An exhaustive account of the condition of the Hungarians under Czech rule, with numerous photographs, statistics and maps.

LATVIJAS WERDEGANG. By Alfred Bihlmans. Riga: Lamey, 1928, 102 pp. Lats 3.

An excellent survey of Latvian history in the past decade.

THE REBIRTH OF POLAND. By W. K. Korostowetz. London: Bles, 1928, 318 pp. 10/6.

The English translation of an important book already noted.

LA POLOGNE ET NOUS. By René Martel. Paris: Delpeuch, 1928, 256 pp. Fr. 25.

Poland idealized, for French consumption.

AU PAYS DU NEP ET DE LA TCHÉKA. By Boris Cederholm. Paris: Tallandier, 1928, 400 pp. Fr. 14.

The author's hair-raising experiences in Russian prisons.

THE HAMMER AND THE SCYTHE. By Anne O'Hare McCormick. New York: Knopf, 1928, 312 pp. $3.00.

Chiefly a reprint of articles written for *The New York Times*. Clear and well-balanced.

LIFE UNDER THE SOVIETS. By Alexander Wicksteed. London: Lane, 1928, 214 pp. 6/.

One of the best books on Soviet Russia. The author, after five years' residence in Moscow, writes simply but shrewdly about everyday life under the new régime.

LA COSTITUZIONE RUSSA. By Mario Sertoli. Florence: Le Monnier, 1928, 435 pp. L. 50.

The first of three volumes of a scholarly treatise.

THE RUSSIAN CHURCH SINCE THE REVOLUTION. By G. P. Fedotoff. New York: Macmillan, 1928, 102 pp. $1.00.

A good brief survey of the problem.

L'EXPÉRIENCE MONÉTAIRE ROUMAINE. By N. C. Angelesco. Paris: Giard, 1928, 259 pp. Fr. 25.

A serious study of the monetary problem from 1914–1927.

JUGOSLAWIENS ENTSTEHUNG. By Dusan A. Loncarević. Vienna: Amalthea, 1928, 672 pp. M. 9.

The author, a Serb official, has written an admirable account of the economic and political struggle with Austria and the emergence of the new state, as seen from Belgrade.

GROSS-DEUTSCHLAND, GROSS-SÜDSLAWIEN. By Camillo Morocutti. Vienna: Braumüller, 1928, 103 pp. M. 3.

An extraordinary book, in which the author, who is leader of the German minority in Slovenia, gives a detailed account of the sufferings of his people and then proceeds to propose the formation of a new Mitteleuropa based upon the rapprochement of Germany and Austria on the one hand and Jugoslavia and Bulgaria on the other, the two sections to be bound together by economic and other agreements.

POLITICAL MEMOIRS, 1914–1917. By Prince Nicholas of Greece. London: Hutchinson, 1928, 320 pp. 24/.

The war diary of the Prince, full of valuable material and shedding much light on the incredible Allied policy and the deposition of Constantine.

The British Commonwealth of Nations

THE HISTORY OF BRITISH CIVILIZATION. By Esmé Wingfield-Stratford. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1928, two volumes, $12.00.

On the whole an excellent performance, marked throughout by understanding, impartiality and balance.

BRITISH DOCUMENTS ON THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR, 1898–1914. Edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. London: H. M. S. O., 1928, 886 pp.

Volume V of the great British collection and one of the most interesting and important. The subject here dealt with is the Near East in the period from 1903 to 1909, which, in a sense, is the prelude to the Great War. The first chapter of the volume is devoted to reports on conditions in the Ottoman Empire before the Young Turk Revolution. A number of other chapters are taken up with the knotty Macedonian question and the activities of the Balkan revolutionary committees. We have here also the first authentic and complete material on the famous Reval meeting of 1908 and an admirable collection of papers dealing with the various phases of the Turk revolution. But the bulk of the volume is taken up with the Bosnian crisis and the relations of the Great Powers. Isvolski and his machinations are clearly brought out and the acuteness of the tension is demonstrated. As in the other volumes, the editorial work is of the highest

grade. Henceforth no student of Near Eastern affairs can afford to neglect this splendid source material.

BRITAIN AND THE WAR. By General Huguet. London: Cassell, 1928, 254 pp. 15/.
The English translation of a book by the former French military attaché in London, already noted in these bibliographies.

LAST CHANGES, LAST CHANCES. By Henry W. Nevinson. London: Nisbet, 1928, 361 pp. 15/.
Observations and experiences of the well-known journalist, especially interesting on the Irish situation and the Ruhr occupation.

DER GEISTIGE GEHALT IM BRITISCHEN IMPERIALISMUS. By Freiherr Kleinschmit von Lengefeld. Marburg: Elwert, 1928, 176 pp. M. 5.
British imperialism as it appears from the writings in the *Round Table*.

INDIA IN THE CRUCIBLE. By C. S. Ranga Iyer. London: Selwyn, 1928, 336 pp. 7/6.
A mass of detailed information, but important as a complete statement of the moderate Indian view on the question of reform.

LIVING INDIA. By Savel Zimand. New York: Longmans, 1928, 296 pp. $3.00.
A good book to read on India. The author is not profound, but gives a fair and unsensational survey of the history of the country, the social structure and the political situation.

INDIA: THE NEW PHASE. By Sir Stanley Reed and P. R. Cadell. London: Allan, 1928, 184 pp. 3/6.
The first of the authors is editor of one of the leading Indian newspapers. The book is a complete review of India's needs and present problems, well-informed and concise.

UNDERSTANDING INDIA. By Gertrude M. Williams. New York: Coward-McCann, 1928, 342 pp. $3.50.
Vivid impressions of extensive travels by a woman with insight and discrimination.

AN INDIAN COMMENTARY. By G. T. Garratt. London: Cape, 1928, 7/6.
A solid book of facts, well-presented and impartial.

THE WORKING OF DYARCHY IN INDIA. By "Kerala Putra." Bombay: Taraporevala, 1928, 159 pp. 6/6.
By an Indian professor. A book packed with information clearly presented, though not entirely without bias.

SEVEN MONTHS WITH MAHATMA GANDHI. By Krishna Das. Madras: Ganesan, 1928, 449 pp. R. 3.8.
The inside view of the non-coöperative movement of 1921–1922, by a fervent admirer.

The Near East

ACROSS THE WORLD OF ISLAM. By Samuel M. Zwemer. New York: Revell, 1919, 382 pp. $4.00.
The editor of the *Moslem World* reviews the problems arising from the awakening of the Moslem masses.

IL RISVEGLIO DELL 'ISLAM. By I. Zingarelli. Milan: Treves, 1928, 261 pp. L. 18.
The familiar theme presented by a well-informed writer.

CHEZ LES CHRÉTIENS D'ORIENT. By Jean Mélia. Paris: Fasquelle, 1928, Fr. 12.
An interesting contribution by the former director of the French commissariat in Syria.

WESTWARD TO MECCA. By Sirdar Ali Shah Ikbal. London: Witherby, 1928, 224 pp. 12/6.

Thrilling adventures in Afghanistan, Turkestan, Persia, Iraq and Hedjaz. The author throws light on the Bolshevik régime on the Indian frontier.

THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF IRAQ. By C. A. Hooper. Baghdad: MacKenzie and MacKenzie, 1928, 277 pp. 10/6.

A valuable historical introduction, followed by an authoritative analysis of the constitution of 1925, by the president of the Court of First Instance in Iraq.

THE MANDATE FOR PALESTINE. By J. Stoyanovsky. New York: Longmans, 1928, 414 pp. $8.50.

A thorough technical study of the mandate, which clears up a number of obscure points.

PALÄSTINA: IDEE, PROBLEME, TATSACHEN. By Gerhard Holdheim. Berlin: Schwetschke, 1928, 180 pp. M. 3.50.

A general consideration of the idea of a national home and the obstacles in the way of its realization.

ARABIA OF THE WAHHABIS. By H. St. J. Philby. London: Constable, 1928, 438 pp. 31/6.

A fascinating book, continuing the author's *Heart of Arabia* and recounting his mission to Ib'n Sa'ud in 1918.

THE TRANSIT OF EGYPT. By Lieutenant-Colonel Percival G. Elgood. New York: Longmans, 1928, 342 pp. $7.50.

The best general up-to-date book on modern Egypt, particularly strong on the history of the British occupation.

Africa

L'AFRIQUE FRANÇAISE POUR TOUS. By Louis Cros. Paris: Michel, 1928, 656 pp. Fr. 15.

A popular survey of the French African Empire.

LE MAROC. By E. Lemoigne. Paris: Notre Domaine Colonial, 1928, 188 pp. Fr. 15.

A general outline.

L'ÉTHIOPIE AU POINT DE VUE INTERNATIONAL. By E. Rouard de Card. Paris: Gamber, 1928, 200 pp. Fr. 18.

The best account of the international status of Abyssinia at the present time.

LIBERIA OLD AND NEW. By James L. Sibley and D. Westermann. London: Clarke, 1928, 317 pp. 7/6.

A historical sketch of the country followed by a good survey of economic conditions and possibilities.

The Far East

THE PEOPLE OF TIBET. By Sir Charles Bell. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928, 329 pp. 21/.

The best descriptive work on Tibet, written by an eminent authority.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN CHINA. By G. W. Keeton. New York: Longmans, 1928, two volumes. $15.00.

An outstanding book. The author, a professor of law, makes a careful study of the

theory and practice of extraterritoriality from the very beginning of European contact. The second volume is devoted to documents bearing on the subject, some of them hitherto unpublished.

THE CHINESE REVOLUTION. By H. Owen Chapman. London: Constable, 1928, 328 pp. 12/.

An important record of the communist period in 1926-1927 as seen at Hankow.

THE DRAGON AWAKES. By A. Krarup-Nielsen. New York: Dodd, Mead, 1928, 224 pp. $4.00.

One of the best books on recent events in China. The author, a Danish correspondent, was with both armies at one time or another, and gives a keen and unvarnished account of what he saw.

JAPAN UNDER TAISHO TENNO. By A. Morgan Young. London: Allen and Unwin, 1928, 348 pp. 12/6.

The former editor of the *Japan Chronicle* gives a solid account of the last reign, reviewing the part of Japan in the war, social developments, the Siberian adventure, the political evolution, etc.

THE GOVERNMENT OF JAPAN. By Naokichi Kitazawa. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1929, 130 pp. $1.75.

An admirable and convenient brief survey.

FOREIGN COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION IN THE FAR EAST. By Sir Hesketh Bell. London: Arnold, 1928, 320 pp. 16/.

The former governor of Mauritius reviews the colonial system of France in Indo-China and of Holland in Java in a very competent and informing book.

KOLONIALE VRAAGSTUKKEN. By H. Colijn. Amsterdam: Dagblad de Standaard, 1928, 145 pp.

An up-to-date and well-written volume on the colonial problem of the Dutch, by one of the men who knows it best.

Latin America

AMERIKANISCHE INTERESSEN UND PRINZIPIENPOLITIK IN MEXIKO. By Hans G. Römer. Hamburg: Friedrichsen, de Gruyter, 1929, 149 pp. M. 9.

A telling indictment of the American policy in the period from 1910 to 1914.

MEXICO, EUROPA UND AMERIKA. By Alfred Vagts. Berlin: Rothschild, 1928, 415 pp. M. 22.

An excellent book on Mexico, published under the auspices of the *Hochschule für Politik* and the *Institut für Auswärtige Politik*. The author is thoroughly conversant with the whole literature bearing upon his problem and has made extensive investigations in the United States and Mexico. He begins with an admirable account of the development of Mexico since the establishment of her independence, stressing the international aspects of her position and analyzing the changing attitude and interests of Great Britain and the United States. The author works out in detail the emergence of the oil question and its reaction upon the general situation. The period since 1910 is dealt with fully and the reader will find a mine of information collected here.

KAFFE SOCKER OCH BANANER. By Helmer Key. Stockholm: Bonniers Förlag, 1928, 336 pp.

The well-known Swedish publicist and writer on colonial affairs surveys the workings of economic imperialism in the Caribbean.

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By Denys P. Myers

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ABYSSINIA

CORRESPONDENCE respecting Abyssinian Raids and Incursions into British Territory and the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. London, 1928. 32 p. 24½ cm. (Abyssinia No. 1 (1928), Cmd. 3217.) 6d.

AIR NAVIGATION

ADDRESS of President Coolidge before the International Civil Aeronautics Conference. Washington, D. C., December 12, 1928. 5 p. 23½ cm.

INTERNATIONAL Commission for Air Navigation. Bulletin No. 14, October 1928. I. Official Acts Relating to the Air Convention of the 13th October 1919. II. Documents Relating to the Commission. 34, 75 p. 30½ cm.

ALIEN PROPERTY LIQUIDATION

8TH ANNUAL Report of the Controller of the Clearing Office, the Administrator of German, Austrian, Hungarian and Bulgarian Property and the Director of the Russian Claims Department. London, 1929. 59 p. 24½ cm. 2s. 6d.

U. S. TREASURY Department. Obligations of foreign governments receipts from Germany, and disposition of sequestrated alien property and payment of mixed claims; extract from the report of the Secretary of the treasury . . . for . . . 1927. Washington, 1928. 38 p.

ARBITRATION AND CONCILIATION—PAN AMERICAN

ADDRESS of President Coolidge before the Pan American Conference on Arbitration and Conciliation. Washington, D. C., December 10, 1928. 5 p. 23½ cm.

THE INTERNATIONAL Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration. Washington, December 10, 1928–January 5, 1929. General Convention of Inter-American Conciliation. General Treaty of Inter-American Arbitration. Protocol of Progressive Arbitration. Final Act. Protocol Between Bolivia and Paraguay. Washington, 1929. 97 p. 29 cm.

PROCEEDINGS of the International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration. Minutes of the First [–Fourth] Plenary Session, Washington, December 10, 1928 [–January 5, 1929].

———. Minutes of the Committee on Conciliation. First [–Second] Meeting, December 11, 1928 [–December 17, 1928].

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ARMAMENT—AGGRESSION

FINANCIAL Assistance to States Victims of Aggression. 1. Report of the Third Committee to the Ninth Ordinary Session of the Assembly. 2. Report to the Council, submitted by the Representative of Finland, and adopted on September 21, 1928. 3. Extracts from the Minutes of the Third Committee of the Ninth Ordinary Session of the Assembly (Meetings held on September 14 and 15, 1928). 9 p. 32½ cm. (League of Nations, 1928. IX. 14.)

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The protocol of January 3, 1929, is printed in *The International Conference of American States on Conciliation and Arbitration;* see above under Arbitration.

CHILD WELFARE

ADVISORY Commission for the Protection and Welfare of Children and Young People. Child Welfare Committee. The Age of Marriage and the Age of Consent. Geneva, 1928. 32 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. P. E. (2). Revised. 1928. IV. 20.)

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CHINA

THE FINANCIAL Policy of the National Government, Republic of China. Policy Toward the Indebtedness of the Former Peking Government. The Credit of the Recent Nationalist Loans. By Chen Ping-Tsang. 9 p. 31 cm. (Reprinted from *The China Weekly Review*, Shanghai, China.) 50 cents.

A report by the ministry of finance of the Nationalist Government.

COMMERCIAL LAW

COMPARATIVE Study of American Legislation Governing Commercial Arbitration. 1928. 50 p. (Treasury Dept., Inter-American High Commission.) 10 cents.

THE JURIDICAL Status of Foreign Corporations in the American Republics. The Central Executive Council of the Inter-American High Commission. Washington, 1928. 128 p. 23½ cm. (English and Spanish text.)

SECTION ÉCONOMIQUE et financière du Secrétariat. Apercu des moyens directs et indirects mis dans les divers pays à la disposition des acheteurs ètrangers pour s'assurer de la qualité des marchandises dont ils deviennent acquéreurs dans ces pays. Genève, 1928. 136 p. 32 cm. (League of Nations, 1928. II. 38.)

AGREEMENT between His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and the Belgian Government to dispense with the Legalisation of certain Official Documents. Brussels, December 21, 1928. London, 1929. 7 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 3 (1929), Cmd. 3260.) 2d.

COMMERCIAL TREATIES

EXCHANGE of Notes recording a Provisional Commercial Agreement between Egypt and Palestine. Cairo, June 6, 1928. Jerusalem, June 21, 1928. London, 1928. 4 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 26 (1928), Cmd. 3236.) 1d. net.

NOTES Exchanged between His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and the Government of Spain for a modification of the Anglo-Spanish Commercial Treaty of October 31, 1922, as revised by the Convention of April 5, 1927. Madrid, May 31, 1928. London, 1928. 6 p. 24½ cm. (Treaty Series No. 28 (1928), Cmd. 3247.) 2d. net.

COUNTERFEITING

COUNTERFEITING Currency. Summary of the Observations received from Governments up to December 6, 1928, on the Report of the Mixed Committee for the Suppression of Counterfeiting Currency, and on the Draft Convention drawn up by the Committee, October 1927. Geneva, 1928. 30 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, C. 607. M. 185. 1928. II. 54.)

COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE, PERMANENT

AGREEMENT between His Majesty's Government in Great Britain and the Governments of Germany, Denmark, France, Sweden and Czechoslovakia and the Government of Poland to Submit the Question of the Territorial Limits of the Jurisdiction of the International Commission of the Oder to the Decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice. London, October 30, 1928. 1929. 5 p. 24 cm. (Treaty Series No. 1 (1929), Cmd. 3250.) 2d.

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CASE concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits). September 13, 1928. 105 double pages. 24¼ cm. Collection of Judgments. Series A, No. 17.)

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———. TWELFTH (Ordinary) Session. Documents relating to Judgment No. 11 (December

16, 1927). Interpretation of Judgments Nos. 7 and 8 (The Chorzów Factory). 92 double pages. 24½ cm. (Series C, No. 13–V.)

———. THIRTEENTH (Extraordinary) Session. Documents relating to Advisory Opinion No. 15 (March 3, 1928). Jurisdiction of the Danzig Courts (Action by Certain Railway Officials against the Polish Administration). 592 double pages. 24½ cm. (Series C, No. 14–I.)

———. FOURTEENTH (Ordinary) Session. Documents relating to Judgment No. 13 (September 13, 1928). Case concerning the Factory at Chorzów (Claim for Indemnity) (Merits). 568 double pages. 24½ cm. (Series C, No. 15–II.)

ECONOMIC STATISTICS

INTERNATIONAL Conference Relating to Economic Statistics (November 26–December 14, 1928). 1. International Convention relating to Economic Statistics. 2. Protocol to the International Convention. 3. Final Act of the Conference. Geneva, 1928. 79 double pages. 33 cm. (League of Nations, 1928. II. 52.)

FRANCE—FINANCE

FRENCH National Finance and Stabilization. By Henry C. MacLean. Washington, 1928, ii, 22 p. 23¼ cm. (Trade Information Bulletin No. 586.) 10 cents.

REPORT on Economic Conditions in France in 1928. London, 1928. 5s.

This annual report by H. G. Cahil of the British Embassy is highly regarded, and the present issue has attracted special attention.

GUATEMALA—HONDURAS

HONDURAS. Ministerio de relaciones exteriores. Limites entre Honduras y Guatemala. Tegucigalpa, Tipografia nacional,1928. 112 p.

INDIA

CONSTITUTIONAL Reforms. Views of Local Governments on the Working of the Reforms, 1927. Calcutta, 1928. 525 p. 5s. 8d.

ACCOUNTS and Estimates, 1928–29, with explanatory memorandum. London, 1928. 9d.

LABOR

INTERNATIONAL Labour Organisation. Draft Conventions and Recommendations adopted by the International Labour Conference at its Eleven Sessions held 1919–1928. Geneva, International Labour Office, 1928. 158 p. 24 cm. 40 cents.

MARITIME LAW

U. S. NAVAL WAR College, Newport. International law situations with solutions and notes, 1926. Washington, 1928. 124 p. 23½ cm.

MARITIME TONNAGE

ADVISORY and Technical Committee for Communications and Transit. Permanent Committee for Ports and Maritime Navigation. Technical Committee on Maritime Tonnage Measurement. Report on the Differences in the Existing Rules for Tonnage Measurement and in the Application Thereof and on the Establishment of a Uniform Method of Tonnage Measurement. Geneva, 1928. 91 p. 33 cm. (League of Nations, 1928. VIII. 2.)

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INTERNATIONAL Conference on Emigration and Immigration, 2d, Havana, 1928. Agenda of the Second International Emigration and Immigration Conference adopted by the Committee for the International Emigration and Immigration Conference. Havana, 1927. 7 p.

INTERNATIONAL Labour Office. Migration Laws and Treaties. Geneva, 1928. 3 vols. $5.00.

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NICARAGUA—An Economic and Financial Survey, prepared, at the request, of Nicaragua, under the auspices of the Department of State. By W. W. Cumberland. Washington, 1928. v, 178 p. 23 cm. 25 cents.

The survey and financial plan "represent the personal views of Doctor Cumberland," according to a prefatory note by the Department of State.

COMMERCE of Nicaragua. Latest Reports from Nicaraguan Official Sources. Washington, Pan American Union, 1928. 12 p. 23 cm. (Foreign Trade Series, No. 44, 1928.)

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TREATIES

LEAGUE OF NATIONS, Treaty Series. Publication of Treaties and International Engagements Registered with the Secretariat of the League of Nations. General Index No. 2 (Volumes XL–LXIII). 1925–1927. Geneva, 1928. 478 p. 24¾ cm.

COSTA RICA. Colección de tratados. San José de Costa Rica. Imp., Lib. y Enc. Alsina. 1927. En 4° 1 vol.

WORLD WAR

BRITISH DOCUMENTS on the Origins of the War 1898–1914. Edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. Vol. V. The Near East — The Macedonian Problem and the Annexation of Bosnia 1903–1909. London, 1928. 886 p. 27½ cm. 18s. Od. Net.

DER WAFFENSTILLSTAND 1918–1919. Das Dokumenten-Material der Waffenstillstand-Verhandlungen von Compiègne, Spa, Trier und Brussel. Herausgegeben im Auftrage der Deutschen Waffenstillstand-Kommission. Berlin, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft Fur Politik und Geschichte, 1928. 3 vols.

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ZEITKALENDER der Diplomatischen Akten des Auswärtigen Amtes 1871–1914. Synchronistische Zusammenstellung der Dokumente der Grossen Aktenpublikation des Auswärtigen Amtes nach ihren Absendungsdaten. Von Bernard Schwertfeger. Berlin, Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft Fur Politik und Geschichte, 1928. 280 p. 24¾ cm.

A chronological index to the contents of *Die Grosse Politik der Europäischen Kabinette, 1871–1914*.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE RELEASES

The Department of State, Division of Current Information, issues to the press copies of documents made public from time to time. Recent releases are listed below, with identifying numbers. Application for authentic copies should be made to the Division of Current Information, Department of State, Washington, D. C. They are mimeographed and are to be distinguished from publications of the Department which issue from the Government Printing Office.

ADDRESSES — Remarks broadcast by Secretary of State Kellogg, on visit of Argentine training ship, *Presidente Sarmiento*, Oct. 23, S. D. 491, Oct. 22.

Address by Secretary of State Kellogg, before World Alliance for International Friendship, New York City, S. D. 492, Nov. 11.

AUSTRIA — Announcement of Supreme Provincial Court of Vienna, reëstablishment of land registers in Vienna, S. D. 494, Nov. 27.

CANADA — Convention providing for beautification of Niagara River signed by American Minister at Ottawa and Prime Minister of Canada, S. D. 495, Jan. 2.

Smuggling conference to begin Jan. 7, Ottawa, S. D. 500, Dec. 28.

CONFERENCES — Report of American delegation to International Telegraph Conference, Brussels, Sept. 10–22, S. D. 496, Oct. 25.

American representation in International Conference on Economic Statistics, Geneva, Nov. 26, S. D. 497, Nov. 13.

American delegate to Third Session of League of Nations Special Commission on manufacture of arms, Geneva, Dec. 5, S. D. 498, Nov. 22.

Invitations to all countries to First International Hospital Congress, Atlantic City, June 12, 1929, S. D. 499, Nov. 26.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA — Remarks of the Minister of Czechoslovakia, Dr. Ferdinand Veverka, upon presentation of his letters of credence, S. D. 502, Nov. 20.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE — Establishment of Translating Bureau, S. D. 503, Oct. 27.

ECUADOR — Remarks of the Minister of Ecuador, Gonzalo Zaldumbide, upon presentation of his letters of credence, S. D. 504, Nov. 19.

FRANCE — Summary of communication to French Government, Oct. 16, manner of valuation for customs purposes of French exports to United States, S. D. 505, Oct. 30.

GERMANY — Agreement with respect to submission to the Mixed Claims Commission, of late claims, S. D. 506, Jan. 2.

JAPAN — Remarks of Japanese Ambassador, Katsuji Debuchi, upon presentation of his letters of credence, S. D. 507, Oct. 24.

LIBERIA — Extract from President King's annual message to Liberian Legislature, Oct. 18, discussing American assistance in financial administration, S. D. 508, Oct. 25.

LITHUANIA — Remarks of Minister of Lithuania, Bronius K. Balutis, upon presentation of his letters of credence, S. D. 509, Nov. 2.

NARCOTICS — Memorandum adopted by the Council of the League of Nations concerning U. S. refusal to participate in selection of the Permanent Central Board, S. D. 510, Dec. 22.

NICARAGUA — Approval by the Foreign Service Buildings Commission of plans for minister's and secretary's residence and office building in Managua, S. D. 511, Nov. 16.

Letters regarding future supervision by the United States of elections in Nicaragua, S. D. 512, Oct. 24.

Report, on opening of polls, addressed to the Secretary of State, by Brig. Gen. Frank R. McCoy, President of American Electoral Mission in Nicaragua, S. D. 513, Nov. 4.

Message from President Coolidge to President of Nicaragua and General McCoy congratulating them on management of the elections, S. D. 518, Nov. 9.

Report from General McCoy on the elections, S. D. 519, Nov. 13.

Text of telegram from President Diaz to President Coolidge, in reply to the latter's telegram of congratulations, S. D. 520, Nov. 14.

Final canvass of vote by National Board of Elections, S. D. 521, Dec. 7.

American Electoral Mission information report, S. D. 522, Dec. 17.

Exchange of messages between M. Cordero Reyes, Minister of Foreign Relations of Nicaragua, and Secretary of State concerning General Moncada's election to the Presidency, and Cabinet, S. D. 523, Jan. 5.

RADIOTELEGRAPH CONFERENCE — Announcement by International Bureau of the Telegraph Union that a European Broadcasting Conference will be held at Prague, April 4–13, S. D. 524, Jan. 15.

Arrangement between United States and Canada, effective Jan. 1, concerning exchange of communications between private experimental stations in the United States, its territories and possessions, and Canada, S. D. 525, Jan. 18.

U. S. accepts invitation of Canada to attend conference at Ottawa to discuss allocation of short wave radio channels on this continent, S. D. 526, Jan. 19.

REPARATIONS — Statement by the Secretary of State *re* visit of British Ambassador to inquire regarding attitude to appointment of American Experts on commission, S. D. 527, Dec. 24.

Statement indicating reply of the Secretary of State, S. D. 528, Dec. 24.

TREATIES — List summarizing action taken by countries invited to adhere to the General Pact for the Renunciation of War, S. D. 529, Jan. 17.

List of countries which have signed Arbitration and Conciliation treaties with the United States; also list of countries with which negotiations for such treaties are in progress, S. D. 530, Jan. 21.